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This dissertation examines the relationship between organized labor and the 
mainstream environmental movement in the United States between 1970 and 1985. It 
explores this relationship through the critical lenses of three issues (economic 
development, energy, and occupational safety and health), which were central to 
nearly all interactions between organized labor and environmental organizations in 
this period.  I argue that, contrary to popular belief, the two movements collaborated 
with one another consistently throughout this period.  Their cooperative activity, 
sustained through considerable effort, was partially responsible for building and 
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In 2006, when the state of California announced that a new, $7 billion Bay Bridge 
connecting the cities of Oakland and San Francisco would be built using steel 
imported from China, much of the outcry from the United Steelworkers of America 
(USW) was predictable.  The union bemoaned this most recent sign of the loss of 
American manufacturing business, the effect the decision would have on steel jobs in 
the United States, the unfairness of having to compete with low-paid Chinese 
workers, and the inferior quality of Chinese steel.  However, in addition to these 
responses, the USW officials sounded another note in their defense of American steel 
– a note of environmentalism.  “American jobs are at stake and so is the health of the 
planet,” claimed International President Leo Gerard.  “Steel-related pollution levels 
are up to twenty times higher per ton in China than in the U.S., it lacks the 
infrastructure to enforce the laws on the books, and its air and water standards are 
much lower than here.”
1
  Citing a report from the Alliance for American 
Manufacturing, the Steelworkers’ complaints are easily summarized: “China’s steel 
industry is not only harming the health of its own people, but spreading pollution 
around the world and contributing to global warming. At the same time, China 
                                                 
1
 The Bay Bridge controversy has been going on for several years, for news coverage, see Richard 
Gonzales, “California Turns to China for New Bay Bridge, NPR News September 16, 2011; “Bridge 
Comes to San Francisco with a Made-in-China Label,” New York Times June 26, 2011; “New Report 
Focuses on Failures of China’s Environmental Regulation,” USW News, March 23, 2009.  Quotes 
come from USW article. 
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benefits economically from its failure to control pollution, giving it a significant 
advantage over its foreign competitors.”
2
 
 Impartial observers can be forgiven for taking the Steelworkers’ position with 
surprise, suspicion, or a little bit of both.  Remembering famous instances of conflicts 
between union workers and environmentalists, such as that over old growth logging 
in the Pacific Northwest, Americans have come to see the relationship between the 
two as inherently conflictual.  The hostility between the so-called “blues” and 
“greens” is framed in the popular imagination as a competition between two 
irreconcilably opposed processes: economic development and natural resource 
preservation.  In this zero-sum game, there is little opportunity for compromise and 
even less willingness to do so.   
 Conflicts between environmentalists and unions are real, of course, and at 
many points over the past forty years they have been substantial.  Actors on both 
sides have made news excoriating the other for years.  Decades ago, when Earth First! 
founder Dave Foreman wrote in his autobiography/manifesto Confessions of an Eco-
Warrior “it is the sturdy yeoman from the bumpkin proletariat who holds the most 
violent and destructive attitudes toward the natural world,” he drew on a long-
standing thread of radical environmental thinking that blamed modern industrial work 
patterns for much of the world’s environmental degradation.
3
  And in 2012, when 
Laborers International Union of North America president Terry O’Sullivan 
categorized the Sierra Club and Natural Resources Defense Council as “delusional 
environmental groups which stand in the way of creating good, much needed 
                                                 
2
 “New Report Focuses on Failures of China’s Environmental Regulation,” USW News. 
3
 Dave Foreman, Confessions of an Eco-Warrior (New York: Crown Trade, 1991), 31. 
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American jobs,” and as “job killers... out to destroy the lives of working men and 
women,” for their opposition to the Keystone XL pipeline, he was participating in a 
critique of environmentalism that goes back even further.
4
  These heated exchanges 
reinforce the notion that unionists and environmentalists exist largely, if not 
exclusively, in a state of mutual antagonism.    
This dissertation argues that this cut and dried picture of inter-movement 
hostility is misguided.  Although there are multiple examples of blue-green conflict, 
particularly on the local level, the interaction between the two social movements on 
the national level has been far more complex and oftentimes cooperative.  There, the 
relationship between environmental organizations and unions defied easy 
characterization, rising and falling multiple times between 1970 and 1985.  During 
this period, cooperation was more common than competition, as unions and 
environmental organizations frequently collaborated with one another for mutual gain 
and displays of outright hostility were minimal.  As importantly, even at times when 
positive exchanges were limited, there were always individuals within each group that 
counseled forming stronger bonds and worked to extend the boundaries of labor-
environmental mutuality. 
This dissertation explores the work that went into forming and maintaining 
those bonds.  For organizations on both sides of the blue-green spectrum, this process 
was based as much on internal reflection as external negotiation.  Establishing cross-
movement partnerships meant that labor and environmental leaders had to continually 
assess their own and their constituents’ political priorities.  And while finding 
                                                 
4
 O’Sullivan quoted in Jane McAlevey, “Unions and Environmentalists: Get It Together!” The Nation, 
May 7, 2012. 
 4 
 
common cause with potential alliance partners was essential, that process often 
involved a less delicate balancing act than did managing intra-organization dynamics.  
Coalition builders were often forced to overcome suspicion and inertia, but by doing 
so, they brought about sustained contact between workers and environmentalists to 
the benefit of both.  
From the early 1970s to the mid-1980s three issues shaped the relationship 
between organized labor and the environmental movement more than any others: 
energy, economic development, and occupational safety and health.  These three 
issues were, in one form or another, at the heart of nearly all labor-environmental 
interaction during the period, and they provide the thematic scaffolding on which this 
history is built.  The first chapter provides an overview of organized labor’s 
relationship to the environment and environmentalism in the postwar period.  It 
argues that the labor movement was a strong proponent of environmentalism in the 
years prior to Earth Day, and that this pro-environment perspective brought it into 
positive, if infrequent, contact with the conservation-oriented Sierra Club.  Earth Day, 
the subject of chapter two, brought the two movements even closer together.  In the 
wake of the event, unions and environmental organizations came together to push for 
strict national pollution control regulation and expanded rights for workers to 
determine what toxic materials they would come into contact with on the job.   
Both energy and economic development became increasingly prominent 
concerns for the nation in the mid-1970s,  and the shifting place those two issues 
played in labor-environmental relations is explored more deeply in chapters three and 
four.  These chapters argue that, contrary to current historical consensus, the energy 
 5 
 
crisis of 1973 played a relatively minor role in the weakening of the blue-green 
alliance at that time.  Instead, the decline is primarily attributable to the recession that 
began at roughly the same time.  Employers’ ability to use the fear of job loss to 
forestall environmental reform peaked at that time, and environmental activists 
struggled to maintain their ties to the labor movement.  Ironically, energy provided 
one of the few continuing avenues of blue-green cooperation, as the two sides worked 
together to craft a national coal regulatory system that would keep miners safe and the 
air relatively clear. 
The final two chapters examine how the labor and environmental movements 
rebuilt their coalition beginning in the late 1970s.  Chapter five argues that a string of 
political defeats pushed the progressive wing of the labor movement to seek a 
broadened base of support, which it attempted to create through a series of mass 
coalition initiatives with liberal social movement organizations.  Though not 
exclusively aimed at environmentalists, these coalitions brought unions back into 
contact with organizations such as the Sierra Club and familiarized each with topics 
of mutual interest, such as occupational safety and health.  As chapter six shows, fear 
of deregulation during the first Reagan administration pushed the two sides even 
closer, leading to the formation of the OSHA/Environmental Network, a national 
organization committed to defending OSHA and the Clean Air Act.  This 
organization was very successful over its multi-year run, and inspired similar state-
level initiatives that likewise prospered.   
Although the popular imagination has it that the relationship between 
environmentalists and workers has always been dominated by confrontation, in the 
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past twenty-five years, a growing field of academic scholarship has emerged to offer 
a far more nuanced perspective. The theoretical foundations of the field were laid by 
environmental historians such as Richard White and William Cronon, who were some 
of the earliest proponents of integrating working-class and environmental history.
5
 
These scholars, pointing out the absurdity of disassociating environment and work, 
inspired generations of scholars to reexamine old events through new interpretive 
lenses. Since that time, a complicated picture has emerged at the intersections of 
space, class, landscape, and production.  Historians have problematized the 
conceptual dualities of “natural” and “urban,” “leisure” and “work,” and 
“environmentalist” and “worker,” demonstrating that the boundaries between these 
notions are at best ill-defined and are at worst distractions from understanding more 
fundamental historical processes.
6
   
Considering the dominant position that environmental historians enjoyed in 
driving the development of this literature, there is no small amount of irony in the fact 
that it is actually quite labor-centric.  Much of this scholarship focuses on the 
landscape-altering experience of extractive work or the ideas and actions of workers, 
while environmental movement actors have received short shrift.  Thus, we 
understand the choices faced by workers in dealing with pollution of their bodies and 
                                                 
5
 Richard White, “’Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?’: Work and Nature,” 
in Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature, ed. William Cronon (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1995): 171-185; William Cronon, “Modes of Prophecy and Production: Placing Nature in History,” 
Journal of American History 77 (Winter, 1990). 
6
 White himself challenges these distinctions in “Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a 
Living?” but subsequent scholars have probed the issue even more deeply. Good starting points in this 
historiography include Maureen A. Flanagan, “Environmental Justice in the City: A Theme for Urban 
Environmental History,” Environmental History 5, no. 2 (April 2000): 159-164; Arthur F. McEvoy, 
“Working Environments: An Ecological Approach to Industrial Health and Safety,” Technology and 
Culture 36 (supplement 1995): S145-S172; Karl Jacoby, Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, 




communities, and how they have dealt with these problems along a spectrum of 
reactions between fighting and ignoring them.
7
  But we know far less about how and 
to what extent environmentalists used class to structure their own analyses of 
environmental threats.  We have learned how workers’ institutions, including the 
UAW, were pioneers in calling for federal regulations to control pollution and protect 
the wilderness, but we know relatively little about the ways in which environmental 
organizations altered their agendas to appeal more to working people and unions.
8
  
Scholars have studied the outdoor recreational activity of workers, but none that I am 
aware of have focused any energy on the work habits of environmental professionals, 
for whom activism pays their bills.   
In this dissertation I attempt to avoid the labor-centric position that has 
characterized so much of the existing literature.  This is not just a history of how 
workers dealt with environmental problems or how unions demonstrated 
environmental savvy.  It is as much a story of how environmentalists learned to speak 
the language of the working class and to care about workers’ issues.  In offering a 
fuller examination of environmentalist efforts to build bridges with the labor 
movement, I offer insight into a movement whose motivations in dealing with 
organized labor have previously been unclear.  In particular, I demonstrate that the 
Sierra Club was a consistent voice for labor-environmental cooperation throughout 
                                                 
7
 For two prominent examples see Andrew Hurley, Environmental Inequalities: Race, Class, and 
Industrial Pollution in Gary, Indiana, 1945-1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1995); Laurie Mercier, Anaconda: Labor, Community, and Culture in Montana’s Smelter City 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001). 
8
 Scott Dewey, “Working for the Environment: Organized Labor and the Origins of Environmentalism 
in the United States, 1948-1970,” Environmental History 3, no. 1 (Jan., 1998); Chad Montrie, “A 
Decent, Wholesome Living for Everyone: Michigan Autoworkers and the Origins of Modern 
Environmentalism,” in Making a Living: Work and Environment in the United States (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2008). 
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the 1970s and early 1980s.  The Club, more than any other environmental 
organization, valued collaboration with unions, both for its own sake and for the 
strategic political benefits that it brought.  Although not everyone in the Sierra Club’s 
top echelons prioritized its relationship with labor, those who did were well-placed 
and numerous enough to maintain the organization’s commitment during even the 
most challenging of times.  
While historians have grappled with workers’ relationship to the environment, 
they have been less inclined to examine the relationship between workers’ institutions 
and environmental organizations. Those studies that do exist tend to present 
interaction – especially positive interaction – between the labor and environmental 
movements as sporadic and short-lived.  One of the earliest attempts to engage with 
the topic was Robert Gordon’s 1998 essay in Environmental History “‘Shell No:’ 
OCAW and the Labor-Environmental Alliance.”
9
  In it, Gordon describes the 1973 
strike against Shell Oil by the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union (OCAW) 
over the insertion of a health and safety clause into the union’s contract.  Gordon 
argues that an environmentalist boycott of Shell in support of the strike provided 
common ground on which the two movements organized for a few brief years, until 
the end of the decade when “confronted by concerted political opposition and 
economic recession... more conservative elements in both movements revived 
‘traditional’ values, marginalizing the most vocal advocates of continued 
cooperation.”
10
  Later scholars, such as Timothy Minchin in the 2003 Forging a 
Common Bond: Labor and Environmental Activism during the BASF Lockout, have 
                                                 
9
 Robert Gordon, “’Shell No!’: OCAW and the Labor-Environmental Alliance,” Environmental 
History 3, No. 4 (October, 1998): 460-187 
10
 Gordon, 462. 
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examined different incidents but drawn the same conclusions, that potential exists for 
labor-environmental partnership but that it is difficult to sustain in the long-term.
11
     
Political science, sociology, and other social science disciplines have also 
contributed a great deal to our knowledge of blue-green relations.  Scholars such as 
Brian Obach and Brian Mayer have explored the conditions that allow blue-green 
coalitions to thrive (or not), noted what kinds of organizations are most likely to seek 
out inter-movement collaboration, and have explored the social movement theoretical 
underpinnings of such collaborations.
12
  Obach’s 2004 Labor and the Environmental 
Movement: the Quest for Common Ground is representative of the best work of this 
genre.  Obach, primarily interested in the relationship between unions and 
environmental organizations since the 1980s, uses a series of case studies to argue 
that structural differences in the way that unions and environmental groups are 
organized (as opposed to inherent class differences between activists or 
fundamentally oppositional goals) explain the instability of blue-green alliances.  
Like that of many of the social scientists in the field, Obach’s work is well done and 
informative, but it is not historical.  Indeed, Obach condenses four decades of 
interaction into just over thirty pages.  Thus, while his analysis of the present is 
                                                 
11
 Timothy J. Minchin, Forging a Common Bond: Labor and Environmental Activism during the BASF 
Lockout (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003).  It is worth noting that the lockout described 
by Minchin, which also involved the OCAW partnering with environmentalists (this time in Louisiana) 
took place between 1985 and 1989.  So just when Gordon says their partnership collapsed, Minchin 
shows a new one on the rise. 
12
 Brian Obach, Labor and the Environmental Movement: the Quest for Common Ground (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2004); Brian Mayer, Blue-Green Coalitions: Fighting for Safe Workplaces and 
Healthy Communities (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008). For other social science 
engagement with the topic, see Dan Clawson, The Next Upsurge: Labor and the New Social 
Movements (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Fred Rose, Coalitions Across the Class 
Divide: Lessons from the Labor, Peace, and Environmental Movements (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2000); John C. Berg, ed. Teamsters and Turtles? U.S. Progressive Political 
Movements in the 21
st
 Century (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003); Michael Dreiling, “From 
Margin to Center: Environmental Justice and Social Unionism as Sites for Intermovement Solidarity,” 
Race, Gender, and Class 6, No. 1 (October, 1998): 51:63. 
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compelling, his understanding of the ways in which current events relate to earlier 
eras is somewhat suspect.  
While providing a venue for thorough exploration of individual moments in 
the relationship between organized labor and the environmental movement, the case-
study nature of the literature on this topic has two fundamental flaws.  First, because 
the authors present a series of independent interactions, each case takes on the 
appearance of an aberration, reinforcing the idea that moments of cooperation 
between unions and environmental organizations were uncommon.  Second, the 
temporal limits of this literature demonstrate the shallowness of our knowledge of the 
subject.  Because we lack a larger narrative, scholars struggle to judge which events 
are significant and which are not.  The same handful of stories – including the Shell 
strike in 1973, the founding of the group Environmentalists For Full Employment, 
and the staging of a couple of different conferences – get told and retold, but no 
concerted effort has been made to understand how they fit together.   Moments of 
relatively small import take on roughly equal weight to periods of major transition as 
each get repeated in introductions to the topic.  The few detailed studies that exist 
provide us with signposts, but the road itself is difficult to see.   
This dissertation is one attempt to provide that larger narrative.  By setting the 
story on the national level over a fifteen-year period, I have the opportunity to assess 
the significance of events both as they unfolded and as they echoed through the 
period.  This approach allows me to enter into the major debates of the literature with 
a fresh perspective.  For example, historians who have identified connections between 
labor and environmentalists in the postwar era claim that those connections collapsed 
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with the recession in the 1970s; others argue that blue-green interactions were just 
heating up in the 1970s, and only fell apart with in the 1980s.
13
   Both perceptions 
have some degree of merit – the relationship between unions and environmental 
organizations underwent a substantial shift in the 1970s, one that was accompanied 
by increasingly unfriendly interactions.  But that shift was far from fatal to coalition 
initiatives, nor was the renewed antagonism of the 1980s.  What appears to be the end 
of labor-environmental interaction from a short temporal approach can be understood 
as merely the end of a phase within a longer narrative.   
A national approach is made particularly valuable by the fact that much of the 
existing scholarship on this topic studies local interactions.  In some instances a 
combination of local studies can serve as a useful substitute for a national analysis, 
but that is not the case in this instance.  This is because the core issues of blue-green 
relations resonated differently at local levels than they did at national headquarters.  
For example, national organizations may have adopted policies about highway 
construction or toxic waste disposal, but they rarely expressed much concern over 
specific highway routes or dump sites.  However, the planning and development of 
roads and waste disposal sites caused considerable consternation to the communities 
that would be directly affected by them – often leading to sustained protest and 
resistance.  Such issues were, in fact, at the heart of urban environmental politics for 
several generations.
14
   
                                                 
13
 Chad Montrie is a good example of the former.  Robert Gordon is an example of the latter. 
14
 Many books have been written on the relationship between urban planning and environmentalism, 
especially working-class and minority environmentalism. One of the best is Jeffrey Craig Sanders, 
Seattle and the Roots of Urban Sustainability (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010). 
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As importantly, the clash between environmental politics and economic 
development evoked very different meanings on the local and national levels.  In his 
classic work Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the 
Twentieth Century, environmental historian Mark Dowie suggested that “if there is 
ever to be a rapprochement between labor and environmentalists” it would come at 
the local level, where the inherent unfairness of pitting jobs against the environment 
would show itself most starkly when the very people who needed the jobs were the 
ones being poisoned by pollution.
15
 However, this dissertation demonstrates that this 
was often not the case.  National leaders’ distance from labor-environmental conflict 
zones allowed them to take a cooler and more overarching approach to the issues 
involved.  For example, when environmental programs were accused of damaging the 
nation’s economy, national organization leaders could respond that environmental 
programs actually created more jobs than they destroyed.  However, net job gains in 
the economy were of little consolation to the residents of individual towns that faced 
high unemployment when local factories closed.  For this reason, the bitterest 
conflicts between workers and environmentalists often played themselves out at the 
local level, where the conflict was not about “jobs vs. the environment” but about 
“my job vs. my living conditions.”   
The differences between local and national organizing were also felt in the 
ways that groups mobilized politically.  Local organizations, particularly 
environmental organizations, tended to be ad hoc associations that came together to 
oppose specific threats to their communities.  These groups were generally short-
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 Mark Dowie, Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 159. 
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lived, but could attract enormous attention during their periods of active existence 
through direct action tactics.  National organizations could, and sometimes did, also 
use direct action to achieve their aims.  But it was a considerably less prominent tool 
on the national level.  Instead, national organizations relied far more heavily on 
insider approaches to politics based on quiet lobbying.  Partially because of their 
organizations’ money and influence, national leaders had more direct access to 
policymakers and were better positioned to personally affect major debates and 
legislation.  Because of this access, and because their words were disseminated 
widely on television and in newspapers, national leaders such as American Federation 
of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations President George Meany and Sierra 
Club Executive Director Michael McCloskey exercised an all together different form 
of sway over events than did a local union president or a community-based 
environmental activist.  
Because organizational motivations and methods often differed at different 
structural levels, the goals of national and local institutions rarely aligned precisely.  
And yet, the two levels depended on one another for their own success.  The political 
influence that national organizations exercised was premised on the fact that they 
could motivate thousands of local members across the country to take action for a 
particular cause.  At the same time, local campaigns could be won or lost depending 
on whether or not a national partner decided to commit resources to them.  The 
combination of these two facts – that national and local organizations depended on 
each other but often had differing interests – meant that, for both labor and 
environmental groups, the two structural levels coexisted in tension with one another. 
 14 
 
Despite these complications, the actions of the national groups remain an 
important framework for understanding local level struggles.  As far as policymakers 
and the public were concerned, national labor and environmental leaders determined 
their movements’ agendas.  Thus, local leaders often found themselves having to 
answer for the decisions of their national partners within their communities, whether 
they agreed with those decisions or not.  Moreover, local organizations often made 
decisions in reference to how those choices would play at national headquarters.  
Whether or not the locals would be able to expect the support of the national 
organizations – or if they would have to defend  their ideas against a hostile national 
bureaucracy – influenced local thinking, encouraging local leaders to adopt positions 
that were in-line with the desires of the national bureaucracy.  Of course, rank and file 
members also exerted pressure upwards, shaping national considerations.  But again, 
in these instances their success or failure is measured by the degree to which local 
ideas shaped national institutions.  Understanding national prerogatives is essential 
for understanding the context in which local organizers operated and the relationship 
between the two levels of structure.      
Though a national perspective is appropriate for this subject, a study on such a 
large scale also carries with it some potential problems, the most pressing of which is 
the tendency to generalize or to collapse distinctions between different groups of 
actors.  This dissertation is framed around the relationship between the labor and 
environmental movements, but those two groups were not internally united.  Each 
movement was composed of a multifaceted variety of individuals, ad hoc 
assemblages, and formal organizations, each with its own goals, ideology, and 
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political sensibility.  The distinctions between these figures could at times be so great 
that it would be fair to question whether or not scholars should instead discuss various 
“labor movements” and “environmental movements” to better account for such 
discrepancy.  However, while the terms “labor movement” and “environmental 
movement” can be problematic, they are also useful for their ability to easily 
demarcate between the two kinds of associations that are key to my analysis: those 
groups that claim to represent working people and those that claim to speak for the 
good of the environment.  Their use in this dissertation is not meant to imply that the 
actions or beliefs I describe were universal among union members or environmental 
activists, and should instead be understood as signifying a useful, if flawed, 
generalization.    
In examining the relationship between two of the nation’s largest social 
movements, I focus my attention on the dynamics of organizational interaction.  
Numerous organizations move in and out of the story where appropriate, including 
the International Association of Machinists (IAM), International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters (IBT), United Steelworkers of America (USW), and OCAW on the union 
side and the Friends of the Earth (FOE) and Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC) among the environmentalists.  However, three organizations – the American 
Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the United 
Auto Workers (UAW), and the Sierra Club – are of particular importance.  These 
organizations were the largest and most politically influential within their respective 
movements, and their high degree of willingness to seek partnerships across the blue-
green divide (particularly the UAW and Sierra Club) make them ideal subjects for a 
 16 
 
study of this sort.  At the same time, the qualities that made these organization 
exceptional do make their experiences less relatable across other organizations.  
However, though their responses were sometimes different than those of their union 
or environmental peers, the issues that confronted the Sierra Club, UAW, and AFL-
CIO in forming and maintaining their relationships with each other were the same as 
those faced by all organizations.  
 Although the questions at the heart of this dissertation are specific to the labor 
and environmental movements, the organizational focus of this dissertation also 
makes it clear that this history plays out in a context that makes its lessons applicable 
to a variety of social movement groups.  As other commentators have asserted, this 
was a period of professionalization and bureaucratization for most major 
organizations.  It was also a time when the political power of national groups came to 
be based around asserting certain areas of expertise rather than from the lived 
experience of workplace exploitation or neighborhood poisoning.
16
  My work 
engages with this process, suggesting that the transition to professional, leadership-
driven structures was not always associated with the realignment of institutional 
priorities in a more conservative direction.  In the case of the Sierra Club it was the 
professional staff that pushed the organization to embrace new issues and reach out to 
new collaborators. 
Moreover, this narrative serves as a reminder of just how important leadership 
was for U.S. social movements as they underwent large-scale transformation at the 
                                                 
16
 Such works debate the relative importance of memberships within modern social movement 
organizations compared to their professional staffs.  See Christopher J. Bosso, Environment, Inc.: 
From Grassroots to Beltway (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005); Ronald G. Shaiko, Voices 
and Echoes for the Environment: Public Interest Representation in the 1990s and Beyond (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999). 
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end of the twentieth century.  While top leaders had to remain responsive to the needs 
and desires of their membership to some extent, they were often able to chart a course 
of action for their organizations that pulled members in potentially unwanted 
directions.  The clearest example of this trend came in the late 1970s, when a clique 
of progressive new voices emerged at the top of several unions and brought those 
groups back into the fold of inter-movement solidarity.  A similar but less sudden 
pattern was also apparent in the Sierra Club throughout that decade, as the group’s 
professional staff consistently prodded the grassroots to embrace new issues, such as 
pollution, international environment, and workplace health and safety.   
Unfortunately, my focus on institutional structures and elite decision making 
has limited the role played by minority and female participants in this dissertation.  In 
part, this absence of diverse voices reflects a bias of sources.  Even as the AFL-CIO’s 
and UAW’s memberships became increasingly female and African American in the 
1970s and 1980s, their top leaders remained mostly white.  The leadership of the 
Sierra Club, while somewhat less male dominated than organized labor’s, was even 
more racially homogenous; Allison Chin, the organization’s first non-white president, 
did not take office until 2008.
17
  The limited range of life experiences from which 
national leaders drew extensively shaped their ideas about social movement 
organizing.  It led them to focus their efforts on certain areas of the country and to 
discount certain populations as impossible to organize.  As importantly, the limited 
perspectives held by the white male national leaderships of labor and environmental 
organizations led them to consider some issues to be more worthy of attention than 
others.  For example, the AFL-CIO’s firm support for nuclear power throughout the 
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1970s and 1980s largely ignored the dangers nuclear plants and waste disposal sites 
posed to the communities – primarily communities of color – that lived nearest to 
those potentially harmful locations.  By writing a history that is focused on 
organizations, I am in some ways writing a history of institutional decision makers.  
Just as race and sex limited the policy decisions made by these actors, so too do they 
shape the narrative that follows. 
Non-white and female activists, excluded from the power centers in organized 
labor and mainstream environmental organizations, were often forced to operate 
outside these established institutions.  In so doing, these broader, unorganized or 
loosely organized parties contributed an important dynamic to labor and 
environmental politics. They often struck a considerably more radical tone than the 
leaders of mainstream organizations.  By doing so, they pulled the conversation to the 
left, urging less compromising and more anti-corporate solutions to environmental 
and labor conflicts.  Moreover, they also injected urban environmental concerns 
firmly into the era’s policy debates.  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, as the growth 
of the female and minority memberships transformed mainstream organizations, this 
influence also grew and helped to reinvigorate blue-green organizing around 
occupational health and safety and toxic substances control.   
Lack of women and minorities in key leadership positions is only one of many 
criticisms that have been made against the AFL-CIO, UAW, and Sierra Club over the 
years.  Detractors on the right have frequently decried both organized labor and 
environmentalism as radical movements that are out of step with the American 
mainstream and as special interests that care little about the good of society as a 
 19 
 
whole as long as their own narrow causes are serviced.  Meanwhile, the left has also 
been highly critical of many unions and environmental organizations, especially the 
AFL-CIO and the Sierra Club.  Activists have seen these groups as too 
accommodating of business, too gentle in their dealings with political elites, and too 
unwilling to innovate new approaches to organizing.  The academic left has been no 
more kind.  Scholars have criticized the leaders of both the UAW and the AFL-CIO 
for being isolated from the needs of their members and for scapegoating immigrants, 
foreign workers, and non-labor activists to cover up their own failings.
18
  In addition, 
we are told by environmental historians including Dowie, Robert Gottlieb, and 
William Cronon that the Sierra Club, as well as other mainstream environmental 
organizations, have failed to demonstrate any concern for the needs of the city, the 
poor, or the nonwhite.
19
  Historian Brian Allen Drake perfectly summarized the 
impression left by this literature when he wrote “while poor non-whites and working 
people in the postwar period breathed dirty air, drank dirty water, and were routinely 
exposed to safety hazards on and off the job, the Sierra Club and others... skipped 
blithely down the primrose path of national park preservation and white-middle-class 
escape fantasies of wilderness preservation.”
20
    
 This dissertation suggests that, at least in some cases, the criticism from the 
academic left goes a little too far.  While the Club’s main constituency was (and to 
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some extent still is) clearly limited, and while the AFL-CIO was slow to adapt to 
changing political circumstances, it is incorrect to say that either was incapable of 
working beyond their narrowly defined boundaries.  The sort of cross-movement 
collaboration that is studied here shows that labor organizations were aware of the 
need to experiment with new connections and that the environmental movement was 
open to engaging with the environmental problems faced by the working class.  
Certainly none of these organizations are perfect exemplars of unfailing 
progressivism.  But, a nuanced examination of their top-level priorities shows that 
they were also not blind to the issues that historians would raise later.  
 This work suggests the need for historians to deal more explicitly with the 
state of American liberalism at the close of the twentieth century.  Recent historical 
scholarship has emphasized the ways in which conservatism shaped the era, through 
grassroots networking, conservative movement organizing, and high politics – the 
work of Lisa McGirr, Kevin Kruse, Sean Wilentz, and Matthew Lassiter are just the 
tip of the iceberg of the new history of conservatism.
21
 This interest is reasonable, 
considering the ascendant position of conservative politics in the United States at the 
moment.  However, such an emphasis is also constraining.  Liberals – including the 
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Democratic Party and its main allies in the labor, environmental, women’s rights and 
urban reform movements – have been largely written out of this history or portrayed 
as demoralized and ineffectual standard bearers for an increasingly unpopular 
politics. 
 However, the historiographic emphasis on the rise of conservatism is 
problematic.  The success of conservative efforts to unmake the New Deal order has 
been overstated, as has standard declension narrative of liberal defeat and retreat.  
This dissertation seeks to integrate liberal social movements more fully into the story 
of the twentieth century’s final decades by showing that, though a major 
reorganization of U.S. politics was underway, liberals continued to exercise influence 
over the shape of emerging social legislation.  Liberal movement organizations and 
their political allies regularly checked Republican ambitions, effectively blocking or 
redirecting what they felt to be the worst excesses of the conservative platform.  And 
while Republicans were forced to accept a series of half measures on the federal 
level, liberal activists applied pressure on the states, creating a stronger, if more 
piecemeal, system of regulation than had ever existed previously.  These activists 
efforts were particularly adept regarding key regulatory provisions protecting 
workers, consumers, and the environment.   
 As importantly, belying the image of a movement that had given up, these 
liberal groups continued to experiment with new forms of organizing.  In establishing 
inter-movement connections, blue-green collaborators not only pushed the boundaries 
of established institutional norms, they also attempted to devise distinctive political 
processes in response to evolving social circumstances.  As the focus of regulatory 
 22 
 
champions shifted from expanding the regulatory state to entrenching it, liberal social 
movement organizations drew upon deep reserves of support and influence to 
maintain the standards that had been constructed in earlier years.  In this way, 
episodes of blue-green coalition building present historians with an opportunity to 
explore what allows or prevents political renewal and to sort out the underlying 






Chapter 1: The Golden Post-War Years, 1945-1969 
 
In October, 1946, representatives of American government, business, and 
conservation interests met in Washington, D.C., to reestablish the nation’s forest 
policy for the postwar period.  The American Forest Congress, as these meetings 
were called, had met periodically at the end of the nineteenth century, but not at all 
for several decades.  The previous event, held in 1905, had been dominated by 
President Theodore Roosevelt’s call to protect the nation’s forests in the interests of 
posterity.  “You are mighty poor Americans,” he told the assembled crowd, “if your 
care for the well being of this country is limited to hoping that that well being will 
last out your own generation. No man here or elsewhere is entitled to call himself a 
decent citizen if he does not try to do his part toward seeing that our national policies 
are shaped for the advantage of our children and our children's children.” The 
Congress’ aim was not preservation necessarily but conservation, maintaining the 
forests’ existence for the use of future generations, and because, in the words of 
Roosevelt, “if the forest is destroyed it is only a question of a relatively short time 
before the business interests suffer in consequence.”
22
 
 At the Congress of 1946 the goal of natural resource conservation remained 
the same, but much had changed in the intervening years.  First, the preservationist 
instincts of the New Deal’s Civilian Conservation Corps influenced the proceedings 
and contributed to a sense that the nation’s forests had value beyond their commercial 
worth.  Second, while Theodore Roosevelt had wanted business interests to preserve 
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the forests themselves, both out of self interest and out of moral obligation, the 1946 
Congress was more positive about the role government could play in forest 
protection.   Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson promoted the idea of 
“government control of cutting and other destructive practices in private forests.”  
Finally, the biggest change apparent at the 1946 Congress was the active role played 
by representatives of American workers, who now saw a major stake for themselves 
in the fate of America’s forests.  The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) not 
only accepted the government’s requested prohibitions but even asked to strengthen 
them.  Its leaders called for preservation of America’s old growth forests through 
“federal regulation of commercial cutting operations on private timber lands... 
retention permanently of all government-owned forest land, and expanded 
appropriations for additional forest land acquisitions by the Federal Government.”
23
  
 The CIO’s strong stand for environmental protection at the 1946 American 
Forest Congress exemplifies the growing awareness of environmental issues among 
American workers in the postwar period.  Not only was the loot-and-pillage industrial 
mentality of some earlier (and later) unions absent, but here was labor calling for 
federal regulation for the protection, not just the controlled destruction, of the 
environment.  While recognizing that some resources and areas should be conserved 
for the use of future generations, the postwar labor movement also saw the need to 
preserve certain places as off-limits to industry.  This sort of thinking was especially 
apparent in the more socially inclined unionism associated with the CIO, but it was 
not wholly absent from even the more conservative, bread-and-butter unionism of the 
American Federation of Labor (AFL).  After 1955, when the two organizations 
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merged, the former CIO’s biggest member unions, such as the United Auto Workers 
(UAW), remained committed to large chunks of what can be considered a proto-
environmentalist agenda, while the newly created AFL-CIO Industrial Union 
Department (IUD, the successor to the independent CIO) carried the conservation 
banner in the umbrella organization.    
This chapter explores the origins and development of postwar labor 
environmentalism.  As a growing historical literature on the subject the shows, the 
distinction between environmentalists on one hand and workers on the other would 
not have resonated for most laborers in that period.  Many of them were sportsmen, 
campers, or hikers – people who enjoyed the same outdoor recreational pursuits as the 
conservationists of the day.
24
  During a period of rising wages, decreasing hours, and 
longer vacations for their members, many unions found it important to make sure that 
workers would continue to have a place to participate in their favorite leisure 
activities.  Union recreation departments moved beyond the simple organizing and 
promoting of events, and began to lobby for improved access to parks and the 
protection of other green spaces. 
But the postwar labor movement went well beyond that, foreshadowing the 
shape of modern environmentalism more than a decade before the latter’s emergence 
by joining a desire for wilderness protection with a concern with urban pollution.  At 
that time, unions such as the United Auto Workers began developing an intellectual 
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critique of the industrial world that tied the preservation of the natural world to the 
cause of urban public health through their shared threat of pollution.  Unions lobbied 
for clean water and clean air laws, and they fought for increased protections for 
workers’ safety and health on the job.  According to historian Scott Dewey, “during 
the stable, prosperous, ‘golden years’ of the late 1950s and early 1960s... unions were 
in the unusual position of showing concern about pollution and related threats to 
human health before most conservation organizations, and expressing interest in 
wilderness conservation before other pollution fighters and public health 
advocates.”
25
   
The labor environmentalism of the postwar era established a foundation on 
which later labor-environmentalist cooperation could grow.  This chapter argues that 
labor environmentalism in this period was constructed around the tripartite themes of 
natural resource conservation, wilderness protection, and urban/industrial health.  The 
initiatives that postwar unions engaged in, from wilderness planning to pollution 
control, mirrored – and sometimes even overshot – the campaigns of contemporary 
conservationists.  These causes, championed by the CIO and United Auto Workers, 
sometimes brought these groups into contact with organizations such as the Sierra 
Club, but they more commonly did not.  Instead, postwar unions charted an 
independent course to environmental consciousness that they would later draw on in 
forming links to the environmental movement in the 1970s.  As long as the rising 
tides of the postwar era appeared to be lifting all American boats, there did not appear 
to be much cause for conflict when industry and environment were at odds.  Chances 
were good, it was assumed, that a solution could be found.  The United States could – 
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and should – have high wages, full employment, healthy air, clean water, and green 
places to play.  Nothing less would do.   
Natural Resources 
The CIO’s firmly pro-conservation position at the American Forest Congress grew 
out of larger historical trends in the first half of the twentieth century.  The first 
centered around ongoing debates about the proper use of public spaces and the federal 
government’s role in maintaining them.  For about the first sixty-five years of the 
twentieth century, public land and resource management policy was at the heart of 
environmental politics.  Conservationists lobbied for the creation of government 
agencies that would be responsible for overseeing public lands and encouraged those 
agencies to maintain tight quotas and strict guidelines for resource extraction by 
private interests.  Conservationist goals contrasted sharply with pressures from 
industry groups concentrated in timber, mining, and ranching that pushed for fewer 
restrictions and more open use of natural resources.  Conflicts between these rival 
visions resulted in confusion within government agencies such as the Forest Service, 
who were tasked with maintaining order.  “There,” to quote environmental policy 
scholar Jacqueline Vaughn, “competing goals of protection, regulation, and public 
use... led to decades of conflict within the agency and outside of government.”
26
 
   Debates over the proper role of federal agencies in administering public lands 
were mapped onto and deeply entangled with changing notions about the ultimate 
purpose of those lands in Congress and the White House.  For most of the nineteenth 
century the operating assumption had been that it was the government’s duty to 
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liquidate those holdings to private or state interests as rapidly as good order would 
permit.  However, by the turn of the twentieth century, many people had come to the 
realization that long-term federal ownership of public lands might contribute to the 
common good.  Beginning in the Progressive era, and accelerating through the New 
Deal, the government increasingly worked to manage public lands and the resources 
they contained, not just possess them.  During World War II, the federal government 
entered a more “intensive” phase of managing public lands and resources; at the same 
time it placed a diminishing emphasis on extracting resources from publicly-owned 
areas, stressing more efficient use of what was already available.
27
    
 Organized labor’s postwar opinions on the nation’s conservation needs were 
also shaped by a second, equally important filter:  the conservation policies of the 
New Deal, crafted largely by President Franklin Roosevelt and disseminated to the 
public through a variety of federal agencies.
28
  The most important of these New Deal 
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agencies, in terms of how working people absorbed the message of conservation and 
natural resource protection, was the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC).  Within a 
week of taking office in 1933, FDR had proposed a plan devoted to “conservation 
related employment.”
29
  That plan would eventually lead to the establishment of rural 
work camps across the country, where 2.5 million unemployed young men labored on 
projects planting trees, building infrastructure in state and national parks, clearing 
waterways, controlling floods and erosion, and the like.  The CCC camps also offered 
classes in landscaping, forestry, and wildlife conservation, among other things, 
providing skills and knowledge about nature that participants would carry with them 
even after the Corps closed its doors.  During and subsequent to the war, former CCC 
members became industrial workers and brought their camp-bred environmental 
concerns with them into their unions.  The experience helped breed a fondness for the 
wild in the camps’ workers and also helped to open up natural spaces for visitors 
when the crisis of the Depression had ended.
30
  In these ways, New Deal 
environmentalism was translated into a postwar labor environmentalism that stressed 
conserving natural resources and expanding natural areas for recreation. 
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 A good example of the ways in which organized labor’s thinking on the 
environment was developing in the postwar period is the CIO-produced pamphlet 
Healthy Soil, Healthy People.
31
 Created by the CIO Department of Education and 
Research in 1948, the pamphlet was designed to instruct members on the union’s 
environmental philosophy. Along with titles including How Big is Big Business and 
Analysis of the Taft-Hartley Act, Healthy Soil, Healthy People would have been part 
of libraries in union halls or available to members by mail-order.  The pamphlet series 
was one piece of the CIO’s long-term effort to create knowledgeable and alert 
unionists.  In laying out their environmental priorities, the pamphlet demonstrates an 
organization that was clear in its analysis of the earth’s problems and forward 
thinking in its recommended solutions.   
 As indicated by the title, Healthy Soil, Healthy People was an exploration into 
“the most basic of our natural resources... [and] the least understood,” soil.  The 
pamphlet expressed concern that humanity was on the verge of a great ecological 
disaster, and if action was not taken soon, catastrophe would be the result.  Soil’s 
problems – erosion and falling fertility – were global in scale.  But more troublingly, 
they had been created by mankind’s wastefulness and poor stewardship.  “Man,” the 
writers cautioned, “has become, to his own final sorrow, a perverter of nature’s 
scheme....  Instead of a healthful harmony between man and nature, a pathological 
conflict now prevails.”  They continued, “instead of man’s using his limited soil 
resources rationally, he seems madly bent on destroying them, thus bringing on his 
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  The CIO, through this lesson to its members, stressed that industrial 
society, if people were not careful, would quite literally sow the seeds of its own 
demise. 
 The man-made nature of the problem could be a blessing as well as a curse.  
Since people were ultimately to blame, they could also put a stop to the destruction.  
The CIO’s proposed solution was three-fold.  The first aspect of the solution was 
“good land use,” such as “terracing... crop rotations, and shifts in land use.”  The 
second piece of their plan called for the creation of a federal agency to coordinate the 
conservation efforts of individual farmers and localities, with enough funding to carry 
out its mission and to subsidize the transition of farmers to better farming methods.  
Finally, and most straightforwardly, the United States had to stop being “a nation of 
wasters.”
33
  Following these steps would give the U.S. the best chance of avoiding the 
fate of the Roman and Mayan Empires – great societies that toppled after stretching 
their environments past the breaking point. 
 Healthy Soil, Healthy People was also important in that it established a firm 
justification for organized labor to be involved in environmental issues.  Posing the 
rhetorical question “why should the CIO concern itself with the relationship of man to 
the soil when we have such immediate problems as the high cost of living and the 
need for wage increases?” the CIO response was firm: “for the same reason that the 
CIO concerns itself with issues like Federal Aid to Education and the Marshall Plan.  
Our world is so complex and has so many interrelated problems ... that it is like the 
intertwining wires of a telephone system.  For the best possible service we must do 
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what we can to keep each one at maximum efficiency.”
34
  But it was not simply the 
interconnectedness of different issues that spurred the CIO to action.  Instead, the 
CIO recognized that without a safe and clean environment any other gains would be 
meaningless; “wage increases in themselves mean little,” claimed the pamphlet “if 
they are granted this morning at 10 o’clock and the world we live in is blown to bits 
at 11 o’clock.”
35
  The ultimate supremacy of a healthy globe to all people meant that 
all people and their associations needed to be concerned.  This line of reasoning 
would be repeated frequently in the coming decades by unionists who sought to play 
a role in environmental causes.   
 The CIO’s commitment to resource conservation continued for the rest of its 
independent existence.  In the early 1950s, it opposed turning federal lands over to the 
states, in fear that state legislatures would use the opportunity to liquidate natural 
resources for short-term profits – a fear shared by numerous conservation 
organizations.  In language that would have been appropriate, if unusually aggressive, 
for an environmentalist of the era, the CIO Industrial Union Councils lambasted the 
“raid which we know the reactionary interests intend to make on... the public 
domain,” whereby the people’s common lands “will fall easy victim to state 
legislatures controlled by predatory minorities,” of industrial interests.
36
  In a letter to 
the councils, the CIO’s Assistant Director of Councils, Anthony W. Smith, warned 
members not to be complacent in the face of threats to “the national forests, and other 
timber lands owned and operated by the United States government; the grazing lands 
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within those timber lands... the national parks, wilderness areas, and wildlife refuges; 
the mineral resources of the of the nation,” basically all of the “forests, soil, waters, 
wildlife, scenery and recreation.”  The council directors were instructed to take action 
in opposition to endeavors that might endanger these resources.
37
   
 In the 1950s, the questions of who would control the earth’s limited resources 
and how they would be used were “of great importance to ... CIO members.”
38
  The 
organization weighed in on the side of conservation, arguing that the nation’s 
resources should not be wasted or dealt with lightly.  It maintained that protection and 
long-term planning were the essential elements of good resource policy, and thought 
that the federal government was in a better position to carry out these tasks than the 
states or industry.  However, the CIO’s concerns did not end with extractive 
resources.  As is clear in Smith’s letter to the councils, the organization was also 
apprehensive about the fate of places that existed for the enjoyment benefit they 
provided: the nation’s parks and wilderness.  
Parks and Recreation 
The concept of the wilderness as a place for relaxation and rejuvenation emerged at 
the end of the nineteenth century in reaction to what were seen as the ills of modern 
life.  The beauty and authenticity of the natural world created a siren song when 
juxtaposed against the spreading ugly, stinking, dirty, man-made urban spaces of the 
nation’s big cities.  Those who could afford to escape momentarily to wide-open 
spaces did so to absorb their aesthetic qualities while those wide-open spaces still 
existed.  At the same time, escaping to the wilderness was also seen as a cure for the 







overly civilized lifestyles of the middle and upper classes.  A jaunt of rustic living 
would help to reintroduce masculine virtues like strength, virility, and self-reliance to 
men who had been feminized by their overly sophisticated lifestyles.  Nature thus 
came to embody elite ideals about all that was good in life.
39
  To protect the rural 
spaces that provided such refuge, well-to-do Americans persuaded Congress and the 
state governments to set aside areas for pastoral leisure. 
 The same upper-crust vision that inspired the national park system also led to 
the founding of organizations devoted to protecting specific local natural areas and 
facilitating their use for the recreation of the wealthy.  The late nineteenth century 
witnessed the founding of a number of these organizations, including the Rocky 
Mountain Club (1875), Appalachian Mountain Club of Boston (1876), the National 
Audubon Society (1905), and Theodore Roosevelt’s own Boone and Crocket Club 
(1887), which took a particular interest in Yellowstone National Park.  As the park 
idea spread – stirring the creation of parks, preserves, and reservations at the national 
and state level – so too did the voluntary associations that both helped to establish the 
set-off areas, sometimes acquiring and donating the land, and to maintain their 
undisturbed nature wherever possible.
40
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 The Sierra Club was one of these associations.  Founded in 1892 by twenty-
seven “solid citizens,” the Club’s Articles of Incorporation stressed that its goals were 
to “explore, enjoy, and render accessible the mountain regions of the Pacific Coast... 
and to enlist the support and cooperation of the people and government in preserving 
the forests and other natural features of the Sierra Nevada Mountains.”
41
  The group 
was the brain child of California naturalist John Muir.  Disturbed by continued human 
encroachment on territory that had supposedly been under protected administration by 
the state of California since 1864; Muir led the charge for the creation of Yosemite 
National Park in 1889 and subsequently founded the Sierra Club to protect the 
integrity of the park from logging or mining interests.   
 The early years of the Sierra Club were marked by several important 
legislative battles.  It fought successfully to extend the boundaries of Yosemite.  It 
encouraged Congress to turn administration of the parks over to a new National Park 
Service rather than leave them in the hands of a Forest Service that allowed for 
resource extraction within their boundaries.  Perhaps most famously, the Club worked 
to prevent the damming of the Hetch Hetchy Valley to provide a water reservoir for 
San Francisco.  However, with the Hetch Hetchy controversy finally settled in favor 
of the city in 1913, and the Park Service established in 1916, conservation lobbying 
took a backseat to outings and publishing for the Club in the 1920s.
42
  Leading 
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backpacking and mountain climbing expeditions into the wilderness, the Club got the 
reputation of being little more than “companions on the trail.”
43
 
  In the postwar period, this reputation would rapidly begin to change.   In 
1951, the Club officially broadened its realm of concern beyond the Sierras to the 
entire United States; it now intended to be a truly national organization. At the same 
time, the Sierra Club also reestablished itself as an organization with a concerted 
political voice.  It was led in this effort by “Archdruid of Environmentalism,” David 
Brower.
44
  Hired as the Club’s first Executive Director in 1952 – a position he would 
hold for the next seventeen years – Brower began the transition from volunteer 
leadership to professionalism within the organization.  He also brought with him a 
more aggressive, confrontational style and a desire to insert the Club into any possible 
conservation debate.  During his tenure, the Sierra Club would launch massive, and 
ultimately successful, campaigns to protect or enlarge protected areas around 
Dinosaur Canyon, Redwoods Park, and the Grand Canyon. 
 It was not just the Sierra Club that was changing in the postwar era.  By 1950, 
the idea of parks as playgrounds for the rich had eroded.  Historians generally 
concede that the interwar years were a transformative time in the relationship between 
working people and outdoor recreation.
45
  In Driven Wild: How the Fight Against 
Automobiles Launched the Modern Wilderness Movement, Paul Sutter argues that this 
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transformation was caused by three things: the “rapid proliferation of the 
automobile,” increased government spending on roads and park services, and a 
“maturing consumer culture,” that included “national systems of marketing and 
distribution, the rise of modern advertising... higher wages, the extension of credit, 
and a broadening affluence” among Americans.
46
  These trends combined to increase 
both the desire and the ability of workers to pursue leisure outdoors.  
 As more and more workers began to seek non-urban recreation, unions 
updated their ideas about the proper place for nature in the world.  Historian 
Lawrence Lipin, in his study of Oregon workers, argues that early in the twentieth 
century “labor leaders resisted the efforts of their social betters to manage nature in a 
way that some of it, including what might have recreational and inspirational uses, 
would be preserved from production, particularly when it appeared that such efforts 
were most likely to improve only the lives of the privileged few.”
47
  By the 1920s and 
1930s, however, they had abandoned this simple producerist rhetoric and set aside 
their objections to preserving natural enclaves, although the relationship of some 
unions and workers – particularly in extractive industries – to individual parks would 
continue to be complicated by the need to have access to resources to extract.  Still, 
by the Second World War, these concerns centered more around specific protected 
areas rather than the legitimacy of protection itself. 
 All of the trends that had led to increasing working-class use of national and 
state parks in the interwar years were even more present after WWII.  The National 
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Park Service lands grew by several million acres between 1940 and 1950.
48
  With the 
United States becoming the world’s biggest industrial power, extremely low 
unemployment and rising wages led to higher living standards for more people than 
had ever been seen before.  As wages rose, so too did working-class consumption, 
symbolized by the car.  As suburbs and car culture grew, so too did the need for 
roads, which the federal government provided for with the Interstate Highway Act.  
Along with these earlier stimulants to park usage came fresh reasons to visit the great 
outdoors.  While many workers had been able to secure weekends away from work in 
the 1920s, by the 1950s growing segments of the workforce were winning contracts 
that included full vacations.  Additionally, during the Great Depression several 
million young men had gained experience with the park system and the natural world 
through the Civilian Conservation Corps; many of these people grew fond of the 
places where they were camped and wanted to revisit them later in life.  All of these 
factors combined to produce an explosion in the number of visitors to parks and other 
wild areas in the postwar period. 
 The more workers had access to leisure time, the more their unions had a 
stake in shaping how they would spend it.  By providing union sponsored venues for 
recreation, union leaders could provide a welcome service while expanding the role 
their organizations played in workers’ lives.  Sharing leisure time with one’s fellow 
workers would also be a good way to increase solidarity in the workplace.  To this 
end, many unions experimented with recreation departments or committees at both 
the local and international level.   
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 The most famous of these experiments was the United Auto Workers’ 
Recreation Department, which was in operation by 1939.
49
  UAW officials believed 
that caring for the recreational needs of members was especially important in their 
case because of the monotonous nature of production on an auto assembly line.  In 
addition to hosting the standard bowling and horseshoe leagues, ice-skating 
competitions, and baseball games, the UAW’s Recreation Department also devoted 
considerable time to the outdoor passions of its members.  Through the department, 
according to historian Chad Montrie, “the union encouraged and aided growing 
concern by autoworker families for enhancing outdoor recreational opportunities, 
conserving natural resources, and controlling pollution.”
50
  The success of these 
endeavors is evidenced by the expansion of the Recreation Department in 1953 and 
the concurrent decision by delegates at that year’s convention to require locals to 
establish their own recreation committees.
51
  The local recreation committees and the 
larger Recreation Department acted as a vital link between the UAW and its 
members, encouraging them to make greater use of the outdoors and working with 
government officials to increase their access to open spaces. 
 The postwar spike in open-lands use worried a segment of the environmental 
community, opening a debate that continues into the present.  Some, following in the 
philosophical footsteps of John Muir, thought that the best way to protect natural 
spaces was to expose people to them.  Those who had visited a place and felt kinship 
with it, they thought, would be more likely to want to defend it.  Others, in contrast, 
argued that there was a limit to the effectiveness of such thinking.  Many of the 
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people in this camp were turned off by the growing throngs of visitors to areas that 
had once offered seclusion and solitude.  At a certain point, they reasoned, too many 
visitors begin to despoil protected areas by littering, trampling the vegetation, and 
disrupting the wildlife.  For this group, roads became the ultimate symbol of 
humanity’s convenience interfering with nature that it supposedly hoped to defend.
52
 
 Like other conservation groups, the Sierra Club was divided over the issue, 
and its public activity waffled back and forth between the 1920s and 1950s.  On one 
hand, the Club worked closely with the Park Service to promote the parks as tourist 
sites, thinking that such use would prove their value to skeptical government officials.  
It also supported the building of roads and trails to make majestic areas more 
accessible.  On the other hand, it refused to support the establishment of Kings 
Canyon National Park in California unless it was “devoted to wilderness, with no 
roads or hotels like those in Yosemite.”
53
  Some Club members also led a successful 
initiative to have the phrase “render accessible” removed from the Club’s statement 
of purpose, which had originally stated that the Club was designed to “explore, enjoy, 
and render accessible,” California’s mountains.
54
  Eventually a compromise position 
within the Club was achieved, based around the establishment of formal legislative 
distinctions between parks, which were intended to be accessible to tourists, and 
wilderness areas, which were intended to remain mostly undisturbed.
55
    
 Despite the ambivalence toward the explosion of park use among some in the 
conservationist community, the upsurge in working-class support for the park system 
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made the labor movement relevant to the Sierra Club in a way that it never had been 
before.  Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, UAW representatives championed the 
expansion of the National Park System in Congress, culminating in 1968 with their 
support for the creation of Redwoods National Park, which was also a top priority for 
the Club.
56
  The CIO, too, was applauded by the small full-time staff of the Sierra 
Club for its “extremely good and effective conservation program.”  Club leaders were 
so enamored of the CIO in the early 1950s that they sought out any excuse to do an 
article on the union in the Club’s official mouthpiece The Sierra Club Bulletin.
57
  The 
article idea was eventually scrapped due to the partisan nature of most CIO 
publications, which would have meant major qualifications if quoted in Sierra Club 
literature.  But the Club remained of the opinion that the CIO was “generally in 
accord with the recommendations of national conservation organizations.”
58
   
 The CIO’s biggest plus, from the Sierra Club perspective, was its early 
opposition to a hydroelectric dam project on the Green River in Dinosaur National 
Monument, which lies on the border between Colorado and Utah.  The CIO’s 
membership may have been more persuaded by the government’s claims that the 
planned dams were needed to provide water and electricity to support the growing 
western population than was the Club’s, but both organizations thought that 
maintaining the protected national monument should take precedence.  The campaign 
to save Dinosaur was the Club’s biggest initiative to that point.
 59
  Their lobbying 
effort was intense, including trips down the river for journalists and politicians, 
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challenging government planners’ figures in Congress, and a public relations 
campaign that included the production of two films and the publication of a book 
about Dinosaur Monument.  The CIO, also standing in opposition to a dam in that 
area, accused President Eisenhower of selecting the location specifically to cause 
controversy, which it alleged would allow him to scuttle the project entirely.
60
  
Ultimately, the CIO broke with the Sierra Club’s position by acceding to construction 
at an alternative site a few miles away, after receiving government assurances that the 
plans would “provide facilities for recreation for those now interested in the scenery 
and wildlife aspects of this area, as well as ... power needed for the expanding 
population and industrial growth in the mountain states.”
 61
  However, by that time 
the CIO’s reversal was not terribly troubling to the Sierra Club, whose campaign 
against the dam was already shaping up to be a success. 
 Preservation of wilderness and scenic areas became more controversial among 
unions in the 1960s, but that goal was not abandoned by the entire labor movement.  
West Coast loggers, particularly those in the former AFL-affiliated Carpenters and 
Millworkers unions, would earn a reputation for being among the most militant anti-
environmentalists in organized labor when they opposed the creation of Redwood 
National Park at the end of the decade, citing job concerns.  However, the United 
Auto Workers, not hampered by job concerns and remaining committed to the parks 
program, supported Redwood.  At the same time, it also supported the creation of a 
National Trails System, National Lakeshores scattered around the Great Lakes, and 
other preservation initiatives.  In 1967, the UAW created a new department – the 
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Department of Conservation and Resource Development – to handle the numerous 
environmental concerns that had been growing within the union.  Although the 
department would focus on more than just land-use issues – indeed by the late 1960s, 
industrial pollution was becoming a more pressing concern within UAW leadership 
circles (discussed in more detail below) – it was no coincidence that the person 
selected to head the new endeavor was also in charge of the newly renamed 
Recreation and Leisure-Time Activities Department, Olga Madar.  Madar would 




 On the issue of wilderness protection, American unions frequently found 
themselves on the same side as conservation organizations in the postwar period.  
Although unions felt some need to balance employment concerns with the expansion 
of protected areas, they seldom came into irreconcilable conflict with 
environmentalists.  The rising popularity of the national parks at the time indicates 
that this position was generally in line with mainstream American opinion.  At the 
same time, unions were ahead of most conservationists and the population at large in 
their concern over what would become the other basic tenet of modern 
environmentalism:  industrial pollution. 
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Pollution and Urban Industrial Health 
Organized labor’s interest in pollution grew out of a desire for basic standards of 
health and safety on the job.  At the turn of the twentieth century, the American 
workplace was significantly more likely than its British or German counterparts to 
kill a worker, either in a sudden accident or through drawn out illness.  And, it was 
getting more dangerous over time.  Thus, unions saw the importance in using 
collective bargaining to create safer spaces of employment.  Even the most 
conservative of bread and butter unions pled their case for the great triumvirate of 
wages, hours, and conditions.
63
  Historian Mark Aldrich has shown that between the 
end of the nineteenth century and World War II the perception of workplace accidents 
in the United States shifted from one seeing them as “routine matters of individual 
carelessness” to one that considered them “reflect[ing] management failure.”  As 
responsibility for employee safety got pinned to management, a combination of labor 
agitation, law, technology, and public shaming combined to create an atmosphere in 
which businesses were more willing to accept that responsibility and to take action to 
improve their safety records.
64
    
 The case for workplace health – as opposed to safety – was slower to develop 
and union initiatives on that front took longer to become mainstream.  Most ailments 
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were hard to classify as originating in poor working conditions rather than unsanitary 
living conditions; their causes were not obvious, or were, at least, difficult to prove.  
The extent of industrial diseases was similarly difficult to trace – they often went 
undiagnosed or misdiagnosed and plant managers frequently stonewalled 
investigations and denied culpability.  The coalescence of the science of industrial 
hygiene between 1910 and 1930 helped to bring a bit of clarity to the issue, but did 
not solve it entirely.  Even diseases with well known industrial origins such as 
radium, mercury, or lead poisoning, as well as certain particulate diseases including 
Black Lung, were frequently thought of as occupational hazards that would be nearly 
impossible to prevent. 
 Still, by the end of the Second World War, American business – again 
prodded by social reformers and organized workers – had made some strides in 
creating less toxic working environments.  In the 1940s there was an explosion in 
contract clauses in collective bargaining agreements designed to eliminate health 
hazards for workers.  Notably fewer people were hospitalized or killed by diseases 
contracted at work.  And for those who did get sick, the improving system of 
employer-based health insurance generally provided them with better care than 
workers would have had one or two generations before.
65
   
 At the same time, even after industrial hygiene programs were implemented in 
some industries, others accepted that certain disorders were going to remain 
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occupational hazards.  Chemicals, dusts, and gases continued to threaten workers, and 
the establishment of industrial health programs could sometimes paradoxically make 
it more difficult to find treatment or compensation.  With added expenses figuring 
into the equation, polluting industries that – for whatever reason – could not or would 
not improve disease prevention took great pains to cloud the discourse around 
emerging hazards.  Meanwhile, the doctors who treated sick and dying workers were 
often hampered in recognizing new threats by what industrial disease historian 
Christopher Sellers refers to as “constricted notions of pathology,” meaning that 
medical professionals tend to assess illnesses and their causes in established 
patterns.
66
  Thus, the fight for safe and healthy workplaces continued throughout the 
century.   
 Considering the efforts of working people and unions to maintain healthy 
standards on the job, it should come as no surprise that they would advocate similar 
positions off it.  Because governmental action to control pollution on the state and 
federal levels was limited in the early 1950s, and because the press was uninterested 
in such concerns, it is difficult to document with any certainty what unions were 
doing at that time.  What is certain, though, is that by the end of the decade several 
important industrial unions, including the United Steel Workers and the Oil, 
Chemical, and Atomic Workers (OCAW), were dealing intensively with the issue.  
The UAW led the charge, becoming, to quote Chad Montrie, “among the first 
organizations, if not the first, to call attention to the contamination of air and water 
both inside and outside the factory gates.”
67
  Olga Madar, one of the leading voices in 
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the UAW for pollution control as well as outdoor preservation, echoed the earlier 
justification of the CIO when she defended the UAW’s anti-pollution work in 
Congress.  While testifying on strengthening clean air standards, she noted that “we 
make little progress when we find that the gains in better health are negated when the 
worker leaves the plant and finds his community’s living environment polluted.”
68
  
Having come out of long struggles with workplace contamination, it made sense for 
these groups to be early supporters of pollution regulations.     
 By 1958, union officials frequently testified before Congress for the 
establishment of clean water programs.  The UAW leadership, in particular President 
Walter Reuther, made pollution a frequent topic of discussion in the coming years, 
and the intensity of Reuther and his union’s environmental commitment only 
increased as the 1960s wore on.  In 1965, the union hosted a major conference called 
United Action for Clean Water, which brought union leaders into direct contact with 
the first-stirrings of pollution minded environmentalists.  In 1967, the union’s 
representatives called for tough federal standards to control pollution from vehicle 
exhaust.
69
  By the time he was invited to speak at the yearly meeting of the Water 
Pollution Control Federation, in 1968, Reuther was seeking to enlist individuals and 
all levels of government in a “$100 billion ... war on pollution during the next five 
years.”
70
  Although it was the federal government whom they expected to foot the bill 
in that war, Reuther, Madar, and others in the UAW hierarchy had made 
environmentalism a valued piece of their agenda, and hoped to find allies wherever 
they could.  
                                                 
68




 “Pollution Funds Urged by Reuther,” WP, September 27, 1968. 
 48 
 
 The UAW was operating at the forefront of a movement that had yet to gain 
widespread support.  It was not until the 1960s and early 1970s that concerns over 
pollution made their way into the consciousness of society at large.  Awareness of 
both pollution’s effect on public health and its deleterious impact on nature grew in 
prominence at that time.  Historians have frequently pointed to the 1962 publication 
of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring as a turning point for American environmentalism.  
Published serially in The New Yorker and becoming a best-seller in its full form, the 
book demonstrated the ecological concept of the interrelatedness of all things to a 
popular audience by showing how overuse of pesticides, particularly DDT, harmed 
everything from bald eagles to human beings.  Silent Spring’s publication was called 
the event of greatest consequence in 1962 by Audobon Society Chairman Irston R. 
Barnes in his regular Washington Post column “The Naturalist.”
71
   
 Public opinion polls support the common contention that Carson’s book 
contributed to an upsurge in American concern with pollution, public health, and the 
environment.  Gallup polls conducted in 1960 and 1961 did not show any respondents 
listing pollution as a problem, but by late 1964 and early 1965, three-quarters of 
respondents were familiar with the issue of air pollution and nearly one in five 
considered it to be one of the problems that Congress should work hardest to fix.
72
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The nation was further galvanized by events later in the decade.  The first pictures of 
the Earth from space taken by NASA in 1966, the devastating effects of the use of 
defoliant Agent Orange in Vietnam, and the fire on the Cuyahoga River in 1969 all 
contributed to a growing sense that swift action needed to be taken to protect and 
clean up the environment in its entirety.  As Carson herself reminded readers, 
“pollutants in air, water, soil and food – consisting of radioactive materials as well as 
harmful chemicals – all interact to produce serious impact on the living organism.  
These various problems perhaps need to be attacked separately, but the place of each 
in the whole must not be forgotten if intelligent and fruitful solutions are to be 
found.”
73
  As the 1970s dawned, Americans were more prepared than ever to institute 
those solutions, and their associations would be asked to help lead the way.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the labor movement expressed concern for the 
environment in three ways prior to 1970, led by the CIO and industrial unions such as 
the UAW.  It called for the expansion and development of the national park system as 
well as for increased protection for scenic wilderness areas.  It also made the case for 
conserving natural resources such as forests, mineral reserves, water, and soil.  Even 
though workers in the extractive industries had a clear stake in maintaining access to 
the materials they were paid to extract, labor had as much interest in conservation as 
it did in exploitation of these resources.  To groups such as the CIO, those resources 
represented a treasure held in common by all the American people – one that should 
not, at the very least, be easily and cheaply ceded to the industrial machine.  Finally, 
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the labor movement worked to improve the physical condition of its members by 
reforming the health and safety standards of employers.  These concerns quickly 
transformed into unease about the health of the larger community, inspiring the UAW 
and others to become early advocates for national pollution standards. 
 These stances often mirrored those of environmental reformers, even though 
they did not often bring unions into contact with conservation organizations.  Both 
sides agreed that keeping natural resources in the hands of the federal government 
rather than the states’ would be the best way to protect them for the future, and both 
sides advocated for new wilderness and park designations.  However, the two 
constituencies generally promoted these causes individually, pursuing similar reforms 
along separate tracks.  Moreover, as will be explored in more depth in the next 
chapter, the Sierra Club hesitated to embrace the cause of pollution control in the 
1950s and 1960s, putting them a step behind the UAW on urban environmental 
issues.  Unions such as the UAW did not share the Sierra Club’s apprehension at the 
prospect of taking on pollution, which it saw as distinct from its members’ core 
interests.   
 Although the two movements did not regularly associate, this unity of purpose 
would prove important in the coming years.  The labor movement’s postwar 
engagement with conservation, parks, and pollution would provide unions with the 
expertise needed to become key advocates for expanding environmental regulations 
in the 1970s.  Moreover, when the labor and environmental movements did start to 
make a concerted effort to work together in the wake of Earth Day, 1970, they found 
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that these common principles bred respect among the organizations and provided a 
foundation on which cooperation could be built.     
 52 
 
Chapter 2: Earth Day and Beyond, 1970-1973 
 
April 22, 1970 – the first Earth Day – has become shrouded in mythology, both 
positive and negative.  A persistent legend on the political far-right has it that the date 
of the event was selected to honor Russian Revolutionary Vladimir Lenin by marking 
the centenary anniversary of his birth.
74
  A more generous and widely shared belief is 
that Earth Day was responsible for creating environmentalism as we know it today.  
Even the website for the Earth Day Network, the modern organization responsible for 
the event’s stewardship, reinforces this belief, saying that April 22 marks the 




 That second myth is not considered to be any more accurate than the first by 
environmental historians.  Robert Gottlieb, for example, rightly points out that Earth 
Day “was an idea directly tied to the enormous surge of interest in quality-of-life and 
environmental issues in the late 1960s;” as such the event took advantage of a 
movement that was already growing rather than serving as its impetus.
76
  Still, few 
would make the mistake of downplaying the cultural significance of Earth Day, 1970.  
The event’s success helped to establish an environmental consciousness in a widely 
dispersed public, and it reinforced the idea that environmental problems were 
national, as well as local, in scope.  Furthermore, the publicity generated by the event 
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also helped inspire concerted action on the part of state legislatures and Congress to 
tackle the nation’s environmental problems.   
 Although historians have noted the role the labor movement played in Earth 
Day’s success, none have examined the ways that the event reverberated in union 
circles.  Earth Day proved to be a watershed moment in the relationship between 
labor and environmentalists.  Between 1945 and 1969, the two had supported some 
similar programs but worked together only infrequently, generally on local wilderness 
protection initiatives.  In the wake of Earth Day, however, new horizons for 
environmental protection seemed reachable, new allies desirable.  Building on 
common ideas that had been developing for decades and the shared experience of 
promoting and coordinating aspects of the event, the two endeavored to act in a more 
united fashion; they would no longer just stand on the same side on environmental 
issues, they would now stand together instead. 
Pollution and the Sierra Club 
As was explored in the previous chapter, the late 1960s was a period in which U.S. 
residents began to think more seriously about ecological issues.  But ironically, the 
groups that should have been in the best position to capitalize on Americans’ new-
found interest in the environment were initially slow to act.  Most old-line 
conservation organizations did not readily adopt pollution-control issues or make the 
transition to modern environmental organizations, and some never did.   
 The Sierra Club epitomizes this hesitancy.  While its conservation interests 
grew in size throughout the 1950s and 1960s, it remained almost entirely devoted to 
matters of public lands management.  Former Sierra Club board member and 
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president William Siri later recalled “bits and pieces of other concerns emerging” by 
the early 1960s, but no major actions were taken.
77
  The first and only time that 
pollution made it onto the Board’s agenda before 1969 was at the end of 1966, when 
it referred a Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs’ resolution on air pollution to the 
Club’s Advisory Committee on the Biological Sciences for further review.
78
  Even 
pesticide use, an issue that had stirred significant opposition in the population at 
large, was slow to gain traction with Club leaders.  For a long time, official 
conversation within the group about pesticides was limited specifically to whether 
spraying should be done in national parks.  The Board of Directors was divided on the 
issue, concluding initially that more information was needed before they could act.  It 
took a year for the Board to eventually adopt a position against pesticide use in the 
parks, calling for no “manipulation of habitat within National Parks and Monuments 
or in Wilderness, Wild, and Primitive Areas of National Forests, except at developed 
roadside camps and utility areas,” in 1964.
79
   
 The Sierra Club’s uncertainty in embracing issues like pollution was a 
reflection of internal splits developing within the organization’s leadership.  One of 
the fault lines was generational:  long-tenured members of the Club had defined it as 
a land preservation organization for so long that it was difficult for them to change 
with the times.  Some members worried about what change would mean for the group 
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and if it would detract from what they saw as their core responsibilities.
80
  Moreover, 
the younger leaders who joined the board in the 1960s, and who tended to be more 
supportive of expanding the Club’s range of causes, also rubbed the older members 
the wrong way by refusing to abide by the board’s established code of polite 
disagreement.  Siri remembers that “board meetings became more acrimonious as the 
sixties wore on... [in part] because a new breed of somewhat younger person was 
coming to the board, who held extreme and adamant positions on nearly every 
issue.”
81
   
The other major source of friction within the group was between the volunteer 
leadership and the professional staff.  The Sierra Club was created as a members-led 
organization, and maintained a strong volunteer leadership structure.  The 
organization is made up of numerous local chapters which are mostly led by 
volunteers.  Above them are state chapters, and at the top of the Sierra Club sits the 
Board of Directors, a group of fifteen volunteers who are elected by the membership 
to three-year, re-electable terms.
82
  The head of the Board of Directors is the 
organization’s president, who was traditionally the organization’s most respected 
voice.  However, by the 1960s, the Sierra Club was also starting to develop a growing 
professional staff headed by the executive director.  The executive director officially 
answers to the board, but is in actuality responsible for the day to day running of the 
organization.
83
  Today, the executive director is the most influential person in the 
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whole Club leadership structure, but in the 1960s the amount of decision making 
authority he possessed was still undefined.  
 As early as 1966, the staff, led in large part by Conservation Director Michael 
McCloskey, was moving toward seeing the urban environment as valuable and issues 
such as clean air as important battlegrounds of the future.  The volunteer leadership 
governing the Board of Directors was more cautious about expanding the Club’s 
purview to include these matters.  Many of them were also irked by the abrasive 
leadership style of Executive Director Dave Brower, whose uncompromising 
positions and refusal to ask for the board’s input on major decisions angered the 
volunteer leaders.  The controversy over Brower’s management, which “became a 
question of staff vs. volunteer member,” was coming to a head in the late 1960s.
84
  
The board sought to limit the influence of the professional staff, and the exact 
opposite would be achieved by allowing the Club to engage with problems that the 
staff was more expert in than the volunteers.  Some of this conflict was smoothed 
over when McCloskey replaced Brower as Executive Director in 1969 (it is no 
coincidence that the Club began taking pollution more seriously at that time), but 
tension between staff and volunteer leaders as well as between old and new members 
continued to make the group’s progress toward fully embracing pollution and other 
modern environmental issues slow.
85
  However, those issues were about to be thrust 
onto the Club’s plate in a way that no one anticipated by the explosive success of 
Earth Day.   
                                                 
84
 Siri oral history, 118-136; quote on page 125. 
85
 McCloskey, In the Thick of It, 53-58; 85-90. 
 57 
 
Earth Day, 1970 
Earth Day was the brainchild of Wisconsin Senator Gaylord Nelson in the summer of 
1969.  The event that Nelson originally planned was a national teach-in for the 
environment, to be modeled on the anti-Vietnam War teach-ins that had been 
sweeping the nation for several years.  Nelson quickly enlisted the help of other 
legislators, including Maine Senator and former Democratic Vice Presidential 
candidate Edmund Muskie and California Republican Congressman Pete McCloskey, 
whose presence as co-chairman of the event was designed to give it an air of non-
partisanship.
86
  The chairmen hired Denis Hayes, a graduate student activist at 
Harvard University, to coordinate the planning for the event and set up a non-profit – 
Environmental Teach-In, Inc. – to accept donations.   
 Despite the organizers planning for a relatively small event, things rapidly 
took on a life of their own.  Requests for information poured in from students and 
teachers across the country, and people began organizing local events on their own 
initiative.  Nelson expressed great satisfaction with this turn of events, later 
remembering that “Earth Day worked because of the spontaneous response at the 
grassroots level.  We had neither the time nor the resources to organize twenty 
million demonstrators and the thousands of schools and local communities that 
participated.  That was the remarkable thing about Earth Day.  It organized itself.”
87
   
 Because there was so much grassroots support for the event’s planning, the 
organizers ended up with little control over the final product.  The offices staffed by 
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Hayes and others, mostly volunteers, worked to distribute information about the event 
and attempted to maintain an air about the proceedings that was not too 
confrontational.  They were mainly successful in both efforts, although they could not 
entirely distance the event from the New Left counterculture for many observers (this 
despite the fact that the most radical student protestors generally avoided Earth Day 
celebrations, considering them a facile distraction from the more important issues of 
civil rights and the Vietnam War).  And although Nelson would continue to refer to 
the occasion as the Environmental Teach-In, the plans quickly ballooned to 
encompass events far beyond that.  April 22 would see parades, picketing, letter-




 Of the wide spectrum of groups that participated in Earth Day – 
“congressmen, militants, businessmen, housewifes [sic], and hippies,” according to 
one news report  – few played a larger role than organized labor.
89
  Senator Nelson 
recounted a few years after the event that “when we organized Earth Day in 1969, 
contributions in support of the event were made by a broad cross-section of labor 
unions representing a substantial majority of organized labor in the United States.  
Among the earliest contributors were Walter Reuther’s United Auto Workers and the 
AFL-CIO through George Meany.”
90
  Denis Hayes has also asserted that the UAW 
was among the most important sponsors of the event: 
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Without the UAW, the first Earth Day would likely have flopped....  The 
UAW was by  far the largest contributor to the first Earth Day, and its support 
went beyond the merely financial.  It printed and mailed all our materials at its 
expense – even those critical of pollution-belching cars.  Its organizers turned 
out workers in every city where it has a presence.  And, of course, Walter then 





As it turned out, the most valuable service provided by the UAW was its strong 
advocacy of the event within organized labor circles, with Reuther frequently cajoling 
or embarrassing other unions into firmer support.  Meany, for example, was not 
terribly excited about the idea of an environmental teach-in, but he felt compelled to 
match the Auto Workers’ early donations to the Earth Day cause so as not to be 
shown up his rival Reuther.
92
   
Although Meany and Reuther had, as the presidents of the AFL and CIO 
respectively, united the house of labor in 1955, their alliance was rarely easy.  While 
the two men shared certain personality traits – both were brash and not shy about 
confrontation – they had very different perspectives on labor politics.  Meany, 
although a fierce and unflinching advocate for workers’ right to organize, was 
thoroughly committed to a narrowly defined vision of business unionism.
93
  As he 
saw it, unions’ proper concerns, with few exceptions, involved the shop floor and 
their members’ ability to earn a living.  Bragging “I never went on strike in my life; I 
never ran a strike in my life; I never ordered anyone else to run a strike in my life,” 
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Meany, more than any other single individual, was responsible for dedicating the 
AFL-CIO to mainstream social ideas and accord with employers.
94
 
Reuther, on the other hand, imagined organized labor’s role in the public 
sphere more broadly.  Unions, he thought, should be acting in concert with other civil 
society organizations to improve the lives of all Americans, not just their members.  
He actively embraced the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements, and he was 
highly critical of other AFL-CIO leaders for their hesitation to join “with other 
community groups to rebuild cities, fight pollution, improve education, improve the 
security of the aged, extend equal rights and opportunities, insure maximum 
economic growth, fight poverty and improve communication with ‘the liberal 
intellectual and academic community.’”
95
   
Tension between the two over labor’s political direction led to the UAW’s 
withdrawal from the AFL-CIO in 1968.  Pollution control in and of itself likely 
played little part in the UAW’s split from the AFL-CIO, especially considering that 
the AFL-CIO supported some pollution control endeavors – though its goals were 
certainly more cautious than the Auto Workers’.  Still, Reuther’s desire to work 
tightly with environmentalists, and Meany’s refusal to do so, was part and parcel of 
the larger dynamics at play between the two in regard to civil rights and the Vietnam 
War.  By aligning himself with the environmental cause, Reuther also encouraged 
other unionists to support his social unionist vision. 
 The United Auto Workers provided funds and manpower to the Earth Day 
events, and Reuther personally worked hard to spread the clean environment message 
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as well.  In the days leading up to the event, Reuther shared the stage with 
congressional leaders of the Earth Day campaign, trying to increase support for the 
event and, more importantly, for the environmental protection legislation that was to 
follow.  On March 13, he and Edmund Muskie challenged a standing-room only 
crowd of University of Michigan students to get organized politically on the state and 
local levels.  Reuther took his time with the crowd and in interviews afterward to 
remind people of his union’s commitment to healthy workplaces and healthy 
communities, and he promised to make pollution control an issue in UAW collective 
bargaining with auto manufacturers.  It became exactly that, as nearly 750 
environmental protection demands were made by UAW representatives in contract 
negotiations that year.
96
   
 The UAW’s support for Earth Day was all the more impressive considering 
that the product most of its members were paid to assemble – the automobile – was 
not going to escape its share of condemnation.  After all, it was the omnipresent car 
that belched lead-contaminated fumes and covered American cities in a haze of smog.  
Sixty percent of air pollution in the United States, the New York Times reported two 
days before Earth Day, came from autos.
97
  And when Earth Day arrived, citizens 
across the nation did indeed seek out ways to symbolically protest the dangerous 
pollution of the internal combustion engine.  Some decided to leave their car in the 
garage for the day, choosing to walk or bike instead.  College students buried cars or 
their engines on many different campuses, while students at Wayne State University 
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in Detroit planned a more spectacular event – picketing General Motors headquarters.  
Several big cities, including New York and Philadelphia, cordoned off parts of town 
from motorized vehicles; meanwhile, New York City Mayor John Lindsay asked 
municipal services to only use cars for emergencies and trotted out an electric car, 
which he used in his travels among the city’s events.
98
   
 Rather than being deterred by the targeting of automobiles, the UAW used the 
opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to the environmental cause.  Senator 
Nelson was invited to speak at the Auto Workers’ national convention in Atlantic 
City on April 21, and he used the opportunity to call for cleaner, emission-free 
engines.  His comments largely echoed those made by Reuther one day earlier when 
he declared in his presidential address that “the auto industry is one of the worst 
culprits and has failed to meet its public responsibility.”
99
  Cleaner engines and a 
greater emphasis on mass transportation, Reuther claimed, could help solve the 
environmental crisis while at the same time maintaining high levels of employment 
for auto workers.  The convention delegates, presumably convinced by the arguments 
of Reuther and Nelson, passed a resolution calling for a national “Environmental Bill 
of Rights,” using the collective bargaining process to fight pollution, and imposing “a 
rigid timetable ... upon the auto industry to develop an engine that will not pollute the 
air.”
100
  As if to reemphasize the sincerity of the resolution, the UAW followed it up 
by bringing a propane-powered car to lead the Earth Day parade in St. Louis, to 
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demonstrate that automobiles could produce little emissions if the industry took the 
problem of air pollution seriously.
101
 
 If the AFL-CIO did not share the UAW’s enthusiasm for Earth Day, it was not 
alone.  With the exceptions of the Wilderness Society and the Conservation 
Foundation, the major, established conservation groups participated only marginally 
as well.
102
  For many, their hesitation was cultural.  Establishment conservationists 
including Michael McCloskey worried that Earth Day was going to be dominated by 
New Left radicals and those whose environmental concern “expressed itself through a 
lifestyle emphasis involving voluntary simplicity, and communes, and things of that 
sort,” i.e. hippies.
103
  The older groups also thought that the focus of Earth Day was 
misplaced and that urban pollution would detract attention from their pet issue of 
wilderness protection.   
 Each of these feelings was manifest within the Sierra Club as much as any 
other organization.  The buttoned-down, culturally conservative leadership of the 
Club was uncomfortable with the long-haired student protestors they imagined at the 
helm of the new movement, and theses leaders were also unsure of the direct action 
tactics that were being organized in some quarters.  McCloskey later justified the 
Club’s inactivity by claiming that it “wasn’t sure it had much expertise when it came 
to mass demonstrations, and we did not particularly identify with the counterculture 
that was heavily involved in Earth Day organizing.  We believed more in mastering 
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the arts of political persuasion than in demonstrating to show our discontent.”
104
  The 
staid Club conservationists clearly worried that their image could be tarnished if the 
public came to associate their movement with New Left activism.   
 At the same time, many in the upper echelons of the Club were also concerned 
that wilderness issues would be left behind with the emergence of new environmental 
concerns.  This fear was especially apparent among the volunteer directors.  Ed 
Wayburn, the Club’s president from 1961 to 1964 and again from 1967 to 1969, 
worried “we cannot afford to let up on the battles for old-fashioned Wilderness Areas, 
for more National Parks, for preservation of forests and streams and meadows and the 
earth’s beautiful wild places.”
105
  While it was good that people were paying attention 
to the environment, the new environmental concerns could prove to be distractions 
from needed conservation initiatives.  The Club’s leaders were not yet convinced that 
these other issues mattered as much as their traditional interests, and they also knew 
that they lacked expertise in dealing with pollution and urban environmental 
problems.  If new issues came to the fore, the Club risked losing some of the prestige 
it had acquired through decades of involvement with the wilderness.  Any focus on 
“approaches other than those the traditional movement has pioneered and knows 
best,” noted McCloskey, could mean falling membership, falling donations, or other 
disasters.  He also hoped that “our willingness to learn and to work with others will 
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 All these worries combined to make the Sierra Club approach Earth Day with 
apprehension, but the organization could not avoid it entirely.  The national office 
gave the chapters permission to get involved in whatever way they saw fit, and those 
that did participated in the same type of locally planned events as the rest of the 
country.  The national office Sierra Club also got its famous books department 
involved with the publication of an anthology called Ecotactics.  The book was 
designed as a primer to help show the newly environmentally-aware ways to get 
involved; it sold 400,000 copies in the months around the event.
107
  McCloskey 
himself spoke at the University of Minnesota on Earth Day, delivering the keynote 
address for the day’s events, encouraging the audience “to make a lifelong 
commitment to environmental work.”
108
  
 If the Sierra Club national leaders were hoping that Earth Day would pass 
without affecting their priorities very much, they were in for a disappointment.  Earth 
Day had an impact on the Club far out of proportion to its moderate involvement, and 
it ended up reshaping the organization in important ways.  Luckily, most of the 
changes seemed to benefit the group, rather than harming it, as many board members 
had feared.  Rather than being left behind by the emerging “new environmentalism,” 
the Club was able to adapt better than almost any other conservation organization and 
became the nation’s leading voice on environmental matters. 
 Between 1969 and 1971, the Sierra Club’s membership grew from 79,000 to 
131,000.  McCloskey reasonably surmised that this growth was “caused in large 
measure by the explosion in media coverage in all things environmental in the months 
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leading up to the first Earth Day.”  The Club’s numbers did not just benefit from 
increased environmental awareness but also from its preexisting position as the best 
known conservation group in the country.  The “exploding media coverage created a 
new market for environmentalism,” McCloskey explained, “and in this market, the 
Sierra Club was already a well-established brand.”
109
  The Club’s staff understood 
that its growing membership had to do with the prominence of the organization in 
particular as much as it had to do with awareness of the environment generally, and 
they worked to increase its media exposure whenever possible. 
 In the end, Earth Day also helped create a more holistic approach to the 
environment within the Sierra Club – “a new consensus, new agenda, new 
philosophy, and new approach,” in the words of the executive director.
110
  Important 
members of the professional staff were already leaning toward such a position, 
embracing pollution issues as well as wilderness, at the end of the 1960s, but they had 
a difficult time convincing the volunteer-led Board of Directors to accept a change in 
direction.  Earth Day helped give the staff the upper hand internally both by 
increasing the Board’s awareness of urban environmental problems and by allowing 
the staff to argue that if they did not embrace the concerns of the public, the Club 
would become irrelevant.  Also, since a large portion of the Club’s new membership 
was made up of the same young idealists who had turned out to Earth Day events, the 
elected Board now had a new constituency to worry about pleasing.
111
  Within 
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months, pollution issues took on a new life within the group, and they decided to 
create alliances to further the goals of ending air and water pollution.
112
 
Labor-Environmental Cooperation After Earth Day 
The environmental regulatory system that was built between 1970 and 1975 is 
testament to the ecological awareness that Earth Day both contributed to and emerged 
from.  Congress passed a series of new federal environmental regulations in that 
period, including the National Environmental Policy Act (which established the 
Council on Environmental Quality, 1970), Clean Air Act (1970), the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act (1970), the Clean Water Act (1972), the Marine Protection, 
Research, and Sanctuaries Act (1972), the Pesticide Control Act (1972), the 
Endangered Species Act (1973), the Safe Drinking Water Act (1974), and the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (1975).  Responsibility to enforce these new regulations fell 
to a handful of similarly newly created federal agencies – including the 
Environmental Protection Agency, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
and the Consumer Product Safety Commission – as well as effected citizens, who 
could sue polluters for damages.  Private watchdog organizations also came to play an 
important role in enforcing environmental regulations.  The Sierra Club Legal 
Defense Fund became the best known in the late 1960s, when it convinced the court 
system to grant it standing to sue polluters even though members had not been 
personally injured by the pollution.  These reforms were similar in goals to some that 
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had come before, building on a groundwork that had been laid in the states in 
previous decades.  The major difference between the environmental regulatory 
system of the early 1970s and its predecessors was its scope; whereas earlier 
regulative systems targeted particular industries or sources of pollution, these new 
acts applied to the entire industrial system.
113
   
 As this new regulatory environment was taking shape, unions and 
environmental organizations worked together to make sure that the legislation would 
be strong enough to accomplish the difficult task of cleaning up the American 
environment.  Hoping to capitalize on the success of Earth Day, a strategy conference 
was organized by Denis Hayes and Environmental Action – the renamed 
Environmental Teach-In, Inc. – at the UAW’s Family Education Center in Black 
Lake, Michigan in the summer of 1970.  Built by the union in the late 1960s to be a 
place where unionists could come to learn, share tactics, and relax in serene wooded 
space, Black Lake was, according to Walter Reuther, “a thing of beauty where man 
and nature can live in harmony.”
114
  In the summer of 1970, it was also the place 
where 250 environmental leaders, student Earth Day organizers, and union chiefs 
came together to network, workshop ideas, and coordinate their efforts for the coming 
months.   
 The Black Lake conference included a great deal of spirited spit-balling of 
ideas, with the national press reporting that discussions “ranged over a wide variety of 
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urban and industrial pollution problems and political, legal and educational methods 
for forcing reforms.”
115
  Both sides felt free to raise their favored issues.  The 
unionists hoped to use the opportunity to create more of a groundswell for proposed 
legislation that would become the Occupational Safety and Health Act.  




The subject of the new movement’s tactics also attracted a great deal of 
attention.  Participants worried that electoral politics would prove ineffective in a 
political world where “politicians gave lip service to efforts to solve environmental 
problems, then emasculated antipollution bills in committee in response to the 
pressures of industrial lobbies.”  Surely, holding legislators’ feet to the public interest 
fire would be necessary, but conferees also considered more direct democratic means 
to produce environmental legislation, such as ballot referendums.  Other kinds of 
direct action tactics, such as creating “proxy fights in stockholders meetings,” also 
received some attention, as did various other ways to pressure polluters.
117
    
 Although the recently proposed Clean Air Act is not directly mentioned in the 
reports of the event, it was almost certainly a topic of discussion.  After all, it had 
been Senator Muskie’s announcement that he would push clean air legislation, more 
than anything else, which set the conference planning gears in motion a few short 
weeks after Earth Day.  And the coordinated effort subsequent to the conference 
smoothed the way for the Clean Air Act’s passage considerably.  The UAW, along 
with the Sierra Club and several other environmental organizations, signed a joint 
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statement to Congress calling for “air pollution control standards so tough they would 
banish the internal combustion engine from autos within five years,” and “guarantee 
every American a safer, cleaner atmosphere by 1975.”
118
  The union involvement in 
the lobbying efforts for the Clean Air Act was especially critical.  Business 
spokesmen attempted to defeat the bill by characterizing it as endangering the 
employment of industrial workers.  But when the UAW, OCAW, United 
Steelworkers, International Association of Machinists, and AFL-CIO (not all of 
whom were represented at Black Lake) registered their support, it “really muted the 
jobs issue,” according to Dennis Hayes.
119
 
 Similar activity characterized the next several years.  The Black Lake 
conference participants scored a second victory when OSHA passed later in 1970, 
with wide support from the environmental community.  “The in-plant environment is 
merely a concentrated microcosm of the outside environment,” Environmental Action 
reminded its followers, “the environmental health hazards that workers face affect the 
entire population.”
120
  Communication between the various organizations was further 
institutionalized the next year, when the Urban Environment Conference was founded 
to provide a permanent meeting place for unionists, environmentalists, and consumer 
advocates.  The UAW, OCAW, and United Steelworkers joined with environmental 
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organizations again in 1972 to lobby for that year’s environmental initiatives.  The 
combined effort was especially critical in securing the passage of the Clean Water 
Act, which only became law after overcoming a presidential veto.
121
     
 The era’s biggest test for labor-environmental coalition builders came in 1973, 
when Shell Oil was struck by the OCAW.  In the fall of 1972, when the 175,000 
member Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers union entered into contract negotiations 
with the nation’s oil refiners, workplace environmental concerns topped their agenda.  
The union insisted on inserting clauses into the coming contracts that called for 
employee medical exams, third-party plant inspections by mutually agreeable experts 
paid for by the companies, and, most importantly, labor-management health and 
safety committees who could oversee plant safety and make binding decisions 
regarding safety policies and procedures.  Although refiners considered health and 
safety policies to be exclusively management prerogatives, most did not want to risk a 
major labor dispute over the issue.  So, by January, 1973, the union was able to come 
to terms with all of the nation’s largest oil producers except for two, one of whom 
was the second largest seller of gasoline and other petroleum products in the United 
States:  Shell Oil.
122
  
 Shell’s intransigence led the members of the eight OCAW locals they 
employed – among the most militant locals in the union – to walk out at the end of 
January.  However, the union realized that a strike on its own was not likely to have a 
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large enough impact on the company’s bottom line to affect the negotiations because 
most of Shell’s American production facilities had been automated by 1973 and 
“production continue[d] at all struck facilities.”
123
  So to increase the pressure on 
Shell, the OCAW called for a national boycott of its products.  The work the union 
had done to establish connections within the environmental community in the years 
prior paid dividends when eleven environmental groups quickly signed on to the 
boycott, claiming “this struggle is of historical importance in that it is the first time a 
major labor union has struck on what is fundamentally an environmental issue.”
124
 
 The question of whether or not to endorse the strike and boycott was a 
controversial one within the Sierra Club, which did not immediately join in.  
Although the group had made strides toward embracing a wider range of issues in the 
previous few years, taking sides in a labor dispute over in-plant conditions went too 
far for many.  Outraged board member Pete Zars fought vociferously against doing 
so, minimizing the dangers faced by industrial workers.  “It is my belief,” Zars wrote 
to his colleagues, “that the Club should have the least to do with the in-plant 
industrial environment and the most to do with the outdoor recreational 
environment….  When I accept a job as a dishwasher, I expect to deal with dirty 
dishes, hot soapy water, and fogged eyeglasses.”
125
  But at the same time, the OCAW, 
UAW, Friends of the Earth, Environmental Action, and other groups who were 
already participating in the boycott encouraged the Club to follow suit as a means of 
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cementing a positive image within labor circles.
126
  The question bubbled at various 
levels of the Club hierarchy for weeks, until the Board of Directors’ Executive 
Committee decided to support the strike in early March.  
 The Sierra Club’s association brought the boycott renewed attention and 
helped justify the strike among a larger segment of the population.  Uniting under the 
auspices of the Committee to Support the Shell Strike, the boycott’s labor and 
environmental planners disseminated ideas for how to conduct the boycott.  
Individuals could help by not buying Shell products and returning their Shell credit 
cards, while the more adventurous were encouraged to “Demonstrate at Shell 
offices... Picket Shell Service Stations... Distribute literature,” and try to pressure 
universities holding Shell stock to sell it.
127
  Within a few months the boycott’s 
impact was obvious:  sales of Shell gasoline were down by as much as a quarter.
128
   
Despite the pressure on Shell, the outcome of the boycott was mixed.  The 
OCAW was in even worse shape than the company, with strike funds dangerously 
low and one of the biggest striking locals pushing for independent negotiations.  The 
strike ended at the beginning of June with a compromise settlement – Shell allowed 
the creation of the health and safety committees, but their prescriptions would be 
nonbinding and the company would not have to pay for outside inspections.  Without 
the strict enforcement mechanisms, the committees in Shell plants were significantly 
less powerful than their counterparts at other refiners.
129
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In addition, in the wake of the boycott the Sierra Club’s grassroots members 
made it clear to their leaders that the directors who pushed to join the boycott had 
gotten out ahead of the rank and file.  Of the letters received by the national office 
reacting to the Board’s decision, only a few were written in support, while ten times 
as many expressed “doubt, puzzlement, or various degrees of unhappiness.”
130
  Many 
thought the decision was “too political” or were hostile to organized labor in general.  
But most of the hostility toward the decision to support the strikers emanated from the 
conservation branch of the group, those that thought the Club should stay out of 




Even though only eleven members dropped out of the Club in the month after 
joining the boycott, the grassroots anger that was expressed gave additional leverage 
to leaders who still felt insecure about embracing an ever-expanding vision of 
environmentalism.  The letters of disapproval that came into the San Francisco 
headquarters in 1973 expressed a fear that the organization would not be able to 
reconcile its “historic focus on natural areas” with a new, broader agenda.
132
  These 
letters echoed the fears of Club President Ray Sherwin, who wondered if the “Club’s 
extension of its activities beyond traditional wilderness and resource conservation” 
would endanger its “credibility” with the public and policymakers.
133
  Although it 
was too late to put the genie back in the bottle entirely, the negative reaction of its 
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membership kept the Sierra Club’s efforts for the occupational environment limited to 
small, symbolic actions for several more years.   
 The outcome of the Shell strike and boycott was not exactly what the labor-
environmental organizers would have wanted.  The strike ended with partial success 
at best, and stirred a reaction among Club members that chastened the organization’s 
biggest advocates of workplace environmentalism.  Yet, the effort was not a total 
disappointment.  By bringing the forces of organized labor and environmental politics 
together in strong collaboration, the boycott showed that the two sides could rely on 
one another for support.  Coming as it did during a period of increasing cooperation, 
the boycott appeared to be the culmination of a long journey towards a firm blue-
green alliance. 
Conclusion 
For decades, there had been considerable overlap in the agendas of organized labor 
and environmentalists.  When the Sierra Club proposed expanding the National Park 
System or setting aside land as a wilderness preserve, they often found many unions 
willing to accede to those demands.  When they called for the protection of natural 
resources, unions agreed that using up the nation’s supplies of timber, minerals, and 
soil was a bad idea.  And when some of the biggest conservation organizations in the 
country belatedly recognized that pollution was an issue worthy of their concern, they 
found that progressive unions such as the UAW had been working for clean air and 
water for nearly a generation.  But while the two sides pursued overlapping goals, 
they did so independently and only occasionally acknowledged one another’s efforts.  
 76 
 
Nothing that could fairly be called a coalition, or even a relationship, existed between 
them.   
 This chapter has argued that the first Earth Day changed that dynamic by 
opening a pathway for closer, more sustained interaction.  This pathway was laid 
down by the outpouring of regulatory initiatives that followed in Earth Day’s wake, 
which were instrumental in creating a relationship between organized labor and the 
environmental movement.  Recognizing the need for massive and sustained pressure 
for a cleaner environment, unions and environmental organizations reached out to one 
another as they never had before.  Instead of independently pushing for the Clean Air, 
Clean Water, and Occupational Safety and Health Acts, the two sides established a 
united message: these initiatives are good for all Americans, regardless of their 
employment.  The experience of helping craft the Clean Air and Occupational Safety 
and Health Acts created a foundation of good communication to draw on, and the 
new regulations also created a legal framework whose continued monitoring would 
keep labor and environmentalists in dialogue.  During the Shell strike, this 
cooperation went beyond talk and beyond lobbying.  Workers, framing their problems 
as environmental ones, asserted their rights to control their workplace atmosphere; 
environmental organizations moved outside of their comfort zones to participate in 
protest action in support.   
 However, workplace health and safety issues were controversial within the 
Club.  Although some members supported embracing them and the relationship to 
labor more extensively, others argued that doing so was a mistake.   There was more 
at stake in this skirmish than a minor tactical point.  The early occupational safety and 
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health debate took place at a time of major philosophical transition for the Sierra 
Club, as the youthful cohort of members who were drawn to the organization in the 
wake of Earth Day sought to infuse the group with a broader understanding of 
environmentalism than the more established, traditional membership base was 
comfortable with.  For much of the Club’s old guard, taking on urban environmental 
issues such as occupational health and safety, pollution, and solid waste was an 
uncomfortable step away from the natural area protection agenda that had initially 
drawn them to the Sierra Club.  “Bit by bit,” Will Siri would later recount “the Club’s 
vision broadened to include such things as pesticides, pollution ... energy, and even 
labor.  This at first was not accepted with enthusiasm by all members of the Club.  A 
few argued that the Sierra Club was a wilderness conservation organization, and let’s 
stay in the woods.”
134
 
   Staying in the woods was not an option, however.  The flood of young 
people joining the group in the wake of Earth Day did not just bring new ideas; their 
sheer numbers also rapidly increased the complexity of managing the organization, 
which in turn strengthened the hand of the professional staff.  Although they 
backtracked on occupational health, the staff, led by Michael McCloskey,  was 
increasingly moving toward a broader vision of environmentalism.  They would not 
give up on pollution, and they would not willingly give up on the labor alliance.  
Their commitment to that alliance would be tested even more in the coming years. 
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Chapter 3: Recession and Green Blackmail, 1972-1976 
In recognition of the Sierra Club’s support during its 1973 Shell strike, the Oil, 
Chemical, and Atomic Workers invited Michael McCloskey to speak at its annual 
convention in August.  He was a natural choice.  McCloskey had grown up in Oregon 
in the 1940s, the son of “fervent New Deal Democrats.”
135
  He had worked in a 
cannery in high school and college before graduating and serving a tour in the Army.  
McCloskey later attended law school at the University of Oregon with an eye toward 
a potential political career.  However, that dream rapidly faded in 1961, when 
McCloskey took a job as the first field organizer in the Sierra Club’s history, 
responsible for managing operations across the Northwestern United States.  
 By 1969, McCloskey had assumed leadership of the entire Sierra Club and 
had continued to steer the organization in the general direction that had been laid out 
by his predecessor, Dave Brower.  Like Brower, McCloskey envisioned the Club as 
an assertive organization that “would not shy away from controversy.”
136
  He also 
understood that it was in the Club’s best interest to not just be a wilderness 
organization, but to actively engage with the wider concerns of modern 
environmentalism.  At the same time, the lawyerly McCloskey did not attract the sort 
of negative attention that the grandstanding Brower sometimes did.  McCloskey saw 
tremendous value in compromise, big-tent environmentalism, and in nurturing 
political alliances wherever they could be found.  He brought to the directorship a 
history of working with unions and blue-collar workers, and he was one of the 
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leading voices in convincing the Club’s Board to support the OCAW strike.
137
  He 
was, and in the coming years would continue to be, one of his group’s fiercest 
proponents of cooperation with organized labor. 
 McCloskey’s convention speech, entitled “Labor and Environmentalism: Two 
Movements that Should Work Together,” outlined an argument for blue-green 
collaboration that would have been familiar to many in the audience.  He noted that 
the two movements had a great deal in common and shared similar political 
opponents.  “Both of us have learned that a mercenary society that is callous about the 
fate of workers,” he declared, “is apt to be callous about the fate of the public’s health 
and the rights of other living things....  We have both suffered from the callousness of 
industries that don’t care, whose only goal is profit, who fight every reform, who 
oppose every program, who never stop disparaging us, and who never tire of 
misleading the public.... With the forces arrayed against us, we need to work together 
if we are to have any chance of succeeding.”
138
 
 Not only did the two sides face similar obstacles, but they also had recent 
history on their side.  McCloskey recalled a litany of familiar occasions when unions 
and environmental organizations had collaborated on shared goals, including the 
creation of OSHA, the passage of the Clean Water Act (along with provisions that 
would allow workers to call for EPA investigations of plants suspected of 
endangering their health), and preventing the building of an American supersonic 
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  Given their growing familiarity with one another, McCloskey 
was hopeful that workers and environmentalists could continue to work together to 
achieve their overlapping interests.  
 At the same time, McCloskey’s tone was as much defensive as it was 
optimistic.  He worried that the environmental community was being made into a 
boogeyman by industrial polluters, and that unions were not doing enough to combat 
the stereotype of the environmental job killer.  “Environmentalists are beginning to 
feel that they are being singled out for special criticism on the job issue,” McCloskey 
claimed, despite the fact that little hard evidence existed to support the allegation that 
environmental protection led to plant closures.
140
  “It is time for the labor movement 
to realize that it can’t uncritically accept management’s word on ecology or 
environmental matters any more than it can on working conditions and wages and 
hours....  Any union which looks only to management for word about what the future 
holds in terms of supplies, raw materials and markets may be dumbly being led to 
slaughter."
141
  Within a very short period of time, McCloskey’s fears would prove to 
be prescient, as the cooperative activity between labor unions and environmental 
organizations began to falter. 
 Many scholars have correctly suggested that the mid-1970s was a rocky 
period for blue-green collaboration.  Historians Scott Dewey and Brian Mayer, for 
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example, each individually made that argument more than ten years apart.
142
  The 
same is true for sociologist Michael Dreiling, who posited in his essay “From Margin 
to Center: Environmental Justice and Social Unionism as Sites for Intermovement 
Solidarity” that “the labor-environmental alliance that culminated in the passage of 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act and Clean Air Act amendments had run 
course by the early 1970s.”
143
  These scholars and others further suggest that the dual 
causes of this split were the deep recession and energy crisis that both began in 1973.  
These two issues, the historical literature insists, were a brutal one-two punch from 
which coalition builders in the labor and environmental movements struggled to 
recover.
144
    
 Unfortunately, none of these scholars actually investigate this claim of 
causality.  The labor-environmental relationship in the mid- to late-1970s has never 
been the focus of historical examination; the period has served primarily as either a 
coda at the end of a postwar study or a brief introductory catch-up leading into an 
exploration of the 1980s or later.
145
  Since the mid-1970s are not the focus of these 
studies, their presentations of the era tend to be impressionistic, with secondary 
sources and a dash of common sense taking the place of detailed primary analysis.  
Taking a deeper look at the period over the next two chapters, I hope to disentangle 
inherited wisdom from historical reality.  This deeper look reinforces the idea that the 
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recession drove a wedge between unions and environmental organizations while 
calling into question energy issues’ role in that break. 
 This chapter explores the recession’s effects on labor-environmental coalition 
making.  It argues that a concerted campaign by the forces of industry designed to 
weaken and discredit cross-movement collaboration, combined with recessionary 
economic pressure on workers and their institutions, led to a breakdown in 
cooperative activity as labor organizations pulled away from environmentalists and 
reconsidered their previous environmental commitments.  The industry’s campaign, 
led after 1972 by the Business Roundtable, struck cultural as well as economic 
chords, threatening blue-collar workers across the country with the prospect of job 
loss for the sake of granting a few snobby environmentalists a pristine wilderness in 
which to play.  Green blackmail, the term adopted by unions and environmental 
organizations alike to describe such threats from business, became an important 
dynamic in the relationship between workers and environmentalists, as the recession 
seemed to offer an affirmation of business leaders’ claims that the new regulatory 
system developing in the United States would damage the nation’s economy.   
 Concerned environmentalists, finding themselves on the defensive with their 
former unionist partners, did whatever they could to win back their erstwhile allies.  
The Sierra Club struggled to refocus the terms of the economic debate by arguing that 
environmentalism was a job creator rather than a job destroyer.  It proposed 
legislation to prevent green blackmail and to provide for compensation to any 
workers who were actually displaced by new environmental policies.  The Club even 
created a committee within its leadership structure devoted to courting back working 
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people.  Its efforts, along with those few voices from the labor movement still calling 
for closer cooperation, had little effect.  Coalition builders found themselves forced to 
adopt a defensive posture, focusing their time on showing that environmentalism did 
not create problems for working people rather than demonstrating its benefits for 
them.       
The Business Counterattack 
From the perspective of environmental movement veterans, industrial polluters 
appeared to have been caught off guard in 1970 by the rising tide of public support 
for environmentalism building around Earth Day.
146
  As ebullient environmentalists 
pushed legislation through Congress and state legislatures, and many Americans took 
it upon themselves to undertake more environmentally conscious lifestyles, industrial 
polluters scrambled to find a way to stem the movement.  But corporate messaging 
stumbled badly in the months following the event.  Presenting Americans with an 
unfocused and inconsistent series of messages, a normally slick public relations 
apparatus struggled to paint a picture of the environment that would sway the debate 
in its favor.   
 The initial industry response to surging public concern with the environment 
was to obfuscate the issue.  Some polluters kept their emission records secret from 
investigators, others denied that a problem existed or claimed that even if the 
environment was polluted, further study was needed to understand the trouble’s 
causes and consequences.
147
  When environmental problems ultimately proved too 
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stark to minimize, the industrial response shifted to deflecting blame to the public at 
large.  Chemical manufacturer Hercules Incorporated, for example, admitted that 
“there is no doubt that the flow of pollutants into the ground, streams and the air we 
breathe has waxed for many years and it is time to make it wane,” but it was not 
willing to accept what it considered to be undue amounts of responsibility for that 
problem.  “The sources of pollution are multiple,” Herculese contended, “the public is 
so used to using the environment as a sink for its unused and unwanted by-products, 
that it is hard to get them to realize the true picture or to accept the ultimate 
responsibility which must rest with the people.”
148
  In this way, many corporations 
hoped to avoid public perceptions of their guilt by shaping the nation’s understanding 
of the problem as one of individual responsibility.  This line of reasoning suggested 
that the solution to the pollution issue lay in turning off the lights and properly 
disposing of household garbage rather than in government regulation. 
 Instead of running from the public’s new-found environmental outrage, other 
companies hoped that by greening their image and voluntarily undertaking 
environmental programs they could avoid mandatory regulations and perhaps even 
turn that sense of outrage to their advantage.  Pepsi Cola President James Sommerall 
encouraged bottlers of his beverages to take part in anti-litter projects in their home 
areas because “by doing so, you will win many friends and influence those people 
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who might otherwise attempt to push through legislation banning nonreturnables 
(bottles) and cans.”  Likewise, the Air Transport Association complained to reporters 
that “the airlines recognize that contamination of the air through which they fly must 
be stopped....  We think we have earned the right to do our part ourselves – without 
being told by the government.”  Even the chairman of notorious polluter Standard 
Oil, J.K. Jamieson, boasted of his company’s multi-million dollar investments in 
pollution control research and development.
149
   
 Generally speaking, these appeals fell on deaf ears in the months surrounding 
Earth Day.  Journalists lambasted greening PR attempts as distractions that detracted 
from the true meaning of the event and threatened to make it, in the words of 
Washington Post columnist Nicholas von Hoffman, “a muddled media carnival, a 
paint-up, clean-up, fix-up hoax... an opportunity for institutional advertising, for 
making us think these companies are friendly corporate neighbors and not a part of a 
marketing system which pollutes to prosper.”
150
  The public also refused to accept 
that regulation put an undue burden on polluting industries.   Letters flooded into the 
nation’s major newspapers, challenging the pro-growth assumptions being made by 
business spokesmen.  One typical response argued “the causes of pollution lie not in 
the accelerating growth of the world economy, but rather in the curious way 
Americans...have chosen to price our natural resources....  If... the peoples of the 
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world through their governments... would assess a price for an act which results in 
pollution, the act of polluting would become unprofittable and would be stopped.”
 151
    
 As ineffectual as corporate America’s early environmental campaign was, it 
had within it seeds of two arguments that would later bear fruit.  The first was 
economic.  A clean environment, business leaders were sure to note, could not be 
achieved without cost.  The important question then became who was going to have 
to pay that cost, with the most likely candidates being consumers and workers.  
Donald Cook, president of the American Electric Power Company, expressed this 
view in a letter to the New York Times; “it is one thing to say that a utility company 
must spend $100-million on air-pollution control equipment,” he wrote.   “It is 
another for the customers to realize that their electric bills must increase $15-million 
a year to make this expenditure possible.”
152
  And if customers would not be footing 
the bill directly through higher prices, workers would be forced to pay indirectly 
through lower wages or fewer employment opportunities.  Months prior to Earth Day, 
corporations were already warning of potential job cuts in the event that “the cost of 
[pollution] control devices was excessive.”
153
  For these observers, continual growth 
was both the hallmark of a strong economy and the basis of environmental problems.  
By putting the two in opposition they told Americans that the country could have one 
or the other, but not both.    
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 The cost of environmentalism was explored early and often in the press, 
reinforcing the idea that difficult choices loomed.  Time magazine devoted space to 
the bind that U.S. industry found itself in when confronted by environmental 
questions.  “Industry’s problem,” the magazine claimed “is almost as complex as an 
ecosystem....  If they close polluting plants... they throw employees out of work, and 
employment is part of a corporation’s social responsibility.  Beyond this is the 
problem of who shall pay for anti-pollution devices.  Ultimately the consumer, of 
course, but how much will he accept?”
154
  In 1970 and 1971, these reports, including 
the Time piece, accepted the main thrust of the anti-environmental argument even as 
they remained optimistic that environmental problems could be solved for a price that 
was low enough to bear.   
 The second tactic that industry apologists experimented with in 1970 was to 
present environmentalists as unreasonable or uninformed zealots.  This cultural 
challenge to environmentalism sought to associate environmental reform with the 
youth/hippy counterculture that was so shocking to middle-class American 
sensibilities.  The warning offered by Urban T. Kuechle, president of a major 
appliance manufacturer, to Gaylord Nelson during the planning stages of Earth Day 
struck that familiar chord.  “Too often programs of this type,” he wrote the Senator, 
“are infiltrated by irresponsible and radical persons who seek to turn noble programs 
into platforms for preaching hate and violence.  Certain militants... seem more 
interested in espousing... the total overthrow of the business community, than they do 
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in working toward sensible and acceptable solutions.”
155
  Two months before Earth 
Day conservative commentator David Anderson made a similar case in the Wall 
Street Journal, where he characterized environmental philosophy as being dominated 
by no-growth, primitivist hippies who had little concept of what their “oversimplified 
assessments of the future” would mean for the nation’s economy.
156
    
For the time being these assertions failed to connect with either Americans in 
general or with union leaders in particular.  Environmentally inclined laborites saw 
pollution as a threat equal to job loss.  To those leaders, as well as to their 
environmental allies, maintaining strong links with one another was assumed to be 
the best way to fight green blackmail.  “This relationship is a very basic prerequisite 
to achieving meaningful anti-pollution legislation-enforcement as well as obtaining 
economic protection for industrial workers threatened with job-loss ‘for 
environmental reasons,’” UAW President Leonard Woodcock wrote to Michael 
McCloskey in 1972, as the two planned the next steps for their organizational 
cooperation.  “This factor in itself further mandates the formation of closer working 
relationships between our organizations on a foundation that can assure its ever-
increasing productivity on a long-term continuing basis.”
157
  McCloskey agreed with 
that assessment, and he gave his union colleagues a great deal of credit for their early 
efforts in constraining the growth of anti-environmental sentiment in their 
organizations, telling George Meany that “this effort by industry has been largely 
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unsuccessful because the leadership of the labor movement has seen through this ploy 
and recognized the necessity to protect the environment in which all workers live.”
158
 
 Even unions that were less committed to the environmental program than the 
UAW could find a reason not to publicly break with environmentalists early in the 
1970s.  The nature of green blackmail made it easy to stand against on principle.  The 
practice clearly echoed anti-union drives, where employers illegally claimed that if 
the union came in, the plant would be forced to shut down.  At the same time, 
environmental activism was putting new demands on industry, which, some union 
leaders happily noted, was taking some pressure off of their organizations.  The 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters gleefully reported to its members that 
“increased militancy of consumers and increased public awareness of industry’s 
pollution guilt have placed the corporate giants on the defensive in an area unrelated 
to corporate bargaining.  Big business is reeling daily under the shock of new attacks 
upon it.”
159
  The hope was that business would not have the time or energy to fight 
unionization if it was busy fighting environmental battles.  Even if environmentalists 
were not their friends, some unions figured being their enemy’s enemy was good 
enough. 
In 1972, two fundamental changes occurred that would make the industry 
opposition to environmentalism more effective, especially in regard to breaking the 
alliance between organized labor and environmental organizations.  First, the 
founding of the Business Roundtable that year helped to consolidate corporate 
messaging.  The brainchild of the heads of Alcoa Aluminum and General Electric, the 
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Roundtable grew out of a more informal assemblage of CEOs called the March 
Group, which met regularly to discuss public policy issues.  Deciding that the new, 
non-industry specific environmental regulations of the 1970s made relying on their 
time-tested, industry by industry lobbying methods obsolete, the CEOs of about 200 
of the largest companies in the United States came together under the auspices of the 
Roundtable in an effort to give big businesses a united front in their lobbying efforts 
in Congress.  Later combining with the Construction Users Anti-Inflation Roundtable 
and the anti-union Labor Law Study Committee, the Roundtable formed itself into 
one of the most influential lobbying organizations in Washington.  Organized 
primarily to fight “government regulation of the workplace and environment,” by the 




Second, led by the Roundtable, the business community also honed its 
messaging in a way that cut environmentalists more sharply than before.  McCloskey 
later remembered that “the environmental movement was attacked for ostensibly 
promoting a ‘no growth’ agenda that, it charged, would stunt the economy and dry up 
jobs.”
161
  The content of such attacks was nothing new – corporate America had 
complained for years about the expense of complying with environmental regulation 
– but they were now newly focused and much more targeted.  Consumers were no 
longer central to the anti-environmental drive; instead workers and labor unions 
became the focus of a campaign meant to convince them that environmentalists “were 
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a threat to their employment and their well-being.”  The more politically conservative 
building trades unions were especially targeted by the employer offensive aimed at 
driving a wedge between environmental organizations and the working class.
162
   
This contention became especially effective when paired with a change in the 
cultural messaging on environmentalists.  Instead of being hippies, environmentalists 
were now charged with being elitists.  One of the first to make this critique appears to 
have been Lutheran pastor Richard Neuhaus, whose 1971 book In Defense of People: 
Ecology and the Seduction of Radicalism argued that environmentalists pursued 
narrow class interests that were diversions from the needs of the poor.
 163
  But 
following the onset of the recession, the argument gained salience after being picked 
up by the business press.  The Wall Street Journal became a frequent proponent of the 
idea that environmentalists were “well-to-do elitists trying to deny the poor what they 
themselves already enjoy.”
164
  The concept ultimately even made its way into soft 
news sources such as Harpers Magazine, which in 1977 published a lengthy article 
by conservative columnist William Tucker that compared environmentalists to the 
English gentry as “members of the local aristocracy, often living at the end of long, 
winding country roads.”
165
   
Although this conceptualization of the environmental movement would later 
become highly racialized, for the moment it remained primarily a class-based attack.  
Labor and civil rights activist Bayard Rustin was one of few observers in the mid-
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1970s to inject race into the discussion, arguing in the New York Times that an 
environmentalism that limited growth would “measurably worsen the nation’s ... 
economic plight.  And its promoters would bear the responsibility for having 
shattered the hopes of those who have never had a normal role in the world economy, 
among whom the darker-skinned people of the world rank most prominently.”
166
   
Still, even Rustin’s analysis focused mostly on class, and the accusations of racism 
that would haunt environmentalists in the 1980s were almost wholly absent from the 
discussion in the 1970s.  However, that it was being circulated by a well-respected 
liberal activist such as Rustin demonstrates how quickly the idea spread that 
environmental organizations were willing to sacrifice the economic well being of the 
nation’s most vulnerable populations for the select few backpackers and naturalists 
they represented.   
 By the eve of the recession, the corporate anti-environmental campaign was 
already starting to score some victories.  Growing numbers of union leaders, while 
not quite ready to dismiss the environmental cause entirely, were becoming anxious 
about what it could mean for their members’ livelihoods.  Association of Western 
Pulp and Paper Workers President Hugh Bannister demonstrated this internal conflict 
on the subject of ecology in correspondence with Michael McCloskey.  Bannister 
expressed sympathy for the Sierra Club’s cause “as an outdoors man” interested in 
more National Parks and wild areas.  He told McCloskey that the latter did not have 
to fear Bannister’s organization playing the game of “labor environmental backlash” 
because, despite what industry may want, “we don’t intend to be cast in a mold of 
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  However, the letter also makes it plain how much the threat 
of job loss weighed on Bannister’s mind.  Further regulation of his industry, he 
worried, “will probably force the closure of several of our plants with a job loss of 
more than 2000 people.... It’s very difficult to receive a guaranteed annual income 
from an industry that has been closed down.”
168
  Bannister refused to play the role of 
stooge for the paper industry, but even as he recognized the possibility that he was 
being manipulated, he had to take the threat of plant closure seriously.   
 The growing tension within the labor movement was also clearly evident at 
the California Labor Federation’s statewide convention in 1972.  As the delegates 
attempted to draft a policy statement on the environment that would be acceptable to 
a majority of those in attendance, the difficulty in balancing the convention’s pro- and 
anti-environmental forces became manifest.  The resulting statement turned out to be 
the type of muddled document that only a committee could love.  In it, the Federation 
criticized “employers [who] often try to exploit the job insecurity of workers in order 
to get worker support for their efforts... to recruit organized labor as an ally in [their] 
struggle to avoid environmental responsibilities.”
169
  At the same time, it devoted 
equal space to, and displayed equal anger at, those who “would sacrifice someone 
else’s job for environmental purity.”  The delegates’ prescriptions for future action – 
including mass transit building and long-term environmental and economic planning 
– were the sort of state endeavors that labor-environmental coalition builders 
continued to stress, but the language of the backlash was sneaking in.  
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Environmentalists were framed as “affluent suburbanites” and as people with “a 
callous disregard for the legitimate needs and aspirations of workers.”
170
  The 
statement demonstrates the awkward position that organized workers were starting to 
find themselves in, recognizing the need for clean air and open spaces, but worrying 
that those things took precedence over their immediate needs in the minds of elite 
environmental leaders.   
   Despite some defections, blue-green alliance builders still thought they had a 
workable program.  Major pieces of environmental legislation, including the Clean 
Water Act, continued to draw significant support from organized labor.  More 
importantly, environmental blackmail had been identified as a threat by both sides, 
and alliance builders were moving forward with efforts to curb it.  To that end, they 
helped guide legislation through Congress in the form of the Public Works and 
Economic Development Act of 1972.  The act would have fought green blackmail by 
helping workers who were legitimately displaced by environmental improvements 
find new work, and by paying for their housing for a year and unemployment for 
seventy-eight weeks.  The bill was vetoed by Nixon, but its proponents persisted in 
trying to achieve its goals.  By 1973, the corporate counterattack had some workers – 
especially those in the most unstable and environmentally harmful industries – 
rethinking their commitment to environmentalism, but few were sure that they should 
totally throw their lot in with industry just yet.  The recession would help to convince 
them.  






The recession of 1973, which officially lasted until 1975 but continued to reverberate 
through the economy long after, shocked a nation that had lived through a generation 
of generalized prosperity and years of a booming job market, fed by government 
spending on the Vietnam War and the War on Poverty.  To quote economic historian 
David Sicilia, in 1973 “the United States economy shifted abruptly from growth to 
stasis.”
171
  Losses in productivity were mirrored by rising unemployment – the 
national unemployment rate would hit 9.2 percent by June of 1975, and it was even 
higher (13 percent) for blue-collar workers.  Factoring in the underemployed, those 
too discouraged to look for work, and those working jobs for which they were 
overqualified, labor economist David Gordon has figured that the true unemployment 
rate was closer to 17 percent.
172
  As Americans watched their take-home pay fall by 
almost 10 percent in two years, their real wages were in even worse shape, since a 
double-digit inflation rate ate away at what they were still able to earn.  The situation 
appeared “unreal” for those struggling through it, or, as one laid-off auto worker put 
it, “things have got to get better, because they can’t hardly get no worse.”
173
   
 The evaporation of the “labor market bonanza” of the 1960s and early 1970s 
added fuel to the corporate anti-regulatory campaign, as industry leaders acted 
quickly to capitalize on the recession by linking the tough economic times to their 
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  Corporate leaders staged a dozen conferences on inflation 
in cities across the country in the early months of 1974.  The conferences promoted 
the idea that government regulations had cost industry billions of dollars over the 
preceding few years, and in so doing had raised production costs and lowered factory 
investments.  Their prescribed solutions to the nation’s economic woes called for no 
new environmental regulations for three years and end to “overzealous enforcement” 
of existing ones.
175
  Ford Motor Company’s Henry Ford II agreed with those 
suggestions.  Before a congressional Joint Economic Committee meeting the next 
year, he testified that he had “never before felt so uncertain and so troubled about the 
future of both my country and my company....  I think the economy is more important 
in the short run than clean air.”
176
  Throughout the recession the business lobby made 
its claim plain to all who would listen: environmental controls were nonproductive 
costs that the struggling economy could no longer afford to bear.  
Predictably, the recession and concurrent energy crisis sapped a considerable 
amount of the nation’s interest in environmental reform.  Public opinion polling 
conducted by Gallup in 1974 showed ecological problems to be a very low priority 
for Americans, and their concern for such issues was continuing to fall.  Meanwhile, 
more than seven in ten thought the most important problem facing the nation was the 
economy.
177
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 However, any sense that the nation was ready to turn against ecology in the 
name of energy or economics was illusory.  The environment fell in relative 
importance in many people’s minds, but environmentalism was not itself blamed for 
the recession.  Americans remained supportive of existing environmental regulations 
even as new issues became predominant in their minds.  As a widely circulated 
Opinion Research Corporation study concluded, “even during a time of recession, 
high unemployment, and rising fuel costs, the public does not voice a readiness to cut 
back on environmental control programs to solve economic and energy problems.”
178
  
By late in 1976, public concern about pollution had even rebounded, as two-thirds of 
those surveyed that year said air and water pollution were “very serious” problems.  
People reported thinking that government and industry were doing a poor job of 
controlling pollution, and a large majority favored punishing continuously polluting 
industries by taxing them for their emissions.
179
  Despite the corporate world’s best 
efforts to take advantage of the situation, neither the energy crisis nor the recession 
ultimately made for the massive public relations triumph that businessmen had hoped 
for. 
 Still, although the jobs argument was not effective in deterring Americans in 
general from backing environmental reform, it hit home with one audience:  blue-
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collar workers.  High national levels of support for environmental regulations 
obscured the fact that working-class endorsement of environmental reform was 
waning.  The same Opinion Research Corporation survey that demonstrated 
continued environmentalist sentiment in the U.S. also showed that such sentiment 
was significantly lower in blue-collar households than in their white-collar and 
unemployed counterparts.  Occupation was even a stronger predictor for low 
environmental support than income level, with blue-collar respondents slightly less 
supportive than those in the lowest income bracket.
180
  Many workers grew hostile 
toward an environmental movement that they believed would sacrifice their well-
being for environmental purity.  Soon, bumper stickers with the slogan “No Work, No 
Food – Eat an Environmentalist” became popular in steel regions such as the 
Mahoning Valley in eastern Ohio, where mill operators claimed EPA air and water 
regulations would force them to close plants.
181
  Workers had been cautious in the 
face of threatened job loss previously, but as the recession wore on those threats 
became increasingly convincing.     
 Support for environmentalists and environmental programs within organized 
labor fell.  Unions that had never been particularly inclined toward environmentalism 
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took the opportunity to lash out at those they accused of attacking their standard of 
living.  “Have the excesses of environmental extremists in attempting to block 
construction projects vital to the nation’s growth, economic health, and even our basic 
national security aroused such serious doubts that a major anti-environmental 
backlash is sweeping the country?” asked an editorial in the journal of the 
International Union of Operating Engineers.
182
  Even in friendly unions, an important 
shift in thinking was underway.  While the UAW and AFL-CIO continued to express 
a theoretical desire to work with environmentalists, they were concurrently walking 
back the strongest language of a couple years prior.  Thus, in the mid-1970s, the labor 
position evolved from calling for a clean environment even at the cost of jobs, to 
claiming that environmental regulations need not conflict with job interests, but 
should be opposed whenever they do.  
  The shift was especially notable in the United Auto Workers.  With the 
unexpected death of Walter Reuther in 1970, leadership of the UAW fell to the more 
conservative and pragmatic Leonard Woodcock, who had been serving as the union’s 
Vice President in charge of the General Motors division.  For several years 
Woodcock worked to continue the environmental policies of his predecessor, 
remaining in contact with the Sierra Club and other environmental organizations 
through the efforts of Vice President Olga Madar.
183
  But by the middle of the decade, 
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approximately 100,000 auto workers had been laid off, and rebuilding employment 
opportunities in that industry became the UAW leader’s primary concern.  At one 
time Woodcock had derided green blackmail as “the old politics of corporate 
irresponsibility,” and cautioned that “growth, given the way it has been and is being 
achieved, can no longer be defined optimistically as simply a higher standard of 
living; it must also be defined as a deterioration of the quality of life.”
184
  Now, 
although he maintained that the Big Three automakers should face legal requirements 
regarding emissions and fuel economy standards, he adopted the industry’s call for 
lowering those standards.  He repeated GM’s claim that the company would have to 
totally shut down production if it did not get an extension in meeting carbon 
monoxide and hydrocarbon emission standards, and he warned in a public letter to the 
EPA that “a decision which would compel the automotive industry to close down 
would bring chaos not only upon the workers and their families but upon the total 
economy of the nation.”
185
   
 Woodcock’s response was representative of the positions staked by other 
national labor leaders previously involved with environmental politics, who found 
themselves pressed between the hope of preserving a fruitful alliance and the needs or 
wishes of their members.  Even as they suspected that the dire environmental 
pronouncements of industry groups such as the Business Roundtable were more 
manipulations than honest assessments of risk, these leaders also recognized the 
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power such declarations could have over threatened members’ opinions.  The sensible 
position, it seemed, was to try to stake a middle ground.  Woodcock’s 
pronouncements on the issue tended to lay the blame for the “delicate relationship” 
between environmentalists and workers partially at the feet of “major corporations 
[that] have tried to hold workers, or at least their jobs, hostage against the application 
of environmental regulations,” and partially with “very real disagreements,” between 
the two sides “not so much over goals, but over how rapidly it is possible and feasible 
to reach them.”
186
  That balancing act was never particularly easy, and as the 
recession ran its course, these leaders tended to drift further away from the 
environmental camp.   
 As difficult as it was for major international unions to maintain their 
environmental commitments during the recession, the situation was even worse at the 
state and local levels.  State labor federations found themselves in the unenviable 
position of having to deal with concentrated unemployment problems stretching over 
numerous industries.  Frequently, they also decided that environmental priorities had 
fallen out of balance with the stability of the economy.  In New Jersey, for example, 
the unemployment problem facing blue-collar workers was severe; the state’s overall 
unemployment by the summer of 1974 was a relatively mild 7 percent, but that figure 
grew to 18 percent when considering just the industrial trades and included a 
staggering thirty percent of construction workers.  Unionists in the state believed that 
its “tough antipollution standards” were to blame for their state’s high unemployment 
rate compared to its neighbors.  The state AFL-CIO suggested fighting 
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unemployment by lowering environmental standards in the state and reconsidering 
dam and highway projects that had previously been ruled too environmentally 
destructive.
 187
  In that organization’s judgment, ecologists “pushed a ‘no growth’ 
philosophy that has crippled construction and development through excessively strict 
environmental legislation.”  Whenever the forces of organized labor in New Jersey 
assessed their state’s economic problems during the mid-1970s recession, they 
consistently diagnosed their problem as a lack of competitiveness born out of over-
done environmentalism.
188
    
 The situation was even more tense when it involved labor groups that had 
mixed or hostile feelings toward environmentalism to begin with.  Such was the case 
in California.  The home of the Sierra Club had been the scene of repeated clashes 
between environmentalists and unions (particularly those involved in the construction 
trades) around development issues in 1971 and 1972.  Labor beat back a San 
Francisco ordinance that would have limited buildings to a height of seventy-two feet, 
but lost a ballot initiative that imposed strict planning requirements for construction 
along the coast.  These proposals led California Labor Federation Executive 
Secretary-Treasurer Jack Henning to denounce environmentalists as “socialite 
liberals” who “want to turn cities into villages and stop any highway or dam 
construction that would displace a flower or tree.”
189
  The tension between the state’s 
blue-collar and green forces intensified when the economy started to slump.  A 
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Federation hosted conference on jobs and the environment the next year devolved 
into name-calling directed toward Ray Sherwin, the Sierra Club’s president who was 
there representing his group.  He was told that the environmental movement was full 
of “kooks,” by the president of the California State Building and Construction Trades 
Council, who also described the Club’s agenda as “the green grass and the posies 
grow, but to hell with human beings.”
190
   
 The arguments being made by the New Jersey and California labor federations 
highlight an important dynamic of the jobs versus environment conversation that was 
growing in the mid-1970s.  While workers in many localities worried about plants 
closing and jobs disappearing, the fear of jobs not being created was equally strong.  
Workers in places such as New Jersey worried that their state’s environmental 
regulations put them at a disadvantage in attracting capital investment, and California 
builders looked at delayed highways and cancelled nuclear plants and saw 
opportunities lost.  This aspect of the jobs/environment conflict could be even more 
insidious than job loss because evidence of its impact was so difficult to come by; 
how many of the jobs predicted to be needed for a site would have actually 
materialized if construction progressed was impossible to know, but that did not stop 
affected industries, unions, and workers from asserting economic harm.  For example, 
Laborers International Union research director James Sheets was willing to blame 
nuclear power construction cancellations for the loss of twenty thousand jobs for his 
union’s members, apparently without any statistical justification for that number.
191
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Once the idea that jobs were being lost to the environment took hold, jobs that never 
existed could carry as much weight as those that had been lost.    
 
The Sierra Club Response 
The growing, publicly apparent break between environmentalists and organized labor 
was a source of consternation for the major environmental organizations, whose 
leaders never wanted to make an enemy of organized labor.  The Sierra Club in 
particular moved swiftly to try to ease blue-green tensions.  One of the Club’s first 
initiatives to that end was to formalize a structure within the organization to manage 
and maintain its relations with unions.  Born of a “long standing conviction that 
organized labor and conservation organizations... should work together to define and 
then achieve common goals,” the Sierra Club’s Labor Liaison Committee (SCLLC) 
replaced the group’s earlier, ad hoc communication with labor.
192
  The committee’s 
goals were small: contact unions the Club had no connections with, engage those it 
already knew in dialogue “to find issues of common interest,” and make sure that 
Club members at the grassroots level were not unintentionally exacerbating tensions 
with workers by “sensitiz[ing] our members to understand the economic impact of 
environmental proposals.”
193
   
The committee’s members hoped early on that they could also inspire the 
creation of similar committees in local chapters, but their success in that area was 
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limited.  Most importantly, the SCLLC initiated a discussion within the organization 
about how environmental a question had to be before the Club could be comfortable 
weighing in on it.  Where should the organization’s boundaries be set, and would it be 
alright to politically horse trade with organized labor – “how many labor issues can 
we support in response to environmental issues we ask them to support,” they 
asked.
194
  This conversation was especially important in light of the recent backlash 
from the organization’s members over the Club’s participation in the Shell boycott.  
By putting such issues on the Club’s agenda, the Labor Liaison Committee helped to 
set the stage for the Club to promote non-environmental endeavors in the name of 
nurturing good will from unions. 
 Smoothing the channels of communication between their group and unions 
was a start, but Sierra Club staffers understood that diffusing the jobs issue was the 
real key to maintaining a strong relationship with organized labor.  Initially, they 
hoped to do so by building legal protections for employment into environmental 
legislation.  Having failed in their earliest attempt with the Public Works and 
Economic Development Act because of a presidential veto, environmentalists 
continued to inject the concept into all sorts of environmental bills.  For example, 
during hearings for the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, environmentalists who 
hoped to shore up flagging labor support called for a federal compensation program 
for workers who lost their job to environmental plant closure.  The environmental 
community, they insisted, “recognizes there may be instances where a plant is forced 
to close down in an area where alternative employment is unavailable....  In those 





instances we think the country as a whole should share the burdens imposed by the 
national air pollution control policy.”
195
   
 In addition to working to get employment protections included in major 
environmental legislation, the Sierra Club took the unusual step of supporting 
employment legislation that had no environmental component to speak of.  Club 
members, including the organization’s chief lobbyist Brock Evans, helped to found 
Environmentalists For Full Employment (EFFE) in 1975, with the goal of 
“publiciz[ing] the fact that it is possible simultaneously to create jobs, conserve 
energy and natural resources, and protect the environment.”
196
  The Club itself came 
out in favor of the full employment legislation known colloquially as the Humphrey-
Hawkins Act.  When the bill started being debated in Congress in 1976, the Club’s 
Labor Liaison Committee pushed for a statement of support from the Board of 
Directors.  Advising the Board that the group had been getting “a lot of ‘flak’ about 
the effect of environmental protection on jobs,” LLC members argued that supporting 
a bill that was a high priority for the labor movement would help bridge the growing 
gap between the two movements.
197
  With the Board’s blessing, Evans pressured his 
contacts in Congress to vote for the full employment enterprise, and Club President 
Bill Futrell publicly committed his organization to supporting the bill.  When the bill 
finally made it through the legislature in 1978 – albeit in a disappointingly watered 
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 As the Club worked to make the jobs issue less contentious by legislating 
employment protections, it also devoted considerable resources to showing that the 
choice between jobs and the environment was a false one.  It did its best to publicize 
studies by the EPA or Council on Environmental Quality that supported the idea that 
environmental regulation was not a drag on the economy – which those studies 
consistently did.  The claim that pollution controls caused plant closures could not be 
fully substantiated, as the CEQ found in 1975 when it reported “to date there is no 
evidence that 1) plant closings are important in terms of total unemployment or 2) 
that pollution control regulations have been a prime cause of a significant number of 
closings.”
199
   
Even assuming that employers were always honest when they claimed a plant 
was closed for environmental reasons, studies rarely found that environmental 
regulation was a significant contributor to the unemployment rate.  For example, the 
EPA reported in 1981 that just over 32,000 workers had lost their jobs to 
environmental plant closures since 1971 – less than one half of one percent of the 
American workforce.
200
  On the other hand, the CEQ and EPA consistently found that 
“environmental programs are stimulating construction, equipment, and research 
expenditures that would not otherwise be undertaken”; in other words, that 
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environmental regulations were net job creators.  Environmentalist defenders could 
and did frequently cite such reports as evidence that they were not callously 
disregarding the needs of workers, but were in fact benefitting them by pushing green 
programs.  
 As it worked to show that environmental regulations did not lead to job losses, 
the Sierra Club also tried hard to confront the idea that they were obstructionists 
standing in the way of new job creation.  The facts, Michael McCloskey contended, 
were that the Club only rarely opposed construction projects. “90% of the dams, and 
the freeways, and the factories of the United States have been built without any 
objection from environmentalists,” he told an assembly of unionists.  “We have 
objected to the few that have been ill-conceived, poorly located, or that are 
unnecessary.”
201
   
 But since mere assertions of this point appeared to be ringing hollow, the Club 
set out to develop some statistics to corroborate the point.  In 1975, the task was 
undertaken by Brock Evans, who designed what he came to call the Sierra Club Jobs 
Program.  The program consisted of assembling and disseminating a list of 
construction projects that the Club supported, and was intended to show how few 
building projects were being held up by environmentalists.  The program got a mixed 
response from the group’s state chapters which were supposed to designate the 
different projects as “controversial” or “non-controversial.”  The respondents from 
California supported only one in seven.  North Carolina’s reply included a tongue-in-
cheek suggestion that the shape of their list “makes me wonder if we shouldn’t just 
oppose any federal project and be done with it,” while at the same time only 
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disapproving of six out of thirty-one projects.  Still, Club leaders would find the list 
useful in combating the label of obstructionist by having the ready ability to show that 
that accusation was often not fair.
202
 
 Environmentalists asserted instead that the wasteful practices of industrial 
polluters constituted the real threat to employment.  Recognizing that, in the name of 
efficiency, businesses had been substituting machines for people for over a century, 
environmentalists argued that reversing that trend would be both environmentally 
beneficial and a boost to employment.
203
  In a charge that harkened back to the days 
of Progressive Era conservation, the Club alleged that U.S. industry was destroying 
natural resources at an unsustainable pace without regard for the future.  As it did so, 
it destroyed jobs as well.  Overcutting forests, McCloskey argued, would eventually 
lead to a collapse in employment in the timber industry; where was the outcry over 
these jobs?  “The salmon industry in the Northwest has been decimated by pollution 
and too many dams on the rivers leading to spawning streams,” he pointed out in his 
speech to the OCAW, but neither industrialists nor unions had done much “to save 
the jobs of all those once employed in the packing and fishing industries.  
Conservationists carried the load in trying to save the salmon.”
204
  In making the 
point that environmental stewardship was necessary to control the destructive 
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impulses of modern industry, environmentalists hoped to turn the tables on the 
business community by claiming for themselves the mantle of job protector. 
 They also wanted to show that they could be job creators.  It was an article of 
faith within the environmental community – substantiated by the findings of the EPA 
– that far from hurting workers’ employment chances, environmentalism created jobs.  
Depending on whom one asked, it did so in many ways.  Some, including the 
Wilderness Society’s Sally Ranney, contended that a clean environment allowed 
certain kinds of jobs to flourish.  “Clean air is a big industry,” she testified in support 
of the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments.  “Five million people took advantage of 
Colorado’s ski slopes in 1976, spending hundreds of millions of dollars.  Overall, the 
backpacking equipment and related industries sales were a $300 million industry in 
the United States last year.  Those who bought and used this equipment went to the 
clean air regions of the country.”
 205
  Others, sensing that focusing on the value of the 
tourism industry would only reinforce charges of environmental elitism, preferred to 
focus on the jobs that environmentalism could provide within more traditional 
industrial venues like manufacturing and construction.  Not counting the hundreds of 
thousands employed by the Park Service and Forest Service in conservation work, the 
Sierra Club estimated in 1973 “that 650,000 jobs have been created by modern 
environmental protection and pollution control programs,” in such sectors as 
construction and transportation.
 206
  Retrofitting houses for better energy efficiency, 
constructing mass transit and water treatment facilities, and designing and building 
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cleaner engines and sources of energy all held the potential for green blue-collar 
employment.  Even non-environmental work would require more manpower when 
done in an environmentally sound way.
207
   
 The Sierra Club’s campaign was mostly, but not completely, unsuccessful.  
Some labor groups, primarily those most concerned with industrial hygiene, also 
recognized green blackmail as a problem and worried that the discrediting of 
environmentalists within union circles hindered cooperative efforts between the two 
groups and made it harder to push for environmental improvements within plants.  
Concerned unionists continued to push back against the perceptions engendered by 
green blackmail where they could.  The AFL-CIO’s Industrial Union Department 
conducted its own investigation of the issue and concluded that none of the thirty-
nine plant closings alleged to have been caused by increased environmental 
regulation between 1970 and 1974 actually had been.
208
  The United Steelworkers 
framed the issue around OSHA, arguing that similar pressure was being exerted by 
industry to scale back worker-protective regulations as well.  USW Legislative 
Director John Sheehan claimed that the industry position was suspect:  “When 
[enforcement] occurs we begin to realize that most of the times the threats don’t 
really materialize....  Unfortunately, I think there are many who think the labor 
movement is automatically antienvironment.  I am afraid that impression both ignores 
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the fact and could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
209
   However, the union people 
who carried on with the environmental mantle had largely been marginalized within 
the movement as a whole.  Environmentalism had come to be seen as a threat in many 
important state labor bodies as well as the building trades international unions, which 
were highly influential with George Meany and others in the AFL-CIO brass. 
 
Conclusion 
In the mid-1970s, American industry sought to discredit environmentalism in the eyes 
of workers by convincing them that environmental reforms would endanger many 
jobs and that the proponents of such reforms were wealthy snobs who had the luxury 
to privilege their own comfort over other people’s standards of living.  With help 
from the recession, the campaign did just that, and it succeeded in separating 
environmental organizations from their labor allies.  Organized labor’s support for 
environmentalism declined, although it did not do so in a uniform manner.  Some 
leaders lashed out at environmentalists and participated fully in the environmental 
backlash, while others – mostly from industrial unions – considered the idea of 
environmental job loss to be a manipulative concoction, either wholly or in part.  The 
heads of unions such as the UAW and USW attempted to convince their members of 
that idea, and may have been inclined to fight harder were it not for the fact that blue-
collar workers often did not have the privilege of such perspective.  In the end, most 
union heads who had at one time been pro-environment followed the path of least 
resistance away from pushing for environmental regulation. 
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 Environmentalists responded to the corporate onslaught and labor’s declining 
support with frustration rather than acceptance.  They knew they could not idly sit by 
and watch as they were portrayed as out-of-touch elitists, as their relationships with 
labor unions fell apart, and as working-class support for their programs evaporated.  
In an effort to regain their footing, groups including the Sierra Club argued at various 
times that environmentalism created new jobs, protected those already in existence, or 
at the very least did not lead to major losses of employment for American workers.  
Club leaders went out of their way to maintain a dialogue with the labor movement, 
designing and implementing a program dedicated to that very thing.  The work of the 
group’s Labor Liaison Committee helped to pave the way for the organization’s 
participation in a variety of conferences and legislative initiatives aimed at disarming 
the jobs issue and smoothing out the wrinkles that had emerged between workers and 
environmentalists. 
 Part of the Club’s desire to maintain good relations with organized labor arose 
from hard-nosed political calculation – unions had pulled considerable weight in 
getting early environmental legislation passed, and they could likely pull votes away 
from environmental programs in the future, if they decided to try.  But Club leaders 
such as Michael McCloskey and Brock Evans also genuinely believed that the two 
movements were appropriate and rightful partners.  Their goals were rooted in similar 
notions of the importance of widespread high living standards and they shared the 
same opponents in laissez-faire corporate America.  As later chapters will show, 
attempting to undo the damage that charges of class bias had done to their 
relationship would bring the Sierra Club more vocally and persistently into the fight 
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for unpolluted cities and workplaces.  Even still, they had to be prepared to face the 
enduring legacy of suspicion among workers that sometimes accompanied 
environmentalist initiatives in the urban industrial world.  As it turned out, events 
would bring organized labor back to the table sooner than expected.  By the early 
1980s, the two sides would find themselves engaged in an alliance that was at once 




Chapter 4: Blue-Green Energy Organizing, 1973-1978 
 
Just as the recession was starting to make itself felt in early 1973, observers were also 
beginning to notice that the United States was in the grip of a fuel shortage.  The 
shortage had already driven up energy prices and forced the closure of hundreds of 
gas stations, increasing, in many quarters, concerns of a disaster by the fall.
210
  In 
October, the already strained energy resources of the United States were further 
depleted, when the Middle Eastern member states of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced that they would be cutting off sales of oil to 
the U.S. in protest of American support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War.  By early 
November, the oil shortage had reached crisis levels, globally and in the United 
States.  Despite skyrocketing gas prices, drivers queued for miles hoping for the 
opportunity to fill their tanks.  Schools, unable to heat their buildings during the 
winter, closed their doors; factories found it too expensive to power their machines 
and cut production.  President Nixon estimated that petroleum supplies that winter 
would fall between 10 percent and 17 percent short of demand.  The New York Times’ 
glum assessment of the situation came as a warning to readers that “Things Will Get 
Worse Before They Get Worse.”
211
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 The government struggled to find an answer to the problem.  Proposed 
solutions, such as instituting a daylight savings time and lowering the national speed 
limit, appeared to be short-term band aids at best, while more extensive conservation 
policies were anathema to Republican administration officials.
212
  Price controls 
would ease the financial strains created by the crisis, but they would do nothing to 
ease the lack of supply that was the root of the problem.  Meanwhile, the public 
searched for a responsible party on whom they could vent their anger – the petroleum 
cartel, oil companies, government officials, and occasionally environmentalists all 
took their turn as scapegoat.  Even as the crisis subsided the following year, memories 
of a narrowly avoided total disaster lingered and kept the national debate on energy 
policy alive. 
 The energy crisis seemed to create a ripe opportunity for those who wanted to 
deepen the tension between environmentalists and their working-class allies.  The 
pro-business, conservative press warned that “the developing fuel shortage and the 
consequent ‘energy crisis’ will have a profound effect on the American standard of 
living.  The hell-bent environmentalists, once again, are not helping matters.”
213
  To 
protect that standard of living, the country would have to turn away from a regulatory 
system that had been created in better days “by demagogues, radicals, and self-
appointed elitists... [and] entrusted to bureaucrats watched over by fanatics.”
214
  
Although more restrained in their language, official industry spokespeople, especially 
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those from utility companies, were equally excited at the prospect that the time had 
finally come to start rolling back their regulatory burden.  Proposals for off-shore and 
Alaskan oil drilling, suspension of air quality standards, and relaxation of nuclear 
power regulations flooded out of boardrooms, while California dam supporters wrote 
smugly of an ongoing conflict with the Sierra Club,  “perhaps Mr. McCloskey hasn’t 
noted a new legislative climate since the energy shortage.”
215
  
  The environmental community itself feared that industry’s push would make 
deep inroads among an American public that was staring down potential disaster.  
Sierra Club leaders thought with pessimism about their potential to continue making 
progress with environmental initiatives, and even to protect the gains that they had 
already made.  “Boy what a field day the oil companies and everybody else were 
having with us,” Brock Evans remembers about representing the Club in Washington, 
D.C. during the early days of the energy crisis.  “Finally after four or five years on the 
defensive they could come back and they were the good people, honest people trying 
to provide energy supplies, and we were the bad people, extremists....  We were just 
sort of cowering in the trenches while the artillery thundered overhead, and there 
wasn’t a thing we could do about it.”
216
  Dour observations such as these have been 
accepted by historians, leading scholars to believe that the energy policy debate 
engendered by the 1973 oil crisis played a central role in the souring of labor-
environmental relations in the mid-1970s.   
  However, that perception is inaccurate.  This chapter argues that, regardless 
of the fears of contemporary coalition builders and the musings of modern scholars, 
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the energy crisis itself did not severely damage labor-environmental relations in the 
mid-1970s.  Although the two sides had very different visions for the United States’ 
energy future, those differences did not manifest themselves in outright hostility.  
Instead, the period was characterized by blue-green agreement on specific policies – 
often motivated by different rationales – grudging acceptance of less-than-ideal 
energy decisions, and intra-movement conflict.  Ironically, even as blue-green 
relations soured in other areas, cooperation on energy continued.  Energy would 
become a third-rail in labor-environmental relations only in the 1980s as the problems 
of acid rain and global warming made themselves known.  In the mid-1970s, energy 
flexibility ruled the day.  
 
Short-term Solutions in the Midst of a Crisis 
The nation’s energy consumption had been a concern for the Sierra Club for several 
years by the time the energy crisis hit.  The thinking of the Club’s leadership, 
summarized best by Michael McCloskey in a 1971 address to the American Nuclear 
Society, was that the problems Americans experienced with energy availability were 
largely either manufactured or self-inflicted.
217
  The problem was not so much that 
there were not enough energy resources, but instead that those resources were 
squandered.  The worst of the shortages, McCloskey asserted, were fabricated by the 
energy industry to draw higher prices from consumers and wring concessions from 
Congress in the form of subsidies, tax breaks, or drilling permits.  “We face cries of 
immediate energy shortages because the energy industry has contrived crisis 
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situations,” the Sierra Club president said in an address to the American Nuclear 
Society.  “We have experienced all sorts of sudden fuel and power shortages...  None 
of these so-called crises is very plausible.”
218
   
 As pernicious as these contrived crises could be, they were far less dangerous 
than the mentality that energy companies had fostered in the American public.  
Decades of advertising and artificially low prices created through government 
subsidies had led to a “pro-growth bias toward energy use,” both in public policy and 
the public mind, according the McCloskey.
219
  Americans had developed expectations 
for energy use and its continued growth that were unrealistic and that carried 
environmentally destructive risks.  In one hundred years, McCloskey reminded his 
audience, the U.S. population had tripled while power usage had grown by fifteen 
times; even given limitless fuel resources such usage trends could not continue – the 
country would be physically overrun by power plants within two centuries.  And that 
was not even factoring in the frightening consequences for the planet of such energy 
use.  “At every stage of energy production and use,” McCloskey argued, 
“unacceptable environmental degradation occurs.”  Strip mining, uranium milling, oil 
spills, wildlife habitat disruption, air pollution, and thermal contamination of water 




 Thus, the real energy crisis, as defined by the Club, was too much energy use.  
Its leaders’ solution followed easily from such an understanding:  put “constraints on 
energy growth.”  Remove government subsidies that increase demand, conserve the 
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resources at the country’s disposal, develop more efficient patterns of use, and control 
industries that use an inordinate amount of energy.
221
  The ideas McCloskey sketched 
out in his address became official Club policy the next year.   
The Club’s energy policy, adopted by the Board of Directors and announced 
in pieces between the fall of 1972 and the winter of 1973, reiterated the call for “the 
use of energy in a manner more consistent with the prudent use of the world’s natural 
resources and the restoration and preservation of environmental quality.”
222
  With a 
goal of maintaining a healthy environment, the Sierra Club energy policy called for a 
two-pronged approach to the nation’s energy system.  The first prong was a 
strengthened set of government regulations to control “extraction, transport, and 
storage of fuels,” as well as land use and the design of energy facilities.  The second 
prong was the heart of the plan:  fuel and energy conservation.  The conservation 
component of the proposal included provisions for more efficient use of available 
resources and called for an education program to teach the country how and why to 
use less energy.  However, volunteerism was only half of the plan.  The other half 
was removing “economic incentives” for wasteful use and making “the prices of all 
forms of energy ... cover [that] energy’s true cost.”
223
  The hope was that if higher 
prices better reflected the real expense in creating the American energy network, it 
would encourage people to scale back their usage.   
 The Club had developed these ideas before the worst impact of the energy 
crunch was being felt.  Still, the Board of Directors saw little reason to dramatically 
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alter their proposal in response to the new crisis.  They had established provisions that 
“those of low income do not suffer from the generally higher levels of energy prices 
which can be expected to result from having the user of energy pay energy’s true 
costs,” and highlighted that idea more as conditions worsened.
224
  Otherwise, the 
Club’s leaders saw little reason to concede portions of the policy as lost.  If anything, 
the earlier conservation prescriptions were even more practical now. 
 Solving the energy crisis by promoting a policy that explicitly called for 
increasing fuel costs put the Sierra Club in stark opposition to many labor unions, for 
whom rising costs were emblematic of the problem.  The AFL-CIO adopted a 
position in the worst days of the crisis that criticized solutions “which would allow 
those who can afford it to purchase scarce supplies while those who need it but are 
less affluent would be deprived.”
225
  The AFL-CIO’s plans could not brook 
permanently more expensive energy prices because the labor federation had come to 
associate growing energy use with rising economic standards.  AFL-CIO Research 
Director Nat Goldfinger summarized the sentiment in 1976, when he wrote “unless 
the energy sources are available in sufficient quantities, industries will be unable to 
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So the AFL-CIO’s energy policy was premised on the idea that all available 
resources should be used to produce as much energy as possible as cheaply as 
possible.  Conservation had its place; as far as turning off lights, lowering 
thermostats, and driving more slowly were seen as part of a short-term national plan 
of sacrifice to get energy usage under control, the AFL-CIO generally accepted them.  
However, few within the organization’s leadership hierarchy believed that would be 
enough.  “Conservation,” the AFL-CIO’s Energy program read, “while indispensible, 
is not The Solution.”
227
  Although the Federation did not criticize the Sierra Club’s 
energy program specifically, its position was indicative of the sort of differences in 
perception of the energy crisis that threatened to disrupt the relationship between 
labor and environmentalists.  
 That disruption was avoided in the short term because neither side acted 
intractably on their positions.  A perfect example of this flexibility involved President 
Nixon’s energy proposals, which included a plan to roll back portions of the Clean 
Air Act.  The environmental community was predictably unsupportive of such a plan, 
fearing that it would lead to “massive destruction of the land and pollution of the land 
and water.”  At the same time, the Sierra Club’s Washington Office Director, Brock 
Evans, allowed that limited exemptions to air quality standards on “a case by case 
basis” might be necessary, and would be acceptable to his organization as a 
temporary measure.
228
  Likewise, many labor unions also questioned the wisdom of 
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the president’s approach.  Even the International Brotherhood of Teamsters – Nixon’s 
biggest supporters within organized labor and perhaps the union that expressed the 
biggest concern over gas prices – challenged the White House’s prescriptions, 
quoting an EPA analyst’s claim that the environmental contribution to the fuel crisis 
“has been relatively minor,” in their official organ, the International Teamster.
229
   
 The crisis itself also opened a few avenues of opportunistic cooperation 
between unions and the Sierra Club, where both acted for the passage of the same 
policies but for different reasons.  One example of such strange bedfellow making 
arose when the two sides lobbied Congress to allow states to use money from the 
Highway Trust Fund for mass transit projects, in particular subways and light rail 
systems.
230
  The Sierra Club’s leaders liked the idea of promoting mass transit 
programs for several reasons, but in the energy-conscious climate of 1973 they and 
their congressional allies including Edmund Muskie were able to make a compelling 
case for the fuel efficient nature of busses and trains as opposed to highways.
231
  
Labor’s position was equally calculated.  Obviously any such shift in spending could 
be injurious to highway workers, but the added investment in rail cars and busses 
would likely mean more work for members of major industrial unions such as the 
UAW and International Association of Machinists (IAM).  And because a lot of the 
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highway money was being held up by local planning controversies, the shift to mass 
transit would result in more transportation money being spent overall.  The position 
voiced by the Teamsters was again representative of much of the labor community.  
His union, General President Frank Fitzsimmons asserted, “always supported 
building a good national highway system, and we continue this support.  But we have 




 An even better example of the unusual outcomes of the energy situation can 
be seen in regard to oil industry regulation.  Both the Sierra Club and the AFL-CIO 
supported measures proposed by Congress in late 1973 and early 1974 to restrict oil 
producers’ ability to use the crisis to reap excessive rewards.  These restrictions 
included limits on the ability of U.S. companies to export energy fuels, a windfall 
profits tax, and the eradication of the oil industry’s depletion allowance from the tax 
code – a move that would amount to a $3 billion increase in taxation.
 233
  Congress 
was motivated by the idea that the oil companies had not done everything in their 
power to mitigate the impact of the oil embargo on the American public.  House 
Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur Mills alluded to the punitive nature of the policies 
when he told reporters his thought that “with the price of oil where it is today, there is 
no need for a depletion allowance.”
234
    
 The AFL-CIO agreed with the Congressional assessment.  It “urge[d] 
immediate consideration of an excess profits tax” in order to “make it clear... that the 
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Congress and the American people will not tolerate industry making huge windfall 
profits from an emergency.”
235
  The Federation also supported Congress’ attempt to 
eliminate the oil companies’ depletion allowances, especially in relation to their 
overseas operations.  Both Congress and the AFL-CIO hoped that by eliminating the 
oil companies’ ability to reap excessive profits, the new laws would also strip them of 
any impetus to maintain policies that had helped create high prices.  The Sierra 
Club’s support for such policies grew from a totally different impulse, and the Club’s 
directors were banking on the opposite result.  From the Club’s perspective, the tax 
code was just one of many ways in which the government coddled oil producers.  
Stripping the oil industry of its depletion allowances or its ability to export fuel oil, 
Club leaders hoped, would raise the artificially low price of oil in the U.S. and would 
discourage excess oil production.
236
    
The Divisiveness of Nuclear Power 
In the short-run, the labor movement and the environmental movement were able to 
come to terms with one another reasonably well in regards to the energy emergency.  
Both were willing to make temporary accommodations of principle in the name of 
solving the larger problem, and they ultimately found themselves supporting several 
of the same congressional initiatives.  However, the crisis also prompted the country 
to examine its potential long-term energy shortfalls, and the dialogue between the 
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labor and environmentalist camps was more complicated when it came to confronting 
this issue.   
The development of a renewable energy infrastructure seemed to offer an 
obvious bit of common ground.  Not only would solar and wind power provide the 
country with clean alternatives to oil, but the massive construction projects that would 
be required to create the new generators appealed to building trades unions that were 
well placed in the AFL-CIO hierarchy.  But that technology was still in its infancy 
and would require immense investments in research and development to be made 
dependable.  Even the Sierra Club paid little attention to renewable sources in this 
period.
237
  With this primary avenue for cooperation closed, both sides charted 
independent paths instead.   
 In general, those paths mirrored short-term priorities.  The labor movement 
favored high energy solutions, such as speeding up the building of nuclear power 
plants and tapping new reserves of oil, coal, and natural gas.  Official Sierra Club 
policy, meanwhile, remained committed to energy conservation.  However, Club 
leaders also recognized that they could not maintain their legitimacy in the world of 
public policy with a conservation-only strategy.  Instead, they sought to mitigate the 
damage of a high-energy world until more environmentally friendly alternatives were 
workable.
238
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 The Club’s acknowledgment of the need for a “bridging fuel” to smooth the 
transition from petroleum to a renewable energy system raised at least an implicit 
question of what that fuel would be.
239
  Oil was clearly not going to work, since its 
problems were creating the necessity for a transition in the first place.  The Club had 
also been fighting against the expansion of hydro-electric damming for decades, so 
that was off limits too.  Ultimately, the most acceptable transition energy sources for 
the Club were coal and nuclear power.  Neither was without problems, and each had 
proponents and detractors throughout the organization’s hierarchy.   
Nuclear energy had the force of momentum behind it; only twenty-two 
commercial nuclear power plants were built between 1955 and 1965, but new plant 
construction exploded in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with forty-four nuclear units 
established in 1973 alone.  Nuclear power promised power without air pollution, but 
at the same time concerns were already surfacing about exposure to nuclear radiation 
or the possibility of a core meltdown.
240
  Alternatively, coal – especially coal with 
high sulfur content – was thought to be an even bigger air polluter than oil and posed 
numerous environmental risks between mining and burning.
241
  Still, it was a well-
established energy resource that seemed to promise energy independence through its 
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massive domestic supplies and that could claim technological improvements on the 
horizon that would make burning cleaner.
242
   
 Nuclear power promised to divide organized labor and environmentalists like 
no other form of energy could.  Major environmental protests against nuclear power 
became common in the late 1970s, and by the early 1980s opposition to nuclear 
power became a fundamental tenet of environmental politics.
243
  Alternatively, almost 
no organization in the United States has supported nuclear power as persistently and – 
to quote Canadian labor scholars Larry Savage and Dennis Soron – “largely 
uncritical[ly]” as the American Federation of Labor.
244
  The AFL-CIO’s commitment 
to nuclear energy remained as strong in the 1970s as it had been in the two previous 
decades, when it championed the cause that “the non-military use of the atom be 
realized as rapidly, as equitably, and as fully as possible.”
245
   
However, these seemingly stark divisions belie a far more complicated 
picture.  A deeper look at the internal politics of the Sierra Club and AFL-CIO in the 
early to mid-1970s shows that nuclear power had committed proponents and devoted 
opponents in each.  For that reason nuclear energy created as much division within 
labor and environmental circles in that era as it did between them.  The potential for 
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conflict between labor and environmentalists existed in the mid-1970s, but it was, for 
the time being, unclear where or how the battle lines would be drawn.   
 The AFL-CIO’s dedication to nuclear energy was built on the idea that the 
nuclear industry would provide good, union jobs.  The industry was densely 
organized, and construction requirements were high; it required about 1,000 more 
man-years to build a nuclear energy facility than a coal or oil burning one.
246
  Not 
surprisingly, support for nuclear power was especially high in the Federation’s 
powerful Building and Construction Trades Department, and among affiliates such as 
the International Union of Operating Engineers, since their members could get the 
economic benefit of constructing the plants while generally avoiding the worry of 
exposure to radiation.  Unions that were more directly involved in generating 
electricity from nuclear reactions – such as OCAW or the International Brotherhood 
of Electrical Workers (IBEW) – were somewhat more wary of nuclear power than the 
construction trades, but they understandably focused their attention on campaigning 
for higher safety standards rather than eliminating the industry entirely.
247
 
     The AFL-CIO also saw nuclear power as a legitimate potential source of large 
quantities of energy.  Throughout the mid-1970s, the Federation maintained that 
“rapid development of nuclear power is a ‘must’ without which the nation’s economy 
would falter.”
248
  This argument dominated AFL-CIO energy policy throughout the 
decade, and was most clearly stated in a set of policy prescriptions created in the 
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wake of renewed energy chaos in 1979.  There, in calling for “alternate forms of 
energy to replace specific amounts of oil and natural gas,” the labor organization 
declared that “the nation cannot afford to ignore coal and nuclear energy, despite 
environmental dangers.  Both sources will play an important role in reducing U.S. 
dependence on imported oil.”
249
 
 Despite the AFL-CIO’s overarching support for nuclear power, the industry 
was still pointedly criticized in some labor circles throughout its first decades of 
existence.  Presaging much of the anti-nuclear environmentalism of the 1980s, many 
unions worked to undercut nuclear plants being constructed in their backyards.  As 
early as 1956, the UAW was among the first in the nation to challenge the 
construction of a nuclear power plant when it led the charge to have public hearings 
on siting a nuclear reactor near Detroit, eventually taking its fight all the way to the 
Supreme Court.
250
  Following their international’s lead, a number of UAW locals 
later came out against nuclear power plants proposed near them.  From North 
Carolina to New York, nuclear power protests involving local unions flared up 
throughout the middle of the decade.  At the same time, California IBEW Local 1969 
supported an antinuclear state ballot initiative (Proposition 15), and Steelworkers 
District 31 opposed construction of the Bailey nuclear plant in Indiana.
251
    
 International union bodies also joined the locals in protest, often questioning 
the wisdom of nuclear power in general, rather than just the siting of particular plants.  
                                                 
249
 “Policy Resolution on Energy,” adopted November, 1979 by the AFL-CIO 13
th
 Constitutional 
Convention, GMMA RG20-003, box 44, folder 4. 
250
 The UAW lost the court battle in 1961 and the Fermi plant was built only to be closed in 1966 after 
an accident.  Logan and Nelkin, 8; http://curiouserblog.blogspot.com/2011/11/timeline-of-labor-
environmental.html. 
251
 Logan and Nelkin, 7-8. 
 131 
 
The United Mine Workers, for example, foresaw the cratering of the coal industry in 
increased nuclear generation.  It opposed nuclear power from its inception and 
continued to do so throughout the 1970s.
252
  In 1976 the UAW’s national convention 
passed a resolution that recommitted the union to nuclear skepticism, and in the wake 
of the Three Mile Island nuclear disaster, the union called for a moratorium on further 
nuclear development.  The International Association of Machinists, under the 
progressive leadership of William Winpisinger, also publicly called for a moratorium 
on nuclear plant construction a few months after Three Mile Island.
253
   Thus, 
organized labor was not able to present a united front in support of nuclear power in 
the 1970s.  
By the same token, the environmental movement was unable to present a 
united front against nuclear power in the 1970s, at least not until the end of the 
decade.  Disputes over nuclear power created dissention in the ranks of many 
environmental groups, but none would have an experience that was in any way 
comparable to the roiling mess that the issue created within the Sierra Club.  As 
discussed previously, the Club was an organization in transition when the nuclear 
power debate broke upon its shores.  As the group struggled to fashion a policy 
regarding atomic power, the bitterness from other internal issues continually crept 
into their decisions.  These internal disputes helped make the Sierra Club’s overall 
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position on nuclear power a cautious one, and they were eventually left behind by 
other environmental organizations with more radical anti-nuclear critiques.
254
 
 The Club’s understanding of nuclear power generation was marked by early 
enthusiasm – or, at the very least, ambivalence – which only slowly gave way to 
concern, with consensus for opposition building slowly through the 1970s.  In the 
early 1960s, many in the Sierra Club’s leadership were excited by the prospect of 
nuclear power and promoted it as the responsible alternative to their biggest enemy: 
hydro-electric dams.  That faith in nuclear power was due, in part, to a large 
contingent of scientists and academics from Berkeley and other nearby universities, 
who had confidence in technological solutions to mankind’s problems.  Board 
member, future President, and biophysicist William Siri, spoke for many when he 
asked “The rest of the universe runs on nuclear energy, why not us?”
255
   
Throughout the 1960s the primary concern of the Club’s Board of Directors in 
regard to nuclear power was siting; the potential health dangers arising from nuclear 
fission were a nonissue.  The conservation minded directors would accede to plant 
construction if they believed the location of the facility did not endanger “ocean and 
natural lake shores of high scenic value.”
256
  Such was the case in 1962, when Pacific 
Gas and Electric Company unveiled plans to construct a nuclear power plant at 
Bodega Bay, California.  PG&E’s proposal raised the hackles of nearby 
conservationists but provoked no response from the Club, which failed to even attend 
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hearings on the issue in San Francisco.
257
  Alternatively, if the Club’s volunteer 
leadership did worry about the location of a utility, they would attempt to negotiate an 
alternative site where nuclear power could be produced without endangering a scenic 
wild area.  An example of this course of action came later in the decade when PG&E 
proposed the construction of another California nuclear plant, this one at the Nipomo 
Dunes in San Luis Obispo County.  The Club objected, and Siri (now the Club’s 
president) entered into discussions with the company and other nuclear power 
supporters that resulted in the construction being moved from the scenic Nipomo 
Dunes to Diablo Canyon.  By a nine to one vote, the Board of Directors ratified the 
agreement.
258
    
 The Diablo Canyon decision – which initially seemed to offer a very 
reasonable conservationist settlement – became an unexpected turning point in the 
organization’s relationship to nuclear power.  A cadre of more radical staff and board 
members led by Executive Director Dave Brower grew to regret the agreement, 
framing their argument around broader issues than the appearance of a wilderness 
area.  Instead, they argued that nuclear power was inherently dangerous – nuclear 
plants disturbed the ecology of nearby bodies of water by discharging hot water into 
them, and the nuclear process created radioactive wastes that would be inherited by 
future generations.
259
  Member referenda would twice uphold the decision to accept 
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the Diablo Canyon plant site, but the issue also contributed to the controversy that 
ultimately led to Brower’s resignation in 1969.
260
  
 The Club’s members had signaled their willingness to support nuclear power 
and the conservative cadre on the board that championed it.  However, the ground on 
which the Club stood had shifted.  By the early 1970s the power held by the volunteer 
leaders on the Board of Directors was waning in relation to the organization’s 
professional staff, which was less supportive of nuclear power and more inclined to 
take a broad view of the organization’s mission.  The rise of environmentalism 
around Earth Day, as described in chapter two, further reinforced this shift.  However, 
the traditions of volunteer leadership and support for nuclear power were not easily 
uprooted.  Thus, the Sierra Club’s conversion to nuclear opposition continued slowly 
and with much debate. 
 The first signal of a shifting of the winds came toward the end of 1971 when 
the Sierra Club publicly opposed a nuclear plant that it had earlier supported at Point 
Arena, California.  The focus of its opposition there remained on the scenic qualities 
of the area that were going to be destroyed, but a noticeable undercurrent of nuclear 
toxicity imbued the arguments with environmentalist flair.  In this way, the Club was 
part of a growing trend among those Americans who were coming to doubt the 
possibilities of a nuclear powered world.  By the 1970s, more people than ever had 
come to fear nuclear accidents, and finding a place to dispose of radioactive waste 
had become a problem that was too obvious to ignore.  These trepidations were 
supplemented by scientific studies in the late 1960s and early 1970s that 
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demonstrated the dangers that even low-level radiation exposure could pose to a 
community.
261
   
 In 1974, debate erupted within the Club over whether or not to make the 
organization officially anti-nuclear by calling for a moratorium on the building of 
nuclear plants.  It was not a policy that was easily arrived at, as the board split on the 
issue and a technical committee designed to study it also returned divided.
262
  By that 
time there was a great deal of consensus on siting issues; it was agreed that nuclear 
plants should be kept “out of proposed state parks and wildlife refuges, away from 
scenic and wild coastlines, off of earthquake faults, and to keep their thermal effluent 
out of our rivers.”  That policy, McCloskey would tell the American Nuclear Society 
later in the year, did not single out nuclear plants, for the Club was “anxious to keep 
other large industrial facilities out of these places and away from these things too.”
263
   
Pro-nuclear veterans of the Club’s previous conflicts, such as director Will 
Siri and new president Laurence I. Moss (who was himself a nuclear engineer and 
had been a director for six years prior to his presidency), contended that it was 
sufficient to continue opposing individual plants.  They argued that nuclear power did 
not pollute the air as did fossil fuels, that uranium mining was less destructive than 
coal mining or oil drilling, and that, while nuclear power generation was not perfect, 
nothing was.  A blanket condemnation of nuclear power, they felt, would rob the 
Club of the moral authority to propose less harmful alternatives to proposed nuclear 
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plants.  Siri and Moss were joined in their analysis by local chapters throughout the 
Midwest and the Club’s national Energy Committee, which supported some limited 
continuation of nuclear licensing.
264
   
 The nuclear opponents parried these ideas with a host of reasons why nuclear 
power generation was not an industrial process like any other.  Their focus was on 
safety and the relatively unknown and untested dangers presented by the nuclear 
industry.  Although a core meltdown or other catastrophic event was clearly the 
biggest threat, an equally big problem was posed by the fact that, even if everything 
was functioning properly, the hazards posed by living near nuclear plants had mostly 
been unexplored by industry regulators.  “It is difficult for the public to know what 
risk it is accepting,” the argument went. “Experts differ over whether there is any safe 
threshold level [for exposure to radiation], and agencies differ over whether the limits 
on exposure are stringent enough.”
265
  In the end, the most convincing argument 
against nuclear power rested on the long-term impact that it would have on the planet 
and the morality of leaving future generations with a nuclear burden.  “In building up 
our radioactive inventory,” McCloskey cautioned listeners: 
 we are creating obligations, manufacturing hazards, and developing risks that 
 envelop our biosphere and transcend time in a way that no generation of man 
 has ever before had the effrontery to imagine.  In doing this, we are not 
 merely saying that we here and now accept the risk; we are also forcing the 
 words of acceptance upon the lips of the unborn, of all species, in all places, 
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Director Edgar Wayburn was perhaps less poetic, but was no less clear in 
summarizing his feelings as “I’m afraid for my children’s children.”
267
  
 The moratorium passed in 1974, and as the decade wore on, the Club’s 
officials became increasingly opposed to nuclear energy.  By the end of the decade 
nuclear power had become public enemy number one for many of them.  One of their 
early concerns with the Carter Administration, for example, was its “strongly pro-
nuclear policy” as evidenced by the president’s support for nuclear licensing reform 
and his appointment of nuclear power proponents Joseph Hendrie and Kent Hansen to 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  Despite generally positive assessments of 
Carter’s first year in the White House, McCloskey and Evans also reminded readers 
of their “1977 Washington Wrap Up” that the president’s pro-nuclear Department of 
Energy remained a major problem.
268
   
 Nuclear power’s fall from grace within the Sierra Club – a fall that was still 
incomplete in the mid- to late 1970s – opened a space within that organization to 
reconsider the potential of coal.  Nuclear power failed to divide the labor and 
environmental movements from one another in the early and mid-1970s because it 
divided each internally.  Coal, on the other hand, was not simply a non-issue.  Instead, 
the Club’s serious engagement with the possibilities of coal power helped sustain 
good relations with organized labor, particularly the AFL-CIO and the United Mine 
Workers, through the crafting of a regulatory framework that would benefit workers 
while minimizing harm to the environment.  Although these alliances were marriages 
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of convenience, where the two sides cooperated with different ends in mind, they kept 
the Club in positive contact with the labor movement and minimized energy policy 
conflict between the two. 
Coal Cooperation 
By the 1970s, coal’s position in the U.S. energy system had declined precipitously 
from its 1910 high when it provided 76.8 percent of all fuel consumed in the country.  
In the postwar period oil had slowly but surely cut coal out of both the transportation 
and household energy sectors.  Although coal use had waned significantly in the total 
U.S. energy system between 1947 and 1970, its decline was less marked in the field 
of electricity generation.  While down from a postwar high of 52.8 percent, coal still 
remained an important factor in that field, providing just under 45 percent of the 
nation’s total electrical generation fuel in 1970.
269
   
The energy crisis inspired the nation to take a second look at coal for two 
main reasons.  High oil prices made people enthusiastic about coal’s potential to 
provide continued cheap electricity while freeing up petroleum supplies for gasoline 
and other uses.  As important, coal was also domestically producible in quantities that 
would last for centuries.  The U.S. Geological Survey estimated in 1974 that 3 trillion 
tons of coal existed under the United States – 79 percent of the total fossil fuel 
resources of the country, and, as many labor commenters were quick to point out, of 
more value in terms of BTUs than all the oil in the Middle East.
270
  Also, as industrial 
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economist Richard L. Gordon wrote in 1978, “until the 1970s, coal was by far the 
least regulated of the U.S. energy industries.”
271
  That lack of regulation may have 
been seen as a positive in some quarters, but for groups like the Sierra Club it was one 
of the biggest drawbacks to coal usage – a drawback that would need to be remedied 
by more firmly pulling coal into the system of new social regulation.  It was in the 
building of the parameters of this regulatory system that environmentalists and miners 
would most often find themselves in conversation. 
Prior to the energy crisis, the Sierra Club had dismissed coal as too dirty to be 
a workable energy source.  Coal’s return to preeminence among the nation’s energy 
resources had even been one of the bogeymen raised by the pro-nuclear faction of the 
Club during the 1974 moratorium debates.  But it was a specter that had lost some of 
its potency.  Wayburn remembered a moment where “the argument [was] made that 
it’s much more dangerous to breathe in the effects of coal.  Perhaps it is, in the short 
haul....  But burning coal as far as we know, is not going to affect future generations 
the way nuclear can.”
272
  McCloskey has written of a similar moment of personal 
realization, when he came to favor coal as the “bridging fuel” that would carry the 
United States until renewable energy resources were viable economically and 
technologically.  While recognizing that coal was dirty, McCloskey also noted that 
“in general its conservation impetus makes some sense (substituting relatively 
abundant resources for resources which will be increasingly scarce),” and that “the 
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tradeoffs that would ensue from it are difficult to trace from an environmental point 
of view.”
273
   
 The conversation about coal occurred at a time when the most dangerous 
aspects of its burning were only just starting to be understood.  Awareness of acid 
rain was beginning to slowly work its way into the national consciousness, but it was 
far from being considered a critical threat, and the connection between acid rain and 
sulfur dioxide (SO2) from burning carbon had yet to be fully elaborated.
274
  The 
science behind global warming and its connection to carbon dioxide (CO2) was even 
newer and more ambiguous.  There was, as yet, no consensus that the climate was 
changing or what was causing it if it was.  Sierra Club publications warned of the 
dangers of putting heat into the environment, but CO2’s roll in that process was not 
well known.
275
  As it stood, carbon dioxide was not thought to be particularly 
dangerous, nor was it even one of the pollutants that the Clean Air Act air quality 
standards sought to control.
276
   
 Because the long-term effects of coal burning were so poorly understood, the 
environmental imperative in the mid-1970s was to fix the immediate problems caused 
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  Visibility remained central to the Sierra Club’s concerns, 
especially those of the rank and file.  While smog clouded the nation’s cities, Club 
members worried that the haze of air pollution would diminish the grandeur of natural 
spaces as well.  Letters from members to the EPA, including that of Hugh Church, 
cried out that they had “viewed with alarm the continuing visibility degradation of the 
Middle and Upper Rio Grande Valley,” and other local scenic areas.  Such letters 
promoted the use of technological fixes such as SO2 scrubbers to clean the air.  
“While costs and inflationary impacts are indeed a serious concern of such 
implementation,” Church and those like him argued, “the alternatives of further 
visibility impairment and increased health costs to the nation is simply untenable.”
278
   
 In also raising the issue of public health, Church’s letter makes it clear that 
pollution’s impact on the human body remained a growing concern within Club 
circles as well.  Don Fausett, of the Club’s Rocky Mountain Chapter, expressed 
similar sentiments in congressional testimony on the Clean Air Act amendments of 
1977.  His local group’s concern for clean air, he said, came from the fact that “in the 
Denver area in particular [air pollution] is a daily nuisance and health hazard we have 
to contend with....  It is a clear and present danger to good health.”
279
  These dual 
concerns with visibility reduction and the health impact of air pollution were big 
enough to guarantee that the Club would never actively promote coal, but they were 
also limited enough to allow the group to accept coal use for the time being.   
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  Even a limited alliance between environmentalists and the United Mine 
Workers would have been practically unimaginable only a few years prior.  However, 
by the early 1970s the mine workers union was in the midst of a rank-and-file 
rebellion against the autocratic and corrupt management of its president, Tony 
Boyle.
280
  Rising concerns with Black Lung disease, combined with Boyle’s easy 
dismissal of safety violations that had led to a serious mine explosion in Farmington, 
West Virginia, had made it, to quote historian of the UMW Alan Derickson, 
“inescapably clear that two decades of cozy accommodation with corporate 
management had left the top leadership of the Mine Workers hopelessly out of touch 
with the on-the-job experience of its members.”
281
   In a federally supervised election 
at the end of 1972, rank-and-file forces led by Arnold Miller defeated the Boyle 
machine.  Miller became president of the union, and the newly restructured Mine 
Workers plunged into the politics of workplace health and safety guidelines with a 
vigor that had been missing for many years prior.   
 While health and safety concerns had led to labor-environmental collaboration 
in the past and had inspired UMW members to seek new leadership, they were not the 
basis of blue-green cooperation on coal.  Environmentalists, for example, did not play 
a major role in securing the passage of the 1977 Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Act.
282
  Instead, the relationship between the Sierra Club and the UMW was 
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dominated by a series of reforms involving land use and power plant emissions 
control.  These reforms were expected to appreciably limit the environmental harm of 
coal burning and mining while at the same time shift the economics of coal 
production to privilege areas of the country where the mining union’s presence was 
strongest.  
 The piece of public policy that had the greatest impact on coal burning in the 
mid-1970s was the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments.  The amendments, complicated 
pieces of legislation that they were, would prove to be divisive to blue-green unity on 
certain issues.  For example, the UAW, once a strong environmental advocate within 
organized labor, would work to delay the implementation of standards related to 
mobile sources of air pollution such as cars.  However, in the discussion of stationary 
source standards – the category into which electric power plants fell – unions and 
environmental organizations both pushed for the same objectives.
283
   
 The most important changes being discussed for the stationary source 
standards concerned the goal labeled prevention of significant deterioration (PSD).  
The original Clean Air Act contained ambiguous language that granted a great deal of 
latitude to the states and to the Environmental Protection Agency in carrying out the 
mandates of the law, which only required states to meet minimum overall standards 
of air quality within their borders.  When several states submitted proposals that 
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would have led to areas of very high air quality being lowered to the national ambient 
air quality standard, the Sierra Club sued EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus to 
prevent the approval of those plans.  The Club won a District Court ruling that 
concluded that allowing the quality of any air to decline, even if the resulting 
atmosphere would still meet national standards, violated the “’protect and enhance’ 
language of the Clean Air Act.”
284
  The EPA appealed the decision, but the Supreme 
Court upheld it in 1973.   
One of the primary goals of the Club and other environmental organizations in 
1977 was to legislate these deterioration limits instead of relying on the court system 
or the EPA.
285
  The Sierra Club – along with the Natural Resources Defense Council, 
the Wilderness Society, and Friends of the Earth (the organization that Dave Brower 
founded after leaving the Sierra Club) – took the lead in pushing for strong language 
on the prevention of significant deterioration.  Beyond the general goal of enshrining 
the court’s decision regarding PSD in the text of the law, which they got, 
environmentalists also hoped to expand the concept’s parameters in numerous ways.  
National parks and wilderness areas had previously been granted the highest 
designation for air quality standards, and environmentalists now argued that a broader 
set of recreational areas – including national monuments, historic sites, scenic rivers, 
and the like – should be accorded the same protections.  Also, arguing that “the 
federal government deserves the right to protect their own land,” the environmental 
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community encouraged Congress to grant the federal government, rather than states, 
the power to clear new power plant construction near to those areas.
286
   
 The last major reform that environmentalists sought called for mandating the 
expanded use of emissions-control technology.  Prior to 1977, the Clean Air Act only 
required that pollution control equipment be installed in coal burning plants in the 
parts of the country with the worst quality air.  All other plants could satisfy the sulfur 
dioxide limitations imposed by the law in one of two ways:  install a device, such as a 
flue gas scrubber, to capture the pollutant before its emission into the atmosphere, or 
switch to burning a coal that was lower in sulfur to begin with.  Utilities usually opted 
for the second choice because it was cheaper; it also had the unintended consequence 
of giving a market advantage to coal mined in the West, which was lower in sulfur 
content than that mined in the East.  Environmental organizations preferred the first 
alternative, both because they supported the principal of encouraging utilities to use 
advanced environmental protections and because they did not want to encourage the 
use of western coal, which was more likely than eastern to be strip-mined or to have 
been extracted from public lands.  In 1977, environmentalists sought to expand the 
existing requirements by making sure that existing plants near sensitive areas such as 
parks and wilderness preserves had to use the most advanced available emissions 
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control technology.  And, any major stationary source that was built or modified – not 
just those near parks – would have to incorporate this technology as well.
287
 
 It was in their assertion that power producers should have to use the most 
advanced available technology that the interests of environmentalists lined up with 
coal miners’.  The United Mine Workers had little concern for emissions-control in 
and of itself, but the union was interested  in eliminating the market advantage 
enjoyed by western coal.  The union’s strongest base of support came from states 
whose coal was high in sulfur content:  Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Kentucky, and 
Ohio.  The union believed that eliminating the incentives for purchasing low sulfur 
coal would help bring jobs back to the heavily unionized east.   
 The testimony of Charlie Grimm, a representative from UMW District 6 in 
Ohio, before the Senate Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution demonstrates how 
central jobs were to the Mine Workers’ calculations.  Reminding the panel that he 
spoke for 14,000 Ohio coal miners, he noted “the jobs being discussed are their jobs.  
The economy being discussed is their paychecks.”
288
  More coal use, he proposed, 
would not only help those miners but would relieve the nation’s dependence on 
foreign oil.  But a commitment to coal also had to mean a commitment to “the 
development and use of a variety of pollution control technologies,” because “if rigid 
and arbitrary emission standards continue to be the sole permissible approach to 
compliance with ambient standards, a significant portion of our domestic supply of 
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coal simply cannot be used for the production of electricity.”  Grimm’s testimony 
betrays more bitterness toward “elitist” environmentalists than that of the higher-ups 
in the UMW hierarchy – he partly blamed the EPA “for this disaster to the economy 
of Ohio” – but otherwise it is fairly representative of the union’s position in the 
congressional hearings on the amendments.
289
   
 Environmental organizations and unions also came together in arguing that 
new stationary sources of air pollution should be held to higher standards than old 
ones.  This argument went beyond utilities to include other types of industrial air 
polluters, especially steel mills.  Major industrial unions such as the United 
Steelworkers hoped that by maintaining tough PSD standards and by holding new 
polluters to a higher standard, they could keep industrial production in the already 
organized Northeast and Midwest.  Otherwise, steel or other industrial producers 
would have the ability to move to the comparatively unorganized South or West, 
where the relatively cleaner air would allow them the ability to pollute on the same 
scale without running afoul of the law.
290
  “It is important that the concept of 
preventing significant deterioration be firmly enunciated by the Congress,” contended 
USW Legislative Director John Sheehan.  “Rather than harming economic growth, 
the provisions will channel growth into areas that will not require after-the-fact 
regulation at some future time.  Corrective regulation is where job loss becomes a 
problem.  Preventive regulation promotes job stability.”
291
  Sequestering polluting 
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industries to already polluted areas as much as possible also fit the environmental 
agenda.  After all, preserving lands that had not yet been polluted was the Sierra 
Club’s goal in raising the PSD issue in the first place.    
 While the problem of air pollution created by burning coal was a problem, for 
many environmentalists – the Sierra Club foremost among them – the questions of 
land use raised by coal mining were equally troubling.  Coal industry representatives 
threatened the country that without preferential government treatment, more access to 
federally owned land, and relaxed (or at least not strengthened) regulations, coal 
production could not keep pace with demand, resulting in price increases and rolling 
blackouts.
292
  Against such threats, the Club countered that the areas already in 
production were sufficient, that land that had already been leased for coal production 
was going unused, and that any decisions regarding new mining should be carefully 
considered and subject to strict public oversight.  The deliberations of Club leaders on 
the subject were sometimes dominated by the specific location of a proposed mine, 
such as the scenic Kaiparowits Plateau in Utah.
293
  At other times, the Club favored 
more sweeping limitations on coal mine operators.  For example, the group supported 
the 1976 congressional amendments to the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, which were 
designed to restrict the length of time that coal companies could hold leases without 
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 Throughout the mid-1970s, the UMW seconded the Sierra Club’s main 
assertion:  that increasing coal production need not be tied to lowering mining 
standards.  Fearing for the health of their members as much as for environmental 
degradation, UMW leaders noted that as soon as the energy pinch began in 1973, coal 
companies “attempted to create something approaching a national panic on the 
subject” of whether or not enough coal could be mined to fill the nation’s energy 
needs.  In such an atmosphere, health, safety, and environmental standards could 
easily be shunted aside.  But, UMW officials argued, regulations were not the 
problem.  “We face an emergency crisis today,” they insisted “because government 
has... allowed corporate interests to develop and supply the nation’s energy in 
accordance with their instincts for profit alone.”
295
   The UMW leadership also agreed 
with the Club that opening new leases would be an especially ineffective way to 
stimulate production, since the coal companies were not mining to capacity the leases 
they already held, indeed sometimes were not mining those lands at all.  Arnold 
Miller elaborated on the point in a New York Times editorial toward the end of his 
first term in the union’s top post.  Signaling his support for the environmentalists’ 
position, he opened with a quote by Sierra Club founder John Muir: “‘When I try to 
pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the universe.’  I 
think that is about as true as any idea I ever heard.”
296
  Making his perspective even 
more clear for those who had missed it the first time, he alerted readers that if they 
were confused or angered by what he had to say, they could “blame it on the Sierra 
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Club.  That is what the coal industry does.”  Kidding aside, Arnold elaborated a 
strong case that the nation was being misled in its understanding of how the coal 
industry worked and where predicted shortfalls might originate.  The coal industry’s 
claim that it was made up of over 1200 mining companies buffeted by the winds of 
regulatory reform was misleading; most production was actually controlled by fifteen 
companies “that are so big they can give half a million dollars to a politician without 
its even showing up on their books.”
297
  And those companies, Miller insisted, were 
only fabricating allegations of hardship in pulling profits from their mines.  
 The bigger companies, with effective control of their market, have no 
 incentive to expand except when they are absolutely certain in advance of 
 selling every ton of coal at acceptable prices....  The biggest... combines are 
 sitting on vast reserves of readily recoverable coal.  But the coal will come out 
 of the ground only when the men who own it can be sure of the price they will 
 get for it.
298
   
 
The industry’s predicted shortage, Miller and the Sierra Club agreed, was merely a 
ploy to steer governmental policy in a manner that would inflate their profits by 
improving the terms of their land leases or by lowering labor costs through decreased 
health and safety regulations. 
 Perhaps the most effective way for mine operators to lower costs was to mine 
from an open pit.  Taking coal from the surface meant less up-front capital was 
needed to sink a mine shaft; plus a higher percentage of the coal in a given deposit 
was recoverable from a surface mine.
299
  Surface mines were also more automated, 
which lowered labor costs by employing fewer workers.  It was that final point that 
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eventually brought a divided UMW leadership out in opposition to the growth of 
surface mining, despite the fact that nearly one in six of its members were employed 
in such workplaces.
300
  Michael McCloskey liked to highlight this point when he 
described his organization’s relationship with the UMW, telling audiences that 




 Of course, it was not the lack of job opportunities that made surface mines – 
or strip mines, as their opponents called them – the particular bane of the 
environmental movement in regard to coal mining.  Instead, the environmental 
community worried about the “legacy of brutality to the land,” as a 1974 newspaper 
exposé termed it.
302
  Unreclaimed mines left behind massive, gaping holes in the 
earth – covering two million acres in the mid-1970s – and the destruction was 
compounded by literal tons of “spoil” – unused rock blasted from the top of the coal 
seam and left in piles around the site.  Even when mine operators tried to reclaim the 
land, they had to admit that they were unsure that the top soil could be replaced in a 
way that it would not erode and would bring the land back to its former state, 
especially with agricultural land, where the prospects were “chancy at best.”  And it 
was not just the land; strip mining required titanic amounts of water while at the same 
time potentially poisoning groundwater reserves with acidifying agents.  As 
McCloskey explained to a labor audience in 1973, the process “devastates the land for 
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short-term profit,” a devastation that was totally unnecessary because “we have 
enough underground coal reserves to last 200 years or more yet.”  It was these factors 
that moved environmentalists to join the UMW in supporting strip mining controls 
throughout the middle of the decade, and to call for an outright ban on the practice 
early in 1975.
303
   
 A total ban on surface mining was an unlikely course for the country to take, 
so, as they did throughout the 1970s, environmentalists looked to the federal 
government to establish a regulatory system that would control the practice and make 
it less harmful.  However, the process was fought tooth and nail by the mining 
industry, whose spokespeople claimed it would completely “prohibit mining in the 
west.”
304
  Thus, the legislative process dragged on for six years.  At least twenty-five 
bills were introduced in that time, meeting with varying levels of success.  The Sierra 
Club consistently fought for strict regulations, including restoration requirements and 
taxes or other fees to reclaim older mined areas.  They were joined by the UMW in 
support of Gaylord Nelson’s amendments to the 1973 strip mining bill, which would 
have done exactly that.  That bill was pocket-vetoed by Gerald Ford in 1974, and 
another strip mining bill was also vetoed by the president the next year.  It was not 
until Jimmy Carter signed the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act in 1977 
that tough stripmining controls found their way into federal law.
305
   
 Opponents of the environmental movement could argue that the Sierra Club’s 
work in passing legislation including the Clean Air Act amendments and the Surface 
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Mining Control and Reclamation Act hampered the growth of coal use in the United 
States in the 1970s.  The point is debatable, but even if it were indisputably true it 
would not be very telling.  It was not the Club’s intention to impede coal use or to 
destroy its marketability.  Instead, by creating a regulatory regime that could curb 
environmentally irresponsible coal use, the Club hoped to get the safest use possible 
out of coal until the day that it could be replaced by practical, large-scale renewable 
energy sources.  As the long-term consequences of fossil fuel use came to be better 
understood in the coming years, the Sierra Club would become more hostile toward 
coal, eventually driving a wedge between themselves and the United Mine Workers 
that has yet to be fully removed.  However, in the middle of the 1970s, coal appeared 
to be the least-bad option available to generate power, if it could be sensibly 
regulated.  Far from creating antagonism with organized labor, the regulatory system 
sought by mainstream environmental organizations was supported by many unions, 
and openly cheered by the one closest to the controversy, as the UMW participated in 
the system’s creation.  
Conclusion 
Historians have previously asserted that the energy crisis of 1973 was one of the 
primary causes of the declining relationship between labor and environmentalists in 
the middle of the 1970s.  This chapter has argued that this common idea 
misunderstands the dynamics at play between the two movements, at least one the 
national level.  While the AFL-CIO’s stated goals of more and cheaper energy were 
antithetical to the Sierra Club’s conservation ideal, the potential of energy policy to 
create friction between the two was never realized.  Instead, energy remained one of 
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the few areas of national importance in which the two sides continued to cooperate.  
The short-term emergency engendered by the oil crisis led to a series of compromises 
that saw the Club and unions undertaking a common agenda.  At the same time, while 
creating its long-term energy plans, the Club considered the potential of nuclear 
power and coal in the absence of compelling renewable alternatives.  Although much 
of the blue-green energy cooperation in this period involved pursuing the same means 
for different ends, it was cooperation nonetheless. 
 This alliance of convenience had major repercussions, both for blue-green 
coalition building and for national politics.  In the first case, maintaining open lines of 
communication between the Sierra Club and the labor movement at a time when their 
relationship on other issues was rocky allowed both to continue to see the other as 
multidimensional.  This continued dialogue would later provide an invaluable 
advanced starting position to activists seeking to fully reengage in coalition politics.  
In the second case, the energy debates of the mid-1970s extended the conversation 
about broadening the parameters of the regulatory state by several years.  In trying to 
craft a system that would provide energy at acceptable levels while at the same time 
being as environmentally friendly as possible, blue-green collaborators continued to 
flesh out environmental and labor protections that had ceased to be raised in other 
areas of national politics.  Energy policy reverberated throughout all areas of public 
life, and in so doing, its regulatory infrastructure touched workplace health, clean air, 






Chapter 5: An Alliance Renewed, 1978-1980 
 
“Country is moving heavily to the right,” Stephen Schlossberg, director of the United 
Auto Workers Washington Office advised his boss, UAW President Doug Fraser in 
1979.  Conservatives, he warned, were gathering strength and “making the country, 
both parties and almost all politicians fight on their turf.”
 306
  Schlossberg’s 
assessment of the political atmosphere facing organized labor at the end of the 1970s 
was common among union leaders.  As the recession and energy crisis continued to 
play themselves out across the country, the attention of the labor movement turned 
toward its stalled political agenda, which was being held up, in labor’s own 
estimation, by a Congress and White House that had turned their backs on the unions 
that had helped to elect them.  Labor’s most progressive leaders, including Fraser, 
William Winpisinger of the International Association of Machinists, and Jerry Wurf 
of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, believed that 
their movement’s declining political fortunes arose from having cut itself off from 
potential social movement allies.  This group began to imagine the solution to this 
problem could be found in a more broadly-based form of organizing that would 
reconnect their organizations to their social movement roots.  Their campaign would 
be constructed on the back of “a completely new type of progressive organization for 
the 1980s,” a massive coalition encompassing elements from all across the “sane 
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left,” that would stem the rising tide of conservatism, recapture the fading importance 
of liberalism, and revive the union movement as the new decade dawned.
307
       
 This ambitious thinking led to the development of a variety of coalition 
organizations including the Progressive Alliance, the Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition, 
Jobs with Justice, and Democratic Agenda, all of which were led by labor’s liberal 
wing.  The UAW, IAM, and AFSCME were particularly active in reaching out to 
traditional allies as well as to some organizations, such as the Sierra Club, that had 
previously butted heads with workers. The mass coalitions that were created in the 
late 1970s were unlike the alliances that unions had been pursuing for many years.  
Rather than being temporary associations that were designed to sustain one campaign 
or win one election, these groups were instead thought of as permanent fixtures in 
liberal politics, meant to fundamentally alter the political dynamics of social 
movement organizing for American liberals.    
 These mass movement coalition groups were of particular importance in 
reviving the relationship between unions and environmental organizations. After 
years of limited positive contact between the two, progressive unions – chastened by 
recent political defeats and unhappy with the direction of the AFL-CIO – sought to 
mend fences with environmentalists by inviting them to participate in partnerships 
that included a wide assortment of groups on the political left. Two organizations – 
the UAW-led Progressive Alliance (PA) and the Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition 
(CLEC) – were especially important.  Although the interaction of unionists and 
environmentalists within these two organizations was short-lived, it provided a 
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foundation on which later organizing could build.  Through their participation in 
large-scale coalitions, the two sides defined the parameters of their later teamwork by 
establishing commonalities as well as exposing some potential barriers to cooperation 
that would be best to avoid.  In this way, the Alliance and Coalition were important 
transitional false starts that led to growing cross-movement collaboration in the 
1980s.  
 The mass liberal coalitions that were developed in the late 1970s were 
designed to recall and recreate a time when unions understood their place in U.S. 
politics broadly and took their social responsibilities seriously.  Rather than working 
primarily for the narrow job interests of their members – primarily higher wages and 
shorter hours – as business unions did, social unions worked for the betterment of 
society as a whole.  They saw themselves as members of the broader community, and 
they encouraged and participated in community action for racial and gender equality, 
free speech, immigrant rights, and various other causes.   
Historians would rarely consider the American Federation of Labor to have 
been involved in anything but business unionism, or reject the idea that the UAW 
began its life in the 1930 as a social union.  But when and if the auto workers’ union 
abandoned its social unionist ethics has been the subject of considerable historical 
debate.  For many historians, including Nelson Lichtenstein, the union has come to 
symbolize the overall narrowing of organized labor’s social agenda in the postwar 
period. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, this argument goes, the leaders of the UAW 
and many other formerly progressive unions in the CIO sacrificed their social 
democratic principles by abandoning their unions’ radicals in the name of anti-
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communism.  In the process, those leaders gained political respectability and 
consolidated their positions as the well-compensated heads of narrowly tailored 
collective bargaining machines.
308
  Others have contended that the UAW remained a 
potent force for social justice well into the 1960s.  Kevin Boyle, for example, argues 
“the UAW leadership did not abandon its social democratic agenda in the late 1940s.”
 
309
   Instead, Boyle contends that Walter Reuther and the union he led remained 
committed to large-scale racial and economic reform until at least the 1960s, when it 
joined with civil rights activists, local politicians, and academics to push for the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, War on Poverty programs, and housing 
reform.    
 More broadly, scholars have only just begun to assess the significance for 
liberalism in the 1980s of labor-led mass coalitions such as the Progressive Alliance 
and Jobs With Justice.  The current general consensus is that their success was mixed 
at best.  Certainly they were unable to stop the rightward drift of U.S. politics.  
Jefferson Cowie, who gives the Progressive Alliance a passing nod in his book 
Stayin’ Alive: the 1970s and the Last Decade of the Working Class, says the Alliance 
was “at least a decade too late” to achieve the encompassing results its founders 
hoped for.
310
  In more limited respects, however, the activities of the coalitions led to 
some victories, including the Citizen/Labor energy Coalition’s successful stalling of 
natural gas price deregulation.  One could also argue, as does Andrew Battista, the 
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historian who has studied these organizations most deeply, that the mass labor-liberal 
coalitions of the late 1970s and early 1980s were more important for what they 
represented than for what they accomplished.  From this perspective, their existence 
alone was an achievement; it signaled a recognition on the part of the labor movement 
that it had become dangerously isolated, and continued a tradition of organizing that 
had nearly been abandoned.
311
   
This chapter engages both of these conversations from the perspective of 
labor-environmental relations.  It suggests that Boyle’s understanding of the UAW 
and its leaders is an accurate representation.  If anything, Boyle’s analysis does not go 
far enough because one of Reuther’s deputies, Doug Fraser, continued to pursue a 
widespread social reform program into the 1980s.  Additionally, this chapter asserts 
that, although these mass movement coalitions failed to achieve their farthest 
reaching goal of setting the nation back on a leftward trajectory, they still played an 
important role in the era’s politics.  By establishing the shape of future blue-green 
cooperation, these coalitions inadvertently helped to create an important bulwark 
against deregulation in the early 1980s. 
 
Labor’s Disappointment 
The idea of rebuilding the alliance with environmentalists grew from a crisis of 
confidence within the liberal quarters of the labor movement.  That crisis was 
partially inspired by problems growing for the labor movement in its core functions:  
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organizing and collective bargaining.  Although union membership was steady in 
terms of raw numbers, the long, slow slide in terms of the percentage of the working 
population covered by union contracts had begun.
312
  Even as the 1973 recession 
became a memory, demographic changes continued to hurt unions’ growth potential, 
as Americans moved from the industrialized Northeast and Midwest to the right-to-
work Sunbelt states and from the manufacturing to the service sectors of the 
economy.  Organizing in the private sector was increasingly difficult, and that trend 
was made worse by a resurgence of anti-unionism within the business world.  
Suddenly, labor found itself faced with a more ferocious opposition than it had seen 
in decades.  As early as 1973, big businesses began more actively hiring anti-labor 
lawyers and PR firms, more aggressively opposing organizing campaigns, and more 
frequently requesting decertification elections from the National Labor Relations 
Board.  In the wake of such activity, complaints of unfair labor practices to the NLRB 
spiked, from 13,601 in 1970 to 29,026 in 1979.
313
   
 Fractures in the labor movement’s preferred response to this situation re-
exposed internal divisions that had temporarily been buried just below the surface.  
The AFL-CIO, under the commanding presence of George Meany, favored a cautious 
approach.  Meany had guided the labor movement through a period of massive 
postwar expansion and into a position of power within Democratic Party politics, and 
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he was not ready to concede that his ideas no longer fit with the changing situation in 
which organized labor found itself.  The Federation continued to emphasize the 
importance of political influence and policy expertise, hoping to sway lawmakers’ 
decisions and build a favorable legal environment for union activity.  It took little 
action to increase organizing capacity or improve the success rates of member unions’ 
organizing drives.
314
  “The individual unions have to do the organizing,” said one 
Meany defender when the AFL-CIO president was re-elected in 1977, insisting the 
AFL-CIO’s role was “zeroing in on the legislative process of the United States.”
315
  
AFL-CIO leaders tried to frame their staying the course as pragmatism, arguing that it 
made little sense to abandon strategies that had long proven successful simply 
because they had hit a small rough patch. 
 By the late 1970s, Meany’s version of pragmatism felt increasingly like 
complacence to a block of more liberal and assertive figures who were taking over the 
leadership of several prominent industrial unions.  Coalescing around Fraser, the 
IAM’s William Winpisinger, and the American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Workers’ Jerry Wurf, these progressive unionists charged that the AFL-
CIO hierarchy had become insulated from the problems facing the union 
movement.
316
  They argued that the elderly Meany, who had once been able to more 
or less dictate policy for the federation, was now incapable of taking effective action 
and was leaving the organization rudderless.
 317
  But most importantly, they asserted 
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that if American unions were to return to their former glory, they would have to do so 
by organizing and reaching out with renewed vigor to new and traditional allies.
318
  
 With the AFL-CIO still focused heavily on electoral politics, moderates and 
liberals in the labor movement alike were excited by the sweeping Democratic 
victories in the elections of 1976.  With control of the White House as well as both 
houses of Congress, including a supermajority in the Senate, the time seemed right to 
push back against the business-first policies that had dominated the Nixon and Ford 
eras.  When the congressional session opened in 1977, labor seemed poised to make 
major advances in its legislative agenda.  However, the easy success that labor leaders 
anticipated failed to materialize. 
 The labor program’s progress was excruciatingly slow from the outset, which 
disappointed and frustrated union leaders on both sides of the divide.  Major pieces of 
social legislation that they had been waiting for years to see passed, such as a national 
health insurance system and a higher minimum wage, stalled in committee.  
Meanwhile, the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act struggled to find support 
until it was eventually gutted and passed as a shell of a bill that neither committed the 
nation to numerical employment goals nor guaranteed the government as an employer 
of last resort.  More importantly, the most critical pieces of their platform – those 
designed to improve conditions for union organizing – also floundered.  For example, 
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a common situs picketing bill, which would enable construction unions to picket an 
entire job site because of a dispute with one subcontractor there, was a highly valued 
prize for most of the nation’s building trades unions.  After Gerald Ford vetoed the 
1975 version of the bill, many expected the 1977 version to become law easily.  
Instead, it never made it out of the House of Representatives.
319
   
 Similarly, in the summer of 1978, labor’s top legislative priority for the 95
th
 
Congress – labor law reform – also died ignominiously.  The goal of labor law reform 
was to ease the process of workplace organizing, but the AFL-CIO’s representatives 
in Washington anticipated that a complete overhaul of the existing system would 
result in a burdensome political fight against a massive corporate lobbying campaign.  
For that reason,
 
the Labor Law Reform bill that the AFL-CIO supported in 1977-1978 
did not include such major changes to labor law as repealing section 14(b) of the 
Taft-Hartley Act or card check union certification.  Instead, the federation accepted a 
package of minimal reforms that would have allowed the existing system to operate 
more effectually, mostly by punishing rule breaking companies more severely.  The 
bill easily passed in the House, but in the Senate it unexpectedly encountered a $5 
million opposition effort from business groups, despite its limited ambition.  
Ultimately, with the White House unwilling to exert much pressure on undecided 
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 Many unionists laid their legislative defeats at the feet of the new U.S. 
president, who they felt was not willing to advance labor’s agenda strongly enough 
from the White House.  Jimmy Carter’s relationship to the AFL-CIO had begun 
cautiously.  During the 1976 Democratic primary campaign, the federation brass 
favored either labor stalwart Hubert Humphrey or Washington Senator “Scoop” 
Jackson.  Carter was viewed with suspicion as an unknown quantity emerging from a 
right-to-work state in the Deep South.  Meany’s early comments on the Georgian 
were not encouraging; he told reporters early in 1976 that he was unsure about the 
prospects of a Carter candidacy and that he had “heard [Carter’s record on labor] 
wasn’t any too great when he was governor.”
321
  On the other hand, labor’s more 
liberal block was more optimistic than Meany about the prospects of a Carter 
presidency.  Progressive unions including the UAW and AFSCME became early 
Carter supporters, and reports surfaced that Auto Workers’ president Leonard 
Woodcock was being considered for a position in a theoretical Carter 
Administration.
322
  Regardless of whether or not the AFL-CIO was thrilled with the 
idea of a Carter White House, once his nomination was assured, the union federation, 
chastened by the disastrous results of having sat out the 1972 election, threw its 
resources behind Carter.  When the Democrat narrowly came out on top, labor’s 
forces would claim that their huge get-out-the-vote efforts had been decisive in his 
victory. 
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 However, the AFL-CIO’s honeymoon period with the Carter Administration 
lasted less than four months.  In May, at a routine press conference following a 
meeting of the AFL-CIO Executive Council, Meany – who friends claimed was 
trying to restrain himself in the name of “maintaining a good relationship with 
Carter” – expressed a lack of confidence in the administration’s performance, said 
Carter’s proposed economic stimulus plan was “inadequate,” and editorialized that 
the president spent too much time “working on his image... he has done a lot of 
talking about a number of things, but so far very little action.”  When asked directly if 
labor had anything to be happy about from Carter’s first months in the White House, 
Meany grumbled a monosyllabic “no.”
323
   
 The disagreement between labor and the White House stemmed largely from 
conflicting economic philosophies.  Labor’s overarching goal was economic stimulus; 
it wanted a fiscal policy that would put money in workers’ pockets, expand the 
economy, and bring down the still high unemployment rate.  Specifically, the AFL-
CIO called for increased social spending, a working-class tax cut, and a raise in the 
minimum wage from $2.30 per hour to $3.00, considering the president’s proposed 
$2.50 per hour rate far too parsimonious.
324
  Labor leaders thought the 
administration’s decision to let inflation dominate the nation’s economic discourse 
was a mistake, and accused the president and his Council on Wage and Price Stability 
of fighting inflation on the backs of working people.  The AFL-CIO rejected the 
White House’s proposed wage and price controls outright, having learned from 
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similar programs during the Nixon era that wages were far easier to keep down than 
prices.  The Council on Wage and Price Stability, George Meany fumed in 1978, was 
“trying to jawbone wages and wages alone... let them put pressure on the corporations 
to keep prices down.”
325
  Carter’s people, the AFL-CIO president believed, had their 
economic priorities totally upside down.  
 The nation’s top labor officials were not off base in their understanding of the 
president’s main concerns.  Carter did equate labor’s desired social spending with 
inflation, and he considered inflation to be his number one policy problem.  For his 
part, President Carter thought labor’s preferred economic system drew upon a 
financial orthodoxy that was out of step with the times.
326
  Instead of the stimulus 
programs they wanted, labor leaders got lectured by administration officials about the 
need for restraint in the name of cooling inflation.  Labor Secretary Ray Marshall, one 
of the few people in the Carter Administration who Meany genuinely liked, tried to 
communicate the administration’s point of view to the AFL-CIO president, arguing 
that inflation, not unemployment, was the real threat to the economic recovery, and 
that many people blamed unions for the problem.
327
  Not surprisingly, Marshall’s 
overture did little to convince Meany, who remained thoroughly committed to 
opposing the government’s anti-inflation plan. 
 The AFL-CIO’s relationship to the White House remained tense throughout 
Carter’s time in office, and the president rapidly found himself on equally cool terms 
with the more liberal wing of the labor movement.  Leonard Woodcock, who had 
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pushed the UAW into the Carter camp early in 1976, retired from the union and was 
named U.S. envoy to China in 1977.
328
  He was replaced at the top of the UAW 
hierarchy by Doug Fraser, who sympathized with Carter’s politics more than Meany 
did, but still complained that the nation’s chief executive was an “ineffective” leader 
for liberal reforms.
329
  Fraser was one of several progressive union heads who were 
put in “a pessimistic mood” when their expectations of success in negotiating with the 
White House and Congress fell short.  But the UAW president was more reserved in 
his criticism than some of his colleagues, who, like International Association of 
Machinists president William Winpisinger, occasionally let their unhappiness become 
personal.  Winpisinger did just that near the end of Carter’s first term, when he 
famously reflected to journalists that the only thing the President could do to make 
labor happy in his next term would be to “die.”
330
   
 Organized labor’s problems were deftly summarized by a columnist in The 
Nation, who described the movement as “punch drunk and programless, at war with 
the President and the Democratic Congressional majority it helped to elect and reeling 
from repeated defeats by the well-heeled, increasingly sophisticated forces of 
industry.”
331
  Disgusted by what they saw as the AFL-CIO’s doubling down on failed 
policies, the dissident union leaders argued for a fresh approach.  The keys to 
revitalizing the labor movement, they insisted, were reinvigorating organizing and 
reviving labor’s social movement traditions by reaching out to other interest groups. 
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The Progressive Alliance 
For the new generation of progressive union leaders, the key to understanding labor’s 
decline in the 1970s could be found by studying its opponents.  The political right, as 
they understood it, was becoming more powerful as its elements became more 
cohesive.  Conservative interests were uniting in lobbying organizations such as the 
Business Roundtable, and conservative think-tanks such as the American Enterprise 
Institute provided a common frame of reference for rightist politicos of all stripes.  
Meanwhile, American liberalism had become fragmented, and its strength was being 
drained into a variety of competing interests.  The UAW’s Fraser summarized the 
situation thusly:  “lacking an integrating mechanism, liberal organizations and unions 
inevitably wind up fighting each other (directly or indirectly) in zero-sum conflicts, 
dissipate resources and influences, produce frustration and privatism rather than hope 
and cooperation for the common good.”
332
  If the labor movement were to make a 
comeback, it would have to do it as a part of a broader movement of liberal 
organizations united in the common causes of fairness and social equity.  Followers 
of this line of thinking soon began to work to construct the united liberal movement 
they envisioned through a variety of large-scale coalition initiatives.  
 It was in the name of rekindling its past success that progressive unionists 
sought to build new labor-liberal coalitions in the late 1970s.  The biggest of these 
was the Progressive Alliance (PA).
 333
  Formed in 1978, the Alliance pulled more than 
100 different organizations – ranging from unions and environmentalists to civil 
rights, religious, urban, academic, and women’s groups – into one large “coalition of 
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  The PA’s diversity was initially seen as its biggest strength.  In the 
name of getting as many of its member organizations involved as possible, the 
Alliance’s organizational structure ballooned in size and complexity, with multiple 
levels of decision-making layered on top of one another.  In theory, policy decisions 
had to be approved by a General Assembly, consisting of representatives from all of 
the member organizations, but Assembly meetings were infrequent and most 
decisions were instead made by a sixteen-person Executive Committee chaired by 
Doug Fraser.  Below that was a national board made up of thirty different 
organizations as well as a professional staff that handled daily operations and 
planning.  The Alliance also maintained two permanent Commissions, along with 
“various sub-commissions and subpanels which serv[ed] as permanent work and 
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 The Progressive Alliance’s creator, and the person who was unquestionably at 
its helm, was UAW President Douglas Fraser.  Fraser was a product of the 
Depression-era auto worker struggles.  Coming to the U.S. from Scotland as a child, 
he had risen through the union’s ranks, starting work at Chrysler in the 1930s, and 
signing his first UAW card along with thousands of others in 1936.  At twenty-eight 
he became president of his local, and shortly thereafter became an International 
representative.  He was soon noticed by Walter Reuther, who asked Fraser to be his 
administrative assistant in 1950.  From there, Fraser rose to become one of the 
union’s vice presidents and the head of its Chrysler Department before finally being 
elected UAW President in 1977.
336
  Fraser came to the presidency as a popular and 
respected leader among the UAW’s rank and file; as a Time profile pointed out, “he is 
among the most admired men ever to serve the U.A.W.  Rank-and-filers have never 
considered him a ‘pork-chopper,’....  They like his unpretentious ways ... and candid 
talk.”
337
  Fraser had been a favorite of Reuther’s, and considered himself to be 
carrying on his predecessor’s social unionist mantle.   
 It was in that capacity that, after the failure of the Labor Law Reform bill, 
Fraser began contemplating the organization that would become the Progressive 
Alliance.  The concerted effort made by big business to secure the bill’s defeat, and 
the Senate filibuster that made it a reality, convinced Fraser that systemic problems 
existed in the American political process.  In his now famous 1978 letter of 
resignation from the Labor-Management Group – a roundtable meant to foster 
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cooperation among leaders of business and unions – Fraser laid out the fundamental 
arguments that would shape the PA.  The most critical piece of Fraser’s political 
analysis was that the wealthy had unilaterally abandoned the postwar social compact.  
“I believe the leaders of the business community, with few exceptions, have chosen to 
wage a one-sided class war today in this country,” he wrote.  “The leaders of industry, 
commerce and finance in the United States have broken and discarded the fragile, 
unwritten compact previously existing during a past period of growth and 
progress.”
338
  Even more troubling was that the nation’s democratic institutions were 
being subverted to make the upper-crust assault on the poor and working class easier.  
Fraser asserted that “even the very foundations of America’s democratic process are 
threatened by the new approach of the business elite.  No democratic country in the 
world has lower rates of voter participation than the U.S., except Botswana....  Yet 
business groups regularly finance politicians, referenda and legislative battles to 
continue barriers to citizen participation in elections.”  As voting participation 
became more “class-skewed,” and corporate campaign donations became more 
important, the Democratic Party abandoned its former constituents and became more 
“heavily influenced by business interests,” moving to the right in the process.
339
  
 The Alliance’s goals were as diverse as its membership, but the concerns that 
Fraser articulated in his letter were apparent in all of them.  The PA was expected, at 
a minimum, to fulfill the basic goal of creating comity among its members.  However 
the PA’s early planners, who were mostly drawn from the UAW – including Fraser, 
Government and Public Affairs division Director Stephen Schlossberg, and staffer 
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Bill Dodds – felt that creating an atmosphere of good feelings among liberal 
organizations was not enough.  “Liberals need an organization that functions as a 
facilitator and clearing house,” Dodds, who would soon become the PA’s executive 
director, advised Fraser, “but they also want an organization that joins the battle, that 
creates movement where none exists.”
340
   
 So on top of bringing liberal groups together in the name of good will, the 
organization was supposed to function in three additional capacities, each addressing 
a presumed need of liberal social activists.  First, it would operate as a grassroots 
mobilization force, or, in the words of the Alliance’s planners, “the permanent 
organizational structure for a progressive reserve army.”
341
  The forces that they 
could thus rapidly muster would be useful both in applying political pressure in the 
PA’s own interests and in support to member organizations involved in popular 
struggles.  Second, to counter the growing prominence of right-wing ideas originating 
in think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation, 
the PA would serve as a progressive brain trust, funding research and publications 
designed to “reorient the debate by forcing the corporate/conservative world to 
respond to progressive initiatives rather than the other way around.”
342
   
 Finally, the Alliance’s planners hoped that it would be able to reform the 
political system and bring about the return of “responsibility and accountability in the 
political process.”
343
  To leaders of the Alliance, reforming the system meant making 
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it more responsive to the popular will and eliminating the hurdles that held up 
progressive reform.  Accordingly, it issued calls for lobbying restrictions and 
campaign finance reform, hoping to eliminate some of the influence that corporate 
money had on politics.  It encouraged the Senate to end the filibuster, which had so 
recently cost organized labor its coveted Labor Law Reform.  It also sought ways to 
increase political participation among underrepresented groups.   
 This last effort partially consisted of finding ways to remove legal barriers to 
voting, but it was equally about making people feel included in or connected to 
electoral politics.  Bringing the disconnected back to the polls would mean 
convincing them that elections mattered by introducing a greater measure of 
accountability to the party system.  To this end, the Alliance acted as a caucus on the 
Democratic Party’s left-wing, hoping to compel the party to live up to its campaign 
promises by framing the platform as a binding agreement with the public.  It tried 
unsuccessfully to get the party to hold a midterm convention, where the progress of 
elected officials in meeting the party’s stated goals would be assessed.  Even so, the 
Alliance enjoyed a small victory at the 1980 Democratic National convention, when it 
persuaded the party to create a Platform Accountability Commission to study ways to 
make party officials more committed to achieving its stated agenda.
344
    
 The nature of the PA’s involvement with the Democratic Party has been 
misunderstood in the past.  Andrew Battista argues that the Alliance was meant to 
“reform or transform the Democratic Party... in order to contest for power in it,” and 
make it more liberal.  However, I believe its goal was not necessarily to make the 
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party more liberal, but was instead to make it more regimented.  Alliance leaders 
wanted simply to bring more clarity and predictability to an electoral/legislative 
process in which its members were already confident they could regularly succeed.  
The organization’s early statements make it clear that it would have approved of the 
Republican Party also instituting a binding platform, even though that would have 
potentially made it more difficult for GOP officials to break ranks and support 
Democratic initiatives.  PA leaders believed that having an ideologically coherent 
Republican Party to match the Democrats would be positive for the American 
political system because it would crystallize the differences between the two and 
demonstrate the need for widespread political participation.
345
   
 Although the Alliance was designed to emphasize its mass appeal and diverse 
constituency, it was dominated by its union members.  The Alliance was inspired by 
the falling status of organized labor, and nearly all of the early planning was 
conducted by Fraser and his UAW staff.  Fraser went out of his way early in the 
process to court the participation of “union heavy hitters” with dinners and meetings 
attended only by labor representatives, and he assured those union leaders that the PA 
would maintain an “informal trade union advisory committee to meet as necessary to 
guide the organization.”
346
  The PA drew its professional staff from the ranks of 
labor, and had office and meeting space donated by major unions.
347
  As expected by 
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the Alliance’s planners, the unions also contributed the majority of the organization’s 
monetary funding.  All the PA’s top financial backers were unions, as Fraser noted in 
one funding appeal:  “we have received substantial monetary commitments... I must 
say basically from the labor movement.”
348
 
 The heavy involvement of union forces in the PA’s management assured 
stability in the organization’s infrastructure, but it also carried the potential downside 
of making the group appear to be just an extension of the labor movement.  Fraser 
and his associates worried that if the Alliance was too devoted to labor’s causes, it 
would alienate potential allies and undercut the stated goals of the group.  For that 
reason, they sincerely wanted to make the organization’s official leadership diverse.  
Beginning with the initial planning meeting with break-out discussions led by “a 
woman, a black, and a young activist,” and continuing as the organizing committees 
took nominees for the Executive Board anticipating “UAW, one other liberal union... 
Jay Turner [the President of the International Union of Operating Engineers], 2 blacks 
(one a woman), 1 white woman and one young person from a non labor background,” 
every effort was made to ensure that outcome.
349
  As much as racial and gender 
balance was sought, it was equally important to the PA’s founders that they involved 
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a cross-section of the interests involved in their group, with civic, aged, and church 
groups all represented. 
   The growing prominence of environmentalists in American politics meant that 
their participation in the Progressive Alliance would be invaluable to the new 
coalition.  At the same time, their presence in the organization worried some key 
union leaders, who still considered environmentalists to be antagonistic to working-
class economic priorities.  Fraser and Schlossberg addressed the issue at a private 
meeting they hosted for the group’s biggest labor supporters, acknowledging that the 
environment – along with foreign policy and national defense – was an “area of deep 
ideological division” that could potentially divide the caucus before it even got 
started.
350
  The UAW members reassured their suspicious counterparts that they had 
no intention “to turn this over to the activists and street people,” but, at the same time, 
they cautioned that “this Alliance cannot exclude groups.  We cannot... carry 
prejudices from the past.”  Fraser’s position ultimately prevailed, and an 




 Environmentalist participation in the Progressive Alliance may have created a 
minor stir among some of the organization’s union backers, but for the leaders of the 
Sierra Club, the decision of whether or not to join the Alliance caused little 
dissension.  Their choice was easy for a couple of reasons.  First, joining the Alliance 
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would help the Club in its continuing efforts to fight the charges of classism that had 
left it uncomfortably isolated from non-environmentalist allies.  For the past year, 
Club leaders had been thinking, in the words of President William Futrell, that “a 
basic change in our strategy should be an increased effort to engage those who have 
not marched with us in the past,” and to remake the organization’s image as more 
open and concerned with urban issues.
352
  Part of that policy was trying to reconnect 
with the labor movement, which influential Club officials including Michael 
McCloskey still hoped to do.  But the Club’s broader goal was to develop links to 
non-environmentalist allies more generally.  As part of that effort, in late 1977 and 
early 1978, it had begun outreach programs to build bridges with urban, civil rights, 
and women’s organizations, and had rebranded its in-house newsletter, The Sierra 
Club Bulletin, as the glossy and inviting magazine Sierra.  Joining the Alliance was a 
low-risk, low-cost way to further the goal of establishing relationships with interests 
outside of environmentalism.
353
   
 More importantly, in late 1978 and early 1979 the Sierra Club was 
experiencing pangs of panic similar to the labor movement’s at the unredeemed 
political potential of the previous few years.  Although the shock was more palpable 
for labor, environmentalists had also been left feeling as if they had received a series 
of half measures from a supposedly friendly political structure.  After a fairly 
successful 1977, the Club met with stiff resistance on its biggest initiatives in its core 
organizing area – wilderness protection – in 1978.  That year the Club’s highest 
priority was getting over 100 million acres of land in Alaska protected from 
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development through Wilderness or other public lands designation.  The Club’s 
Washington Office took the lead in lobbying for multiple environmental 
organizations and devoted most of its energy to the effort through the spring and 
summer.  Despite the Club’s best efforts, the process ended in failure, as the House 
version of the bill protected significantly less than the Club had wanted, and the 
Senate version was unceremoniously tabled under the threat of a filibuster by both of 
Alaska’s Senators.
354
   
 The second major Sierra Club wilderness protection disappointment involved 
the Forest Service’s Roadless Area Review Evaluation, or RARE II.  Like the first 
RARE survey, which had been conducted in the late 1960s, RARE II was a study 
conducted by the Forest Service to determine which of the nation’s 62 million acres 
of roadless public land would be appropriate to designate as wilderness areas and 
which would be better given over to multiple use, including mining and timbering.
 355
  
Environmentalists charged from early on that the RARE process was not being 
undertaken as a fair and impartial accounting of public lands, but was instead being 
conducted with “a serious anti-wilderness slant.”
356
   The process was done “as 
quickly as possible” with limited and inconvenient opportunities for the public to 
comment or ask questions about the proceedings.  In a major defeat for the Club and 
other environmental organizations that had participated in the RARE II negotiations, 
the Forest Service ultimately recommended that only 15 million acres of the land be 
protected.  In April, 1979, President Carter accepted the Forest Service proposals, 
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excising 36 million controversial acres from a wilderness designation.
357
  “RARE II is 
a failure,” the Club concluded in its report to Sierra readers; “it was biased toward 
industry... and it did not permit enough public participation....  It is clear that the 
RARE II process was intended to not designate areas as wilderness.”
358
   
 Michael McCloskey would later call RARE II “our first down note in our 
relations with Carter,” but that is not entirely accurate.  While the president’s 
relationship to the environmentalist community was not as troubled as his interactions 
with organized labor, it was far rockier than his environmentalist image would 
indicate.  Although the president was personally popular among environmentalists, 
who enjoyed the access to the White House that they and their ideas were given, 
many in the green movement found Carter to be nearly as ineffective a champion for 
their goals as he was for labor’s.  “As far as his environmental ideas and philosophy 
go, Jimmy Carter is probably the best President this country ever had,” Brock Evans 
told reporters at the end of Carter’s first year in office.  “But in terms of executing 
those ideas, his performance has not been outstanding.”
359
  Time and again – whether 
environmentalists were trying to convince Congress to curb controversial dam 
projects or to pass strengthening amendments to the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts 
– the White House’s application of pressure on the legislature was too late and too 
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light to make a difference.
360
  Carter sympathized with environmentalists’ goals, but 
too often seemed unwilling to do the political work to make them reality. 
 Also, like organized labor, many environmental organizations chaffed when 
Carter’s anti-inflation measures threatened the funding of programs they supported.  
For example, when the president proposed abolishing the Council on Environmental 
Quality in the name of streamlining the functions of the Executive branch, nearly 
every environmental organization in the country opposed the idea and forced the 
White House to backtrack.
361
  Likewise, the president’s call for a freeze on federal 
hiring told the environmental community that he was not serious about ecological 
preservation because the already understaffed EPA would not be able to bring in 
enough specialists to detect environmental problems or enough lawyers to prosecute 
polluters.  That led many, including Environmental Defense Fund attorney Robert 
Ruach, to lambast the president’s pollution control plans as empty rhetoric. “Carter 
makes sweeping statements,” Rauch told reporters, “but he is not putting his money 
where his mouth is.”
362
  Clearly, environmentalists felt that Carter was being 
parsimonious with resources – both political and financial – almost from the outset of 
his administration.  
 Thus, the Club’s leaders were not only attracted to the PA’s potential to 
connect them with other organizations, they were also sympathetic to the Alliance’s 
politics.  When Brock Evans warned Club members that “the tone of the 
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Administration has developed an anti-environmental ring – perhaps in anticipation of 
the 1980 elections and the allegedly more ‘conservative’ political climate,” he 
unknowingly echoed the very fears that had motivated Fraser to found the Alliance in 
the first place.
363
  At the same time, joining a self-described “liberal” organization, 
especially one that was asserting itself in Democratic Party politics, was an odd 
choice for the Sierra Club.  For decades the organization had prided itself on being 
agnostic in terms of party alignment, and it had avoided electoral politics entirely 
until 1976.  The fact that joining the PA provoked so little debate within the Club’s 
leadership – despite the objections of a few Club members to the organization’s new 
political orientation in the late 1970s and early 1980s – was both an indication of the 
organization’s leftward drift and an acknowledgement that the Democratic Party had 
become not just the nation’s de facto labor party, but its green party as well.
364
   
 The Alliance’s most successful endeavors primarily involved publicizing 
issues.  The organization financed several independent academic research projects in 
the late 1970s.  Most notably, its funding contributed to the publication of Barry 
Blueston and Bennett Harrison’s seminal early study of U.S. manufacturing decline 
The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and 
the Dismantling of Basic Industry (1982).  Beyond that, the group sponsored a series 
of well-attended meetings and conferences on a variety of topics, including plant 
closings, political process, and controversy over labor and environmental regulation.  
These events served dual purposes, allowing representatives from member 
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organizations to get to know one another personally while at the same time spreading 
awareness of issues that were of interest to the Alliance’s constituents.
365
  
 Despite enthusiasm for its activities within many liberal organizations, the 
Progressive Alliance proved to be short lived, officially shuttering operations in the 
early spring of 1981.  Battista attributes the end of the Progressive Alliance to the fact 
that its component pieces “never really gelled.”
366
  The coalition’s tremendous size 
made it unwieldy – too many organizations wanted too much attention given to their 
own issues to truly work together.  The Alliance’s leaders struggled to clearly define 
the group’s goals or develop its priorities in a way that would involve and satisfy 
every member organization; it was ultimately an impossible choice: divide the 
group’s resources in a way that could make everyone happy, or concentrate them in a 
way that could maximize their effectiveness and risk ostracizing some members.  
Even Fraser, who had originally seen the Alliance’s size as its best feature, came to 
see it as a flaw.  “You had so many groups with so many different interests, and that 
complicated the matter,” he later relayed to Battista in an interview.  “You’re dealing 
with fifty-five issues and that’s really never a good way to advance a program.  That 
was very troublesome to me.”
367
   
 The Alliance’s short lifespan and unfocused plan of action meant that it 
achieved few of its stated goals, but it would be a mistake to entirely dismiss it.  
Despite its organizational problems, the PA actually remained popular with most its 
members until the end, and it functioned quite well as an avenue for bringing 
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progressive unions into contact with potential allies from outside the labor 
movement.
368
  The connections the PA helped to establish and the example that it set 
would live on in future coalitions between labor and non-labor groups.  Most notably, 
the lessons learned in the building of the Alliance would influence blue-green 
organizing in the coming decade in several important ways.   
 The most obvious lesson that subsequent coalition organizers drew from the 
dilemmas that had hampered the PA was that bigger was not necessarily better.  Post-
Alliance labor-liberal associations would pursue narrower forms of coalition activity, 
either restricting the size of newly formed organizations or controlling their scope by, 
in the words of Battista, “limit[ing] and more clearly defin[ing] their issue agendas, 
and develop[ing] more specialized political roles or functions.”
369
  The blue-green 
coalition builders of the 1980s would do both.  That era’s most durable alliance 
between unions and environmental organizations – the OSHA/Environmental 
Network  – would combine a tightly focused campaign to maintain occupational 
health and clean air standards with an association limited to labor and environmental 
organizations.   
 More importantly, the failure the Progressive Alliance helped to establish the 
agenda that would guide labor-environmental coalition builders in the 1980s and 
beyond.  Two general campaign themes drew the most attention: deindustrialization, 
which was a favored topic for both labor and inner-city organizations, and 
environmental health and safety, which was pushed by many non-labor groups, 
including environmentalists.  “Plant closings and health and safety,” (a term favored 
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over “environment” within the PA in order to “differentiate ourselves from the older 
clean-air consumerist elite types”)  the Alliance’s staff advised Fraser after months of 
discussion, were “issues that could create a movement.”
370
    The benefits of focusing 
on these two points were clear, “[they] unite rather than factionalize our 
constituency... they have immediate appeal to our trade union founders; they create 
momentum and press which lay bare.”
371
  Fraser agreed with that assessment and 
encouraged his organization especially to embrace health and safety issues in the 
workplace and beyond.  “Cancer is a magic word,” he informed the PA Executive 
Committee. “We can organize around it.”
372
   The Alliance never got the opportunity 
to do much organizing around either issue, but the next generation of labor-
environmental coalition builders would forcefully take up the call for cooperation 
around health and safety issues. 
The Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition 
As was the case with the Progressive Alliance, the Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition 
(CLEC) helped to define the parameters of later blue-green alliance building.  
However, whereas the PA demonstrated which areas of cooperation would be most 
fruitful, the CLEC did the opposite.  The failure of the labor-backed CLEC to attract 
the support of the nation’s biggest environmental organizations demonstrated that the 
two sides’ energy priorities were diverging rather than meeting as the 1980s dawned.   
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 After the energy crisis flared in 1974, the issue continued to smolder in the 
United States for the next several years.  The gas lines of 1973 disappeared, but the 
basic discrepancies between supply and demand that had caused them remained.  
During the election of 1976, Jimmy Carter hoped to reignite the public’s attention, 
running with the goal of creating a functional national energy policy that would put 
the nation on a path toward energy self-sufficiency.  Almost immediately upon 
entering the White House, the president set to work, bringing the numerous federal 
agencies involved in energy policy together in a new Department of Energy.  He also 
began trying to sell to the American people a plan to fight the nation’s reliance on 




 The president’s new energy plan, which he developed between 1977 and 
1979, involved more than one hundred provisions, but three major policy initiatives 
made up its core.  The first core initiative was conservation, which Carter considered 
to be “the cornerstone” of his policy.
374
  Calling for smarter energy use all around, the 
president promised federal investment in public transportation and programs to 
reduce energy waste in buildings.  “Conservation,” he told the American public, “is 
the quickest, cheapest, most practical source of energy.”
375
  To go along with 
lowering consumption, Carter also proposed several strategies to increase U.S. energy 
production.  The second core piece of Carter’s energy program sought to encourage 
domestic petroleum producers to pump and refine more oil.  The administration 
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thought that the best way to provide this encouragement was by deregulating oil 
prices, which it assumed would cause the price of the commodity to rise and bring 
with it producers’ desire to increase capacity.  Rising prices would bring with them 
the added benefit of helping conserve energy by potentially lowering demand, but to 
ensure that prices did not rise too precipitously the president also proposed imposing 
a windfall profits tax on energy suppliers who went too far.  The tax, which the White 
House expected to produce at least $146 billion in revenue over ten years, also 
became the starting point for the third core aspect of Carter’s energy program.  The 
president planned to increase American energy production by diversifying its sources.  
While nuclear power, coal, and natural gas all had their places, the money raised from 
the windfall profits tax was to help speed the transition away from foreign oil by 
being invested in alternative energy technologies including solar power, synthetic 
fuels, and oil shale.
376
  
Aside from George Meany, who unexpectedly lauded the president’s vision in 
trying “to bring [the crisis in energy] home to the American people,” the White 
House’s energy proposals were a flop with large segments of the country.
377
  The oil 
industry, along with electrical utilities, the auto industry, and other powerful business 
interests chaffed at the proposed windfall profits tax and at new regulations and 
standards.  The public, meanwhile, stood unwilling to make major sacrifices in the 
name of energy conservation, and feared the rising prices that the administration’s 
plan seemed to invite.  Worse, most even remained unconvinced that the energy crisis 
was real; as late as the spring of 1979 – with oil prices climbing rapidly in the wake 
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of supply disruptions caused by the Iranian Revolution – polling done by CBS/New 
York Times showed that sixty-nine percent of Americans thought reported oil 
shortages were fabricated to allow energy providers to boost profits.
378
   
 It was in this atmosphere of skepticism that the Citizen/Labor Energy 
Coalition was founded in April, 1978, almost a year to the day after President Carter’s 
first National Address on Energy.  The idea for a coalition to bring community and 
public interest groups together with unions to seek equitable solutions to the nation’s 
energy woes came from Heather Booth, a former New Left activist and founder of a 
Chicago-based school for community organizers.  In 1977, Booth reached out to the 
newly elected president of the International Association of Machinists, William 
Winpisinger.
379
   
 “Wimpy” as Winpisinger was known to friends, was a well-known and 
respected progressive unionist figure.  Like his close ally Doug Fraser, Winpisinger 
had risen through the ranks of his union, of which he was elected president in 1977.  
Also like Fraser, Winpisinger believed that the AFL-CIO had made a mistake in 
distancing itself from non-labor interest groups, and he was one of the leading voices 
within the Federation calling for Meany’s retirement in the late 1970s.  The IAM 
chief  was also a harsh critic of President Carter and a self-described socialist who 
favored a national takeover of the oil industry and electric utilities.
380
  When 
approached by Booth about creating an organization devoted to progressive energy 
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politics, Winpisinger excitedly accepted her offer, and the two began the long process 
of planning the new organization.  
 Unlike with the PA, the basic outline of the CLEC’s program was clear from 
the beginning:  unions, senior citizens, and public interest and community groups 
would stand united both in opposition to the president’s energy plan, and in 
promotion of their own, which would put the rights of energy workers and consumers 
front and center.  Guided by the dual assumptions that, in the words of Booth, “1. The 
energy crisis is primarily a political and economic question [and] 2. The energy 
companies and their corporate and political allies are organized effectively to use the 
crisis to promote their own policies and interests,” the CLEC struck an immediate 
tone of anti-corporate populism.
381
  The nation’s energy problems, as defined by the 
CLEC, had less to do with the foreign or domestic origin of the nation’s energy 
supplies than with cartelized nature of the American energy industry.  The group’s 
thinking, according to Battista, was that “a small group of giant, integrated oil and gas 
firms owned and controlled most of the energy resources and deeply influenced 
public energy policy, enabling them to supply and price energy to their advantage.”  
This price gouging by energy suppliers not only made it more difficult for consumers 
to pay their bills, but also drove inflation and endangered the national economy.  
Thus, the CLEC sought “to develop and implement a national energy policy which 
will benefit all Americans by: providing adequate energy to consumers at reasonable 
prices; providing increased employment opportunities; and 
 
Stabilizing the national 
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economy by developing energy self-sufficiency thru (sic) conservation and safe, non-
inflationary, environmentally sound, alternative energy technologies.”
382
    
 In order to reach these goals, the CLEC developed a thorough program of 
action and began promoting it on both the federal and state levels by 1979.  In order 
to keep energy costs low, the CLEC called for the reregulation of prices for oil and 
natural gas which Congress had only recently deregulated and successfully lobbied 
states and localities to reform utility rate structures.  The organization also called on 
Congress to create federal subsidies for low-income people who were suffering from 
high energy costs.  But easing access to energy for working people was only one half 
of the CLEC’s program; the other half sought tighter public control and scrutiny over 
energy providers.  To that end, the organization advocated a law that would fight long 
lines at the gasoline pump by mandating that oil firms run at full capacity in times of 
public need.  It sought to break the trend of oil company conglomeration by legally 
prohibiting their mergers.  And, finally, the Coalition strove to punish oil companies 
for their alleged profiteering by rolling back their tax subsidies.
383
   
 Getting support for such an agenda was fairly easy – dozens of community 
and public interest groups expressed early support, and Winpisinger’s pull within the 
labor movement helped to guarantee strong union backing as well.
384
  CLEC leaders 
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thought that environmentalists were also a natural constituency for their organization, 
but attracting the major green groups proved to be a difficult task.  Environmental 
organizations, including the Sierra Club, were involved in the early planning talks, 
and contributed time and ideas to the organizational process in 1977.  But the 
Coalition lost much of its environmentalist support at its official founding convention 
in 1978, when it refused to take a strong stand against nuclear power.  Although most 
of the organizations that participated in the group were against the expanded use of 
nuclear power as a solution to the United States’ energy crisis, in order to ensure the 
participation of the OCAW, and to limit potential hostility directed its way by the 
AFL-CIO, the CLEC decided at its inaugural convention not to take a position on the 
issue.
385
  In 1978 and 1979, partially in an effort to win back the support of the 
environmentalists it had lost, the CLEC began working for such environmentally 
sound initiatives as a solar-energy development bank, energy conservation laws, and 
increased federal subsidies for energy efficient building practices, but these initiatives 
remained secondary concerns for the group.  In the spring and summer of 1978, with 
an open spot reserved for an environmental group on the Coalition’s Executive 
Committee, and with a standing invitation to join, the Sierra Club’s leaders debated 
the merits of affiliating their group with the CLEC.
386
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 Environmentalists had been no less disappointed by the president’s energy 
proposals than the population at large, although they were initially enthusiastic about 
the administration’s program when it was announced.  To the delight of 
environmentalists across the nation, Carter said the right things on the campaign trail 
and in his earliest days in office – he supported conservation efforts, believed in the 
potential of solar power, and opposed fast breeder reactors to produce nuclear energy.  
All of these goals appeared to be confirmed by the president’s April, 1977 national 
energy address.  With its attention to conservation and renewable energy sources, 
Brock Evans happily told reporters, “the energy message sounded like we wrote it 
ourselves.”
387
   
 However, as they began to digest the actual policy prescriptions being 
proffered by the administration, environmentalists absorbed them with a mixture of 
skepticism and disappointment.  The Sierra Club’s leaders worried that Carter’s 
energy plans were too pro-nuclear, as evidenced by his appointment of two nuclear 
energy advocates to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the pro-nuclear 
emphasis of the newly established Department of Energy under James Schlesinger, 
who had chaired the Atomic Energy Commission in the early 1970s.
388
  Others 
complained that the president’s plans called for heavy investment in the production of 
untried synthetic fuels and would increase fossil fuel usage for the foreseeable future 
– including a doubling of the nation’s coal consumption by the middle of the 1980s – 
rather than scaling back that usage as the nation transitioned to renewable energy 
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sources. Meanwhile, contrary to promised investments in renewable energy, federal 
spending for solar power faced threatened cuts.  Within a short time, the consensus 
had developed within the nation’s major environmental organizations that Carter’s 
energy policy was “disappointing on all fronts.”
389
   
 Even though they were dissatisfied by the solutions emerging from the White 
House, Club leaders’ still had mixed emotions about throwing their support behind 
the Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition.  The deal’s biggest proponent, Evans, stressed 
that it would provide yet another useful opportunity for dialogue with outside 
interests, especially those in the labor movement, which could prove useful in the 
future.  “Building bridges, networks, and mutual trust on many issues can have a 
long-term pay-off,” he stressed, especially when they are being made with “a ‘comer’ 
in the labor movement” like Winpisinger.
390
  But that argument did little to satisfy the 
forces arrayed in opposition, which included the imposing presence of future Club 
presidents Richard Cellarius and Denny Shaffer as well as the organization’s chief 
Washington Representative on energy matters, Greg Thomas.  Evans’ opponents 
questioned the value of joining the CLEC simply with the goal of creating good will 
with the labor movement.  Left-wing unionists, they noted, were the ones that were 
most active in the Coalition, and they also made up the part of the movement that the 
Club already had its strongest connections to.  Joining the CLEC was not only 
unlikely to improve the Club’s relationship with the IAM or UAW, they argued, but 
                                                 
389
 Environmental Defense Fund Executive Director Arlie Schardt quoted in Shabecoff, “Carter Record 
Mixed on the Environment;” Gladwin Hill, “Battle Over Synthetic Fuels,” NYT, July 7, 1979; “Carter 
Energy, Conservation Action Assailed, WP, April 25, 1978; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “The 
Coming Out Party That Bombed,” WP, June 1, 1977. 
390
 Letter to Mike McCloskey and Paul Swatek from Brock Evans, May 1, 1978, BANC MSS 71/289 
c, carton 31, folder 5. 
 193 
 
working with these dissident unionists also risked the wrath of the “stronger” part of 
labor in Meany and the AFL-CIO.
391
  
  Participation in the Coalition thus guaranteed no positive benefits, but 
promised some very real conflicts of interest.  The Club leaders opposed to joining 
the CLEC frequently highlighted these potential conflicts during the debate, often 
framing the issue around the fear that the Sierra Club could be forced to go along with 
CLEC policies even if those went against the Club’s own principles.  Evans tried to 
soothe these fears by pointing out that the Coalition’s policy statements would be 
made only in the names of organizations that expressly agreed to their provisions.  “If 
they take policy in favor of opening up the National Parks to oil drilling,” Evans 
advised McCloskey, “we simply don’t sign on it, and are not identified as supporting 
it.”
392
  But that explanation did not sit well with his adversaries, who insisted that the 
Club’s presence within the CLEC would imply its support for the Coalition’s policies.  
Richard Cellarius, for example, grimly argued to the Board of Directors “by joining, 




 Such an implication would be bad enough if it was over an issue on which the 
Sierra Club had no stated policy, or if, as in the case of the Coalition’s advocacy of 
“the break up of concentrated economic power,” it would pull the Club into policy 
territory it would rather avoid.
394
  But the suggestion of Club support for policies with 
which it had a fundamental disagreement would be unbearable.  The argument that 
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the Club had previously undertaken such risks in joining other coalitions fell flat 
because, as one anti-CLEC voice pointed out, “we have not joined coalitions that 
were dedicated to a stance that we considered wrong on a key policy.”
395
  Such was 
the case, claimed those opposed to aligning with the CLEC, with the Coalition’s 
policy on energy pricing, which rapidly became the most contentious issue under 
discussion.   
 By 1978, the Sierra Club had a standing policy that fossil fuel energy should 
be priced at its “true cost” – a measure of production costs that takes into account the 
limited nature of the resource – while the CLEC seemed to endorse an older model of 
energy pricing which stood below the true cost, and, from the Club’s perspective, 
encouraged wasteful usage.  The debate among the Club’s leaders revolved around 
what exactly the CLEC’s position was, how compatible it was with the Club’s, and 
how firmly it was set.  Evans, after multiple long conversations with CLEC leaders, 
was convinced that the conflict was really a non-issue; the Coalition’s position was 
poorly stated, but could easily be read to agree with the principles of the Club’s 
policy.  The Coalition, he wrote to Club leaders, was worried about price gouging 
more than high prices per se; they had “no inherent objection to paying the real price 
of the resource... there is only a question over what the ‘real’ price is.”
396
  More 
importantly, he did not think that the CLEC position was set.  Evans believed that 
because many of the Coalition’s member organizations were fairly new to energy 
issues, they would be easy for experts from the Club to influence.  Their attitude, he 
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reported, was “soft... to say the least....  We would be able, on either most or all 
selected issues, to get them to adopt the bulk of our position.”
397
   
 Evans’ reasoning failed to impress the other side, which was dubious that an 
organization devoted to energy policy was “not sophisticated on these issues.”  
Thomas, one of the Club’s most trusted voices in regards to energy policy, battled 
hard against joining the CLEC.  He argued that whatever ambiguity existed in the 
language of the CLEC’s policy statements “it is clear... that the chief concern of the 
pricing formula is... to reduce consumer costs and constrain industry revenues.”  It 
was not justified to read them any other way.  Joining the Coalition would be a 
mistake because its policies on energy pricing “would undermine the credibility of 
our energy conservation work for no apparent countervailing benefit.  Presumably, 
the Sierra Club does not join coalitions simply for the sake of joining coalitions, but 
only to promote a common viewpoint.  In this case, it is not at all clear that we share a 
common viewpoint.”
398
   
 The debate played out within the Club’s leadership circles over the course of 
months, with those opposing affiliation generally having the upper hand.  When the 
issue was first raised on the Board of Directors Executive Committee, a few weeks 
after the CLEC’s founding, the concerns with the Coalition’s energy pricing policy 
were immediately apparent.  A final decision was postponed when the opponents of 
affiliation decided to allow Evans and McCloskey to continue to negotiate a solution 
with the Coalition before further action was taken.  In September, the issue was back 
on the agenda, with Cellarius proposing that the committee refuse membership.  
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McCloskey and Evans, sensing that support for joining the group was lacking, asked 
to postpone the decision once again.
399
  The second postponement was granted, but 
by that point any momentum in the direction of joining the CLEC that had existed 
was clearly gone.  The question effectively died, as the Board never took it up again, 
and the Sierra Club remained outside the Coalition.  
 The Club had an opportunity to reevaluate its decision the next year, as the 
energy situation returned to crisis levels in 1979.  With oil prices once again 
skyrocketing and gas station lines once again snaking for miles, the Carter 
Administration stepped up its pressure on Congress to act.  In particular, the president 
now called for bigger subsidies for a crash production program for synthetic fuels, as 
well as the creation of a federal Energy Mobilization Board, which would have the 
power to act to suspend environmental regulations to hasten energy production in the 
event of an emergency like the one the nation now faced.
400
  Evans aptly 
characterized the reaction of the environmentalist community to Carter’s new 
proposals as “a shiver of fear.”  Worried that “the Carter proposal as a package would 
nearly obliterate the successful accomplishments of the environmental movement in 
the last decade,” and that Congress would act hastily so that it could show an 
aggravated public that it was doing something to fight the energy crisis, the Sierra 
Club scrambled to stop the passage of rushed legislation and to pull as many allies as 
possible into the fight alongside them.
401
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 “Energy... has now been temporarily pushed to the forefront of our efforts,” 
the Club’s national governors wrote to local leaders in the summer of 1979.
402
  They 
were not exaggerating; the next several months saw an “all-out effort” by the Club 
against the president’s new plan, with both staff and volunteer resources being shifted 
from other areas to focus on the emergency energy campaign.  The Club’s national 
efforts were a two-pronged affair.  In Washington, D.C., a six person lobbying team 
coordinated a legislative campaign focused especially on draining congressional 
support for the Energy Mobilization Board.
403
  At the same time, the organization’s 
San Francisco headquarters organized a publicity campaign designed primarily “to 
continue the process of eroding the public credibility of the synfuels option” by 
painting synthetics as polluting, expensive, and untested.  These two national efforts 
were combined with a simultaneous massive grassroots mobilization of local Club 
leaders and members.  The Club encouraged its local affiliates to have representatives 
meet with all of the congressmen and senators in their localities during the August 
congressional break.  It also mobilized a frenzied phone calling and letter writing 
campaign which resulted in, by Club estimates, several hundred letters reaching 
Congress in the first week of September alone.
404
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 The Sierra Club also sought to build coalitions with other groups, on both the 
national and local levels, to stifle the dangerous aspects of the White House energy 
plan.  Predictably, the Club was able to rapidly join with other environmental 
organizations, and before long daily meetings were being held at the Club’s 
Washington office.  “Just about the whole environmental community has become 
mobilized in the past week,” Evans relayed to his superiors back in California.
405
  But 
the group’s leaders strategizing in San Francisco thought that environmentalists 
would struggle if they tried to go it alone on this matter.  They recognized that “it is a 
basic fact of political life that members of Congress expect to hear from the Sierra 
Club on this and other environmental issues.”  Additional environmentalist’s presence 
might make legislators begin to pay more attention to the issue, but they were 
unlikely to add much in the way of swaying undecided votes.  “But,” they all noted, 
“[Congressmen] really begin to sit up and take notice when they start to hear from 
labor unions, farmers, consumer groups....  It is important to find other groups to lend 
support to the Club position.”
406
   
 Sierra Club staffers Gene Coan and Ceil Giudicci, who were put in charge of 
directing the Club’s outreach efforts, actively set about trying to construct “an 
informal coalition of other environmental and public interest groups, unions, and as 
wide an array of organizations as we can get involved.”
407
  In deliberating on which 
organizations to reach out to, the two examined a variety of interest groups that they 
thought would be negatively affected by the president’s plan.  Those devoted to 
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environmentally inclined causes such as the anti-nuclear and public health 
movements held some real promise, and some unconventional thinking led to the 
consideration of banking, financial, and church groups.  In the end though, most of 
the Sierra Club’s energy went into working with labor, good government, 
agricultural, and consumer groups.  Many of the organizations targeted by the Club 
were among those that figured most heavily in the CLEC.
408
   
 Even as the Sierra Club hotly endeavored to work with the unions and 
consumer groups that made up the Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition to defeat the 
Carter energy program, the issue of the Club’s officially joining the CLEC remained a 
non-starter.  Temporary alliances between the two on particular energy issues were 
feasible, but it was clear that a permanent coalition would not be.  The CLEC would 
press forward with its ambitious energy program until the mid-1980s, when funding 
problems and internal conflicts over the political direction of the group forced it to be 
rolled into a larger organization, Citizen Action.
409
  Both the Club and the Coalition 
recognized the other’s goals as legitimate, and there is no evidence that the 
relationship between the two was ever hostile.  The Sierra Club understood the need 
for fairness in energy distribution and supported programs to protect the poor from 
unique levels of suffering from rising energy prices, while the CLEC conceded that 
conservation and “environmentally sound alternative energy technologies” were 
needed.
410
  At the same time, the two organizations found their energy priorities to be 
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fundamentally incompatible, which made permanent cooperation on anything but 
secondary goals impossible.    
Conclusion 
The last two years of the 1970s were a transitional moment in the relationship 
between environmental organizations and the labor movement.  At that time, 
progressive unionists in the UAW, IAM, and other unions felt compelled by political 
necessity to rebuild the connections between themselves and other social movement 
organizations that had lapsed in the preceding years.  Unions eased back into the 
partnership with environmentalists by inviting environmental organizations to take 
part in larger coalitions that labor leaders were organizing.  These groups were 
designed to revive American liberalism – and through it the labor movement – by 
energizing its base and giving common form and function to previously disjointed 
activities.  While they never reached that level of success, they drew attention to 
issues from deindustrialization to energy rate discrimination.  Moreover, they served 
as a public sphere of sorts, allowing organizers from diverse social movement 
organizations to meet, learn from one another, and debate issues.     
 The potential for blue-green collaboration embodied by the Progressive 
Alliance and Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition was short-lived, as the Alliance quickly 
ceased to function and the biggest environmental organizations opted out of the 
Coalition after months of indecision.  Rather than signaling the final end of 
cooperative efforts between the labor and environmental movements, these exploits 
instead proved to be false-starts that helped to pave the way for a more enduring 
alliance in the form of the OSHA/Environment Network in the 1980s.  The mass 
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coalitions of the late 1970s brought the leaders of unions and environmental 
organizations back together and asked each side to probe the limits of their 
willingness to engage the other.  In so doing, they gave shape and definition to the 
blue-green alliance by establishing the bounds of future collaboration.  The 
Progressive Alliance showed the need for a clear and definite program, while at the 
same time bringing the themes of occupational safety and health to the forefront of 
the conversation.  Meanwhile, the Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition excised energy 
issues from the discussion – or, at the very least, previewed how risky debating such 









“There is... a new energy pulsating in the country on behalf of environmental 
protection....  Its elitist content is dissolving as environmentalists, labor leaders, and 
occasionally business envoys bury old hatchets and explore new partnerships.  
Underlying this coalition of interests is the spreading perception that distinctions 
between the ‘natural’ and workplace environment are in many ways artificial.”
411
  In 
authoring those words in 1984, Environmental Sociologists Frederick Buttel, Charles 
Geisler, and Irving Wiswall noted a trend that had by that point been growing for 
several years.  The first half of the 1980s was an era of labor-environmental 
partnership on a scale not seen since the heady period following Earth Day, 1970.   
After years of tumult featuring everything from limited cooperation to aborted 
coalitions to outright hostility, the blue-green relationship stabilized in the early 
1980s and fell into a pattern marked by more frequent collaboration, increased 
awareness, and the institutionalization of a permanent partnership under leadership of 
the OSHA/Environmental Network.  
 In the twenty months between September 1978 and April 1980, two trends 
coalesced and shifted the ground on which organized labor and environmental 
organizations found themselves, reopening a space for sustained cooperation for 
shared goals.  The first of these trends, discussed in the previous chapter, was the 
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independent desire of both sides to revive American liberalism through a broad-
based, progressive coalition.  Although efforts such as the Progressive Alliance 
stumbled, they also suggested that occupational safety and health was an issue that 
could sustain mutual organizing.   
 Where the PA showed the two sides that occupational safety and health could 
breed collaboration, a series of environmental disasters in the late 1970s – symbolized 
most powerfully by the chemical leak at Love Canal and the partial nuclear meltdown 
at Three Mile Island – demonstrated the issue’s urgency.  Concern over toxic 
production and waste had been growing within the two movements for some time, but 
it was sent into overdrive by these disasters, which distinctly showed the potential 
dangers faced by workers laboring in and people living in toxic environments.  In this 
way, occupational safety and health became what sociologists refer to as a “bridge 
issue” – a concern that allows for the linkage of two otherwise disparate groups.  The 
occupational safety and health bridge opened a space for unions and environmental 
organizations to continually cooperate on shared goals and provided a chance to 
“neutralize [the other] a little bit” where they disagreed.
412
   
 That bridge was constructed in 1980, when Senator Richard Schweiker 
proposed the near total elimination of routine OSHA workplace inspections.  An 
outraged labor movement made defeating the effort its top priority, and found 
environmentalists to be willing and capable partners in the effort.  This chapter argues 
that the Schweiker Bill marked a decisive turning point in the relationship between 
organized labor and the environmental movement.  Building on links established 
previously, this bill solidified occupational safety and health as an organizing 
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principle and brought the AFL-CIO back to the table through its Industrial Union 
Department.  In its wake, the OSHA-Environmental Network was created to provide 
an official framework for continued cooperation around issues that were essential to 
the environmental safety of the working class, in particular occupational safety and 
health.  The elaboration of recognized organizational links between the movements 
meant that their cooperative activity was more frequent, more predictable, and often, 
more useful than in the past.  
 This chapter works to fill the space between two areas of scholarship that are 
not currently in conversation.  There is a well-developed historical scholarship 
focused on occupational safety and health and the labor movement’s efforts to 
establish, consolidate, and improve upon those standards.
413
  Unfortunately that 
literature focuses mostly on the early portion of the century, often leaving largely 
unexplored the story after the establishment of OSHA or the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration.  These historians also often miss the opportunity to use OSH efforts 
as a window through which to explore larger themes of labor outreach and coalition 
politics.  Meanwhile, although historians have not explored the ways that safety and 
health politics acted to bind the unions to other social movements, sociologists have.  
A small but strong literature in that discipline that examines the role OSH played in 
the relationship between labor and the environmental movement in the 1980s and 
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1990s has emerged in recent years.
414
  However, as insightful as these scholars are, 
their projects are most often highly theoretical; what examples of on-the-ground 
organizing they offer are geared primarily toward showing how blue-green activity 
did or did not fit within a preexisting analytical framework.  They also tend to give 
short shrift to the historical context in which coalition building was happening, 
portraying it in a vacuum that sucks out a lot of its larger significance.   
In bridging these two sets of scholarship, I hope to illuminate the processes 
that under laid the era’s events.  I demonstrate that the making of the blue-green 
occupational safety and health work of the early 1980s was a historically grounded 
development that drew on existing precedents and at the same time expanded the 
parameters of cooperative possibility.  Moreover, I explore the importance of the 
larger political context in which these events occurred.  Calling it an occupational 
safety and health alliance is, to some extent, a misnomer because OSH protection, 
although the inspiration behind this reemerging alliance, ultimately became a stand-in 
for the defense of a broader set of environmental and labor regulations.      
 
Health and Safety 
Although the possibility of blue-green collaboration over occupational safety and 
health had been explored several times in the 1970s, it had never proven to be capable 
of sustaining a long-term alliance.  It was passed up on because neither movement 
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defined OSH issues as a central concern for most of the decade.  The alliance would 
have remained undeveloped if occupational health remained peripheral for the AFL-
CIO and the industrial environment stayed controversial within the Sierra Club.  
However, by the late 1970s, the issue was simultaneously growing in importance 
within each of the individual movements. 
 As demonstrated in chapter one, American unions – particularly industrial 
unions – have a long history of concern for the health and safety of their members, 
stretching back to at least the early twentieth century.  American industry traditionally 
maintained a similarly longstanding claim that the safety of conditions in the 
workplace fell exclusively within the parameters of managerial concern.  Each 
individual worker was responsible for protecting himself from injury, and there was 
little place for collective bargaining on the issue.
415
  This position softened in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, as employers accepted an increased role for unions in policing 
industrial safety.  Although they retained their focus on individual worker 
responsibility and the “voluntary” nature of safety reform, employers became more 
willing to work with unions to promote the cause of employee safety, as long as the 
measures being considered fell within parameters set by employers.   
 Symbolizing labor’s new status, the AFL-CIO and several of its member 
unions helped to charter a Labor Conference of the National Safety Council in 
1956.
416
  The National Safety Council had been formed during the Progressive Era to 
facilitate businessmen’s efforts to limit the scope of industrial safety and health 
regulation by making its members seem proactive while at the same time defining 
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public health as an arena for professional expertise rather than public debate.  By the 
late 1950s, the Council was a massive operation that offered policy makers advice not 
just on industrial safety and health policy, but on home, highway, and other public 
health issues as well.
417
  The Council’s 1962 Safety Guide for Unions, a manual 
geared toward union members and representatives, clearly demonstrated the role in 
safety programming that industry imagined unions assuming. The guide stressed that 
unions should focus their efforts on preventing workplace accidents and injuries by 
training their members in safe practices, disciplining them for dangerous rule 
violations, and using the labor press to “interest… members in safety, convince them 
of its merits, and inform them on how to avoid the hazards of everyday living.”
418
   
Workers’ health and the danger of long-term exposure to toxic substances 
were almost completely absent from the employer-dominated workplace safety 
discussion, but as the short comings of the safety-first approach became increasingly 
obvious in the 1960s, unions increasingly pursued a broader agenda.  Their realization 
that more comprehensive protections were needed to guard against latent health risks 
emerged from a growing awareness of the dangers posed by prolonged exposure to 
lead, cotton and coal dust, and asbestos.
419
  New levels of alertness toward health 
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issues among workers, combined with anger at the frequent lapses of state-level 
regulations and enforcement, helped to inspire organized labor to push for the 
creation of a new federal regulatory system.  The fruits of that effort – the Mine 
Safety and Health Act of 1969, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 
(which established the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health to study 
occupational diseases as well as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
to set standards and enforce regulations) and the Toxic Substances Control Act of 
1976 – paved the way for organized labor to increase pressure on employers to 
provide not just safe but healthful working environments.
420
  
One of the clearest indications that unions in the 1970s were approaching the 
workplace health concerns of their members with increased urgency is the rise of 
negotiated health and safety protocols in union contracts throughout the decade.  
After a 1966 NLRB ruling established that health conditions were mandatory 
bargaining subjects, the number of union contracts that addressed such issues rose 
steadily.
421
  Studies done by the Bureau of National Affairs and the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics demonstrate the trend lines for specific types of health and safety 
protections.  For example, in 1970 31 percent of union contracts in the U.S. ensured 
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the creation of plant health and safety committees; by 1978, 43 percent did.
422
  In 
1979, almost all manufacturing contracts (87 percent) contained some health and 
safety clauses and by 1980, nearly one in four union contracts allowed workers to 
refuse assignments that they felt were abnormally or needlessly hazardous.
423
  Some 
of the most comprehensive contract language emerged from UAW contract 
negotiations with GM in 1973.  The deal, later incorporated into the Auto Workers’ 
contracts with the rest of the Big Three automakers, contained eight health and safety 
provisions, including full-time health and safety union representatives paid for by the 
company, the guaranteed right to strike over health and safety issues, and union 
access to data on employee exposure to dangerous materials.
424
 
 In addition to negotiating specific protections into contracts, in the late 1970s 
organized labor also started to devote new resources to researching occupational 
diseases and educating workers about them.  The AFL-CIO started a new Department 
of Occupational Safety and Health devoted to those goals in 1978, and many of the 
Federation’s constituent unions followed suit, either rededicating or opening new 
workplace safety and health departments of their own.
425
   But by far the biggest 
effort for increased health awareness was made by the AFL-CIO’s newly revitalized 
Industrial Union Department (IUD).  The department’s new president, Howard 
Samuel, set workplace health as one of his top personal priorities and pushed the IUD 
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to increase its OSH efforts throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s.
426
  To that end, 
the IUD established an International Commission on Occupational and 
Environmental Health at the end of 1978 to chart global industrial hygiene practices, 
and the next year it chartered the Workers Institute for Safety and Health, chaired by 
Samuel himself, which pursued “a wide ranging program of scientific research, 
education and community activities.”  The IUD also helped the Pacific Northwest 
Labor College – the nation’s premier center for labor education at the time – to start 
an Environmental Affairs Program in 1979 by helping it secure a grant from the EPA 
to fund the venture.
427
   
 Like that of the labor movement, the Sierra Club’s interest in occupational 
safety and health in the early 1980s was built on a foundation that had been laid in the 
previous decade.  In 1970, the Club applauded the passage of the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act.  A few years later the group attempted to expand its OSH activity 
beyond cheerleading by joining the ongoing boycott of Shell, which was being 
conducted in support of an ongoing strike by the OCAW over plant health standards.  
The action drew positive attention from organized labor, but was an unusual step for 
an organization that had been hesitant to embrace industrial environment issues.  
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As it turned out, this expansion of Club interests was a controversial one 
among its members.  As described more fully in Chapter 2, a sizable portion of the 
Club’s supporters balked at the adoption of this particular cause, preferring instead to 
remain entirely committed to traditional Club goals such as national parks and 
wilderness protection.  Thus, the decade began with a long way to go before 
occupational health issues would be fully accepted by a majority within the 
organization.   
More than that, the incorporation of such subjects into the Club’s repertoire 
happened gradually.  The earliest urban environmental priorities to be incorporated 
into the Club were those that mirrored its more traditional efforts.  For example, 
beginning with the San Francisco Bay Chapter in 1971, local Club chapters around 
the country began to create Inner City Outings programs:  events designed to 
introduce minority youth populations to the great outdoors and instill in them a love 
of nature.
428
  And when the Club developed positions on urban public works, they 
almost always had an obvious conservation or wilderness protection slant; public 
transportation projects would preserve more land than highway construction, while 
building municipal parks and green spaces would bring a bit of the natural world into 
the city.
429
  Even its entrance into energy politics was initially structured around the 
aesthetic impact of power plant siting and emissions.
430
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Club leaders – especially those on the volunteer side of the organization – 
continued to frame the expanding interests of the organization as a defense of 
tradition late into the decade.  In 1978, Sierra Club President Will Futrell finally 
recognized publicly that the growing position of non-traditional environmental efforts 
on his organization’s agenda was not only proper, but necessary.  Editorializing in the 
Club’s mouthpiece Sierra, Futrell argued to members that “it’s time the Sierra Club 
acknowledged that the environment doesn’t end at the city limits... the urban 
environment must be high on the environmental movement’s agenda for the 1980s if 
the movement is to survive.”
431
  But at the same time he was forced to defend this 
position as an outgrowth of existing conservation priorities; “the future of places like 




Still, even as the Club continued to cater to tradition, an increasing number of 
its members were devoting their attention to new environmental concerns, such as 
municipal pollution and toxic waste.  A survey taken in 1978 that asked members to 
rank twenty-three different environmental issues in order of importance demonstrated 
this growing concern over urban environmental problems within the group’s 
grassroots.  The traditional Club concerns of wilderness and natural area protection 
remained top priorities for members.  But they were joined at the head of the list by 
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the more urban issues of air and water pollution, which ranked third and fourth in 
importance, respectively, and toxic substances, which ranked seventh.
433
   
As Club members came to care more about urban environmental issues, they 
did more than just encourage the national organization to act; by the late 1970s, there 
were also numerous local Club activists working for improved pollution and toxic 
waste control regimes in their states and communities.  The efforts of one such 
member, Doris Cellarius, are instructive.  As a Michigan resident in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, Cellarius was an early proponent of urban environmental initiatives, 
inspired by fear for her personal health as well as her community’s.   She was told by 
environmentalist friends that she “worrie[d] too much” about health dangers, and 
although her Club chapter in Michigan was “supportive” of her pursuing pollution 
control, its members were not devoted to effecting change in that area, focusing 
instead on “natural history and urban planning.”
434
  After leaving Michigan for 
Washington State, Cellarius became involved in solid and toxic waste issues through 
working with government agencies at the county level.  She found that she quickly 
became one of the most knowledgeable and committed citizens in the area.  In the 
mid to late 1970s, it became easier to get Club members involved, making calls to 
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lobby for strong state hazardous waste laws and pollution controls.
435
  As it was on 
the national level so it was in the local chapters:  during the 1970s Sierra Clubbers 
slowly recognized the need to incorporate urban spaces into their priorities, gradually 
establishing a much broader definition of “environment” than the one that had guided 
their organization’s early years. 
 Clearly the labor and environmental movements shared a set of interests in 
occupational safety and health, toxics exposure, and community protection that was 
growing in the late 1970s.  The Sierra Club gradually incorporated “urban 
environmentalism” throughout the decade, first tackling pollution and other threats to 
nature, then turning to more fundamentally people-based threats such as toxic waste 
and industrial hygiene.  Meanwhile, organized labor plowed ahead with an industrial 
health and safety program of its own, negotiating workplace protections into union 
contracts and reassembling OSH divisions that had been allowed to lapse into disuse.  
The AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department created a national niche for itself by 
leading the way in research and programming on the in-plant environment.   
At the same time, although activists from both sides were approaching these 
concerns with new energy, they were largely pursuing them in isolation from one 
another.  The labor movement and the environmental movement were moving in the 
same direction on occupational safety and health, but along separate tracks.  It was 
not until OSHA came under serious threat that they were able to build serious 
collective action. 
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The Schweiker Bill 
As the labor and environmental movements’ commitment to protecting the health of 
workers deepened, the federal government’s interest in doing so was repeatedly called 
into question.  All three branches of the federal government had taken their turn 
chipping away at the Occupational Safety and Health Act – the primary legal vehicle 
for protecting workers at the federal level – since its passage in 1970.  President 
Gerald Ford struck the first blow in restraining OSHA in 1974.  That year, in the 
name of cooling inflation, he issued Executive Order 11821, which required the 
nation’s regulatory programs to conduct “Inflation Impact Statements” – basically, 
cost-benefit analyses – to ensure that each agency’s regulatory demands could be 
financially justified.  The program was especially difficult for OHSA, which 
struggled, as it would in later years to attach a monetary value to the healthy lives of 
working people.
436
  And when the president assembled a committee to study the 
possibility of regulatory reform, OSHA was one of the first agencies examined.  In 
1978, the Supreme Court limited OSHA’s inspection authority when it ruled in 
Marshall v. Barlow that the agency’s inspectors had to obtain a search warrant before 
executing on-site investigations.  Putting an end to inspections without prior notice 
made it considerably more difficult for inspectors to catch violations, which could be 
cleaned up or swept under the rug in the sometimes months-long court battles that 
employers waged against the warrants.  Throughout the decade Congress also 
pressured OSHA to act more efficiently in designing and implementing its standards, 
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and by 1979 an effort was underway, led by Republican Orrin Hatch, to kill the 
agency outright.
437
   
 All of these changes were made in response to an anti-regulatory political 
outcry that gained steam among business interests and those on the political right in 
the mid-1970s.  Arguing that “freedom can be suffocated by the bureaucrat” just as 
easily as “squashed by the tyrant,” anti-regulatory crusaders first started gaining 
attention when they blamed the 1973 recession on overly burdensome government.
438
  
These critics – including the Business Roundtable, Chamber of Commerce, and 
American Conservative Union – ascribed a host of negative attributes to regulation:  
it made American businesses less productive, lowered profits, and created inflation by 
adding costs to manufacturing.  “It has been well documented,” Federal Trade 
Commission executive director R.T. McNamar editorialized in the pages of the Wall 
Street Journal in 1976, “that many types of government regulations fuel inflation, 
promote inefficiency, discourage innovation and generally reduce competition.”
439
  
The opponents of regulation found a sympathetic audience among Republican 
politicians and bureaucrats, who used anti-regulatory rhetoric to justify gutting the 
labor, environmental, and consumer protections that were created in previous 
decades.  "With a spirit of almost eager feistiness,” Business Week reported in 1980, 
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 Regulatory reformers saw federal regulations in general as a nuisance, but 
they saved their deepest vitriol for the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration.  By the late 1970s, the safety agency had become “probably the most 
despised federal agency in existence," according to Pennsylvania Senator Richard 
Schweiker.  That assessment arose from a belief among industrialists and 
conservatives that OSHA was especially “adversarial,” overly concerned with trivial 
issues, and unwilling to adjust its standards based on industry input.
441
  In the late 
1970s, OSHA faced a concerted effort led by conservative groups including the 
American Conservative Union to stymie its enforcement abilities.  Inspectors 
suddenly found business owners refusing to allow them entrance without a warrant 
(ultimately leading to the 1978 Supreme Court decision that warrants were in fact 
required), challenging the validity of warrants that had been obtained, and choosing to 
shutter their doors “rather than dicker with OSHA” over regulatory compliance.  The 
agency also saw employers begin to challenge its enforcement decisions with 
increasing frequency, with about one in five cases being contested in 1979.
442
  By the 
time Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980, OSHA had inspired such widespread 
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industry resistance that Dr. Bruce Karh, one of the leading candidates to head the 
agency, worried that it was “in danger of becoming a paper tiger.”
443
 
 OSHA still maintained a cadre of committed defenders, but they were far less 
active in protecting the agency than its opponents were in attacking it.  The nation’s 
unions, among OSHA’s chief supporters, recognized that the safety agency was being 
targeted, but did not take the threat to it very seriously.  The International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, for example, outlined the problem quite clearly to its 
members, noting that “the Occupational Safety and Health Act… is under constant 
attack from those who would weaken or modify it.”
444
  But despite declaring OSHA 
to be a legislative priority, Teamsters lobbyists appear to have taken little action to 
strengthen its standing with Congress.  Likewise, in 1978, the Sierra Club’s Board of 
directors unanimously (with one abstention) passed a resolution reaffirming their 
organization’s support for OSHA, condemning proposed “weakening amendments 
that would exclude workers or otherwise reduce coverage,” and calling for increased 
funding and enforcement.
445
  But although OSHA had the Club’s sympathy, its 
distress did not inspire environmentalist action, and the Club’s commitment remained 
primarily on the page.  
 All of this would change with the proposal of the OSHA Improvements Act of 
1980, which finally forced the agency’s friends to recognize that it was in dire straits 
and compelled them to pool their resources in an all-out defense of workplace health 
and safety regulation.  The OSHA Improvements Act was the unexpected brainchild 
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of Richard Schweiker, the senior Senator from Pennsylvania and ranking Republican 
on the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee.  Schweiker, a former business 
executive, had entered the Senate in 1969.  He was known as a moderate and fairly 
union friendly politician, and although his politics had trended more conservative of 
late, he was not considered a rabid regulatory reformer.  He supported the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act when it was originally debated in Congress, but 
had grown disillusioned with the OSH Administration as it had taken shape in the 
decade since.  So, with the stated goal of moving OSHA “away from the regulatory 
policeman’s role toward [being a] cooperative partner in worker safety and health,” 
Schweiker created the most substantial revision to the agency’s operating principles 
that had ever been suggested.
446
   
 At the end of 1979, Schwekier authored an amendment to the agency’s 
appropriations package that exempted small businesses in safe industries – a total of 
about 1.5 million workplaces – from routine OSHA inspections.  Having moved the 
appropriations amendment through Congress easily and relatively quietly, Schweiker 
introduced the more ambitious S.2153, also known as the “OSHA Improvements 
Act,” or Schweiker Bill, in February, 1980.  The bill sought to change OSHA in 
several ways.  Most fundamentally, it called for all workplaces that had not been 
subject to workmen’s compensation claims in the previous year to be exempt from 
routine inspections.  Since it was estimated that about ninety percent of employers fit 
this category, the bill would practically eliminate OSHA’s routine inspection 
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authority, although it would still investigate major accidents and habitual rule 
breakers.   
 This proposed major change in the structure of OSHA’s authority got most of 
the attention that was focused on the bill, but the OSHA Improvements Act also 
called for additional, smaller changes to the occupational safety and health system.  
Under the new law, for example, OSHA would no longer be compelled to inspect a 
plant after receiving a worker’s complaint, and would instead be allowed to decide for 
itself whether the allegation warranted an investigation, after first contacting the 
employer for a “satisfactory response.”  The bill also would have lowered the 
maximum penalties that businesses would have to pay for violating OSHA 
restrictions if they had a safety committee in the plant.
447
   
 The Schweiker Bill attracted a lot of early support in the Senate.  Its 
proponents claimed that the changes called for were both reasonable and necessary.  
Since OSHA was only able to inspect about 56,000 of the nation’s nearly five million 
workplaces in any given year, supporters claimed that the bill simply helped to set 
guidelines to focus the agency’s activity.  By targeting only the worst offenders, 
OSHA’s scarce resources would be more efficiently used, and by leaving safe 
workplaces alone, the agency’s particularly bad reputation in the business community 
would improve.
448
  The bill was promoted as the sane middle ground between 
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overstepping bureaucracy and unregulated chaos.  It drew powerful supporters from 
both sides of the aisle, including co-sponsorships from Orrin Hatch and liberal 
environmental hero Gaylord Nelson.  The bill was also supported by New Jersey 
Democrat Harrison Williams, the chief sponsor of the original Occupational Safety 
and Health Act in 1970.
449
  In addition, the bill attracted the backing of the deep-
pocketed business lobbyists at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a traditional enemy 
of OSHA’s that was happy to see the agency’s power curtailed.  Although the 
Chamber of Commerce did not think the Schweiker bill went far enough, it saw the 
bill as a good starting point and hoped to get further changes – such as the setting of 
health and safety performance standards rather than “specific rules to meet those 
standards” – included as the proposed law made its way through Congress.
450
  
 The OSHA Improvements Act was instantly a serious concern for the AFL-
CIO, which realized that preventing the bill’s passage was going to be an uphill 
battle.  Labor’s position was made all the weaker by the fact that it had to admit the 
OSH Agency was not without its problems.  It was not able to effectively monitor all 
of the nation’s workplaces, respond quickly to worker complaints, promulgate useful 
exposure codes for toxic substances, or punish rule breakers severely enough to deter 
future violations.
451
  “Any faithful reading of the history of OSHA,” AFL-CIO 
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Secretary-Treasurer Tom Donahue said in marking the agency’s 10
th
 anniversary, 
“will, of course, reveal that we have never come close to that goal of safe and healthy 
workplaces.”
452
  However, most labor leaders diagnosed the agency’s problems – and 
their potential solutions – very differently from the regulatory reformers.  The 
OCAW’s Tony Mazzochi, for example, linked OSHA’s shortcomings to lack of 
worker involvement in the standards-setting and inspection processes.  Others agreed 
more with John Mendeloff, an academic workplace health and safety analyst, who 
argued that “the problem is that the potential of [OSHA’s] present program is too 
small.”  From labor’s point of view, instead of curtailing the agency and reducing its 
inspection capability, Congress should have been expanding both.
453
 
The bill’s opponents, in organized labor and elsewhere, were unhappy with it 
for numerous reasons, from the analytically grounded to the highly speculative.  
Many groups argued that lowering penalties for noncompliance and relying more on 
employer’s self-report data was a recipe for creating violations.  These changes, 
according to Lloyd McBride of the Steelworkers, “emasculated” OSHA and would 
encourage companies to lie to avoid inspections.
454
  Others associated with the labor 
and environmental movements agreed with that assessment, claiming that the bill 
gave employers “a clear incentive to under report deaths and injuries… in order to 
preserve their ‘safe’ status.”  Similarly, the AFL-CIO pointed out that its own study 
of workplace deaths revealed that 41 percent of them had occurred in workplaces that 
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the Schweiker Bill would exempt from inspection, calling into question just what 
definition of “safe” the senator was working with.
455
   
Of all the problems that the bill’s antagonists raised during the debates, the 
most frequent and powerful centered on OSHA’s responsibility as an agent of injury 
and disease prevention.  Opponents argued that eliminating routine inspections in 
most workplaces would fundamentally revise this raison d’être.  Instead of 
preventing accidents, OSHA’s assignment would become investigating their causes 
after they happened and cleaning up the mess, which was “closing the barn door 
behind the horse,” in the words of the AFL-CIO’s lobbying department.
456
  This 
theme was repeated and elaborated throughout the public debate on the bill.  
Washington Post public affairs columnist William Raspberry highlighted the 
differences between the old system and the proposed new one by asking if OSHA was 
meant to be an ambulance or a fence, while the United Electrical Workers took the 
analogy one step further, warning that the bill would “turn OSHA into a coroner’s 





   
The point was driven home most fully in written testimony sponsored by the 
Urban Environment Conference, Sierra Club, and twenty-three other environmental 
and community health groups before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources in 1980.  If the OSHA Improvements Act would be so beneficial, the 
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group asked, why not expand it further?  “Why do we not exempt from food 
sanitation inspections food establishments that have a year’s record of cleanliness?”  
Their own obvious answer to the question was that it was because such a system 
could not preempt problems but could only respond to them.  “What diner would 
want to eat in such an exempted facility? ...  Indeed, if we were to improve restaurant 
sanitation as S. 2153 seeks to ‘improve’ OSHA, some number of restaurant patrons 




Organized labor, led by the AFL-CIO, was among the first constituencies to 
realize the size of the threat the Schweiker bill posed to an occupational safety and 
health system in which they were deeply invested.  To their credit, labor leaders also 
realized the enormity of the challenge facing them in defeating the bill.  They quickly 
appealed to “the non-labor environmental and health communities to help in a major 
legislative battle” in stopping “another chapter in the lengthy history of anti-worker 
legislative attacks on OSHA.”
459
  Between March and May 1980, the AFL-CIO 
solidified its outreach to non-labor groups by hosting a series of regional conferences 
in Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, Houston, and Los Angeles designed to highlight the threats 
OSHA faced in Congress.  Word of the conferences was disseminated widely, 
welcoming all comers “to develop a strategy to defeat this legislation and to establish 
an on-going political structure to safeguard the work environment.”
460
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In its campaign for allies to fight the Schweiker Bill, the AFL-CIO leaned 
heavily on those organizations that possessed a mixed labor and environmental 
membership and that had been founded in the previous decade, including 
Environmentalists for Full Employment, the Progressive Alliance, and the Urban 
Environment Conference.  Of the environmentalist organizations that lacked a 
significant union presence, the Sierra Club was by far the biggest supporter of the 
Federation’s efforts.  The Club’s board very quickly passed a resolution condemning 
the Schweiker-authored changes to OSHA, which Washington Office Director Brock 
Evans circulated “to every labor leader we can think of” to show the Club’s “desire to 
help.”
461
  Evans encouraged his colleagues back in San Francisco to involve the 
organization even more deeply.  “I think this whole question is a golden opportunity 
for us to build bridges with labor,” he wrote in a memo.  “Even more, I think we can 
win.”  Evans need not have questioned his organization’s commitment.  The anti-
Schweiker coalition had strong support among staff leaders, who encouraged Evans 
to continue working with labor to defeat the bill.  Within weeks, strategy meetings 
were being pulled together by the Washington staffs of the Sierra Club, AFL-CIO, 
and United Steelworkers.
462
   
Evans was no stranger to organized labor or OSHA issues.  Two years 
previously, in 1978, he lent his expertise to a USW-led campaign to prevent 
weakening amendments to the agency, and penned an article in National News Report 
that was noted in union circles.
463
  Again this time he did not hesitate to lend his years 
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of experience as the Sierra Club’s point man in Washington to the cause, firing off 
letters to undecided congresspersons, especially those who might be more concerned 
about what environmentalists thought of them than labor unions.  Still, Evans worried 
that his group’s relative lack of experience on workers’ issues would hamper its 
efforts to provide meaningful testimony when the bill came up for hearings.  Would 
the Club’s lack of expertise be an issue?  Would its representatives not be taken 
seriously?  However, Evans’ fears were calmed by his labor associates, who reassured 
him that the Club did not need to be an expert on how OSHA affected workers.  The 
fact that it was not an expert was exactly the point – “this is beyond a labor issue,” he 
was told, “it is a matter of health and safety for the entire community.”
464
   
 The fight against the Schweiker Bill was carried out on multiple levels.  An 
aggressive lobbying campaign was unveiled early, and played a major role in the 
planned actions.  The AFL-CIO seized on election-year pressures to persuade 
Democrats Alan Cranston (CA) and Gaylord Nelson (WI) to withdraw their 
announced support for the bill.
465
  Other Senate Democrats were likewise targeted by 
the labor-environmental OSHA supporters.  “It is not surprising that OSHA is under 
attack at this time,” wrote the EFFE in announcing its opposition to the OSHA 
Improvements Act.  “What is surprising – and intolerable – is that the Schweiker bill 
is supported by some of the Senate’s leading liberals.”  Calling the OSHA 
Improvements Act the “Schweiker-Cranston-Church-Hatch-Williams bill,” the 
proposal’s opponents lumped liberal Democrats Cranston, Frank Church (ID), and 
Harrison Williams (NJ) in with Schweiker and the very conservative anti-labor, anti-
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environment Orrin Hatch, making it clear that they would not forget the liberal co-
sponsors of the bill and would hold them as responsible for dismantling OSHA as the 
Republicans.
466
   
In addition to lobbying, the Anti-Schweiker forces also carried on an effort to 
create grassroots pressure to stop the bill.  Numerous local groups, such as the 
Philadelphia Area Project on Occupational Safety and Health (PAPOSH), Boston 
Mobilization for Survival, and the Committee to Save OSHA of New York City, were 
either created or drafted into service to build support in their areas.  The bill’s 
opponents also organized a letter writing campaign among the members of their 
various organizations, an effort for which Sierra Club members had “very high 
enthusiasm” Evans happily reported.
467
  Predictably, the local efforts were fiercest in 
Schweiker’s home state of Pennsylvania.  There, the Philadelphia-based PAPOSH, in 
coalition with the AFL-CIO, grabbed headlines by picketing the senator’s house.  
PAPOSH also caused a stir when it accused Schweiker of acting out of a personal 
vendetta against OSHA, claiming that he decided to go after the agency after a 
company that he was financially invested in was cited for extensive health and safety 
violations.  It was a “conflict of interest,” the organization charged, for the senator to 
be writing legislation that clipped the wings of an agency that had so recently, if 
indirectly, cost him money.
468
 
 Schweiker would remain on the defensive throughout the next several 
months, as the labor movement led the bill’s opponents in a masterful campaign to 
discredit the OSHA Improvements Act with the public.  Schweiker’s office was able 
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to beat back the idea that his OSHA bill was motivated by vengeance, calling it “a 
false and disgusting slur,” and noting that the senator had been working on the new 
law months before the agency’s ruling.
469
  But the UAW kept Schweiker firmly 
planted on the hot seat by having posters printed up and circulated with the senator’s 
picture surrounded by the caption “WANTED for conspiracy to injure, maim, and kill 
thousands of American workers.”
470
  The poster may have been overblown, but it did 
its job; Schweiker was forced to respond and, in so doing, raised the public profile of 
the controversy even more.  In June, the bill’s opponents returned their attention to 
the bill as opposed to the people behind it, and took out a full page ad in the New York 
Times provocatively asking “Ten years ago, our nation said workers have a right to 
safety and health on the job.  Have we changed our minds?”  The 149 labor, 
environmental, and community health organizations listed as sponsors at the end of 
the ad communicated to readers that the bill had come under widespread 
condemnation, while the aging female worker at its center reemphasized that the 
threat posed by passage spread well beyond traditional industrial occupations.  
Meanwhile, the United Steelworkers issued a call to arms that was far less subtle, 
telling readers of its newspaper to “kill the Schweiker bill before it kills you.”
471
   
 The campaign OSHA’s defenders put together was, in many ways, a defense 
of the system as it stood.  But it was a curious sort of defense.  Reminding people of 
OSHA’s achievements in limiting the dangers faced by workers in industrial settings 
was key to the program, but at the same time, if the bill’s opponents overstated how 
safe American workplaces were, they risked undercutting their argument that OSHA 
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was still necessary.  Emphasizing the dangers of U.S. workplaces, on the other hand, 
potentially begged the question of why an agency that could not seem to adequately 
do its job in protecting workers should be maintained.  The tension was obvious in 
much of the pro-OSHA literature, as the agency’s defenders walked a very fine line.  
The concept that ultimately resolved this dilemma and gained the most 
traction for the bill’s opponents was their framing of the debate as one pitting average 
workers’ health against corporate profit and big business greed.  This messaging 
allowed them to explain the continued danger of American workplaces as a result not 
of OSHA’s failure, but of the agency not being allowed to do its job.  Lane Kirkland’s 
testimony before the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee illustrates this 
framing mechanism perfectly.  “For the first seven years of its history,” the labor 
leader charged “OSHA was not given a chance, [it] was picked out by right wing 
groups and business associations as a symbol of big government’s interference with 
laissez-faire business practices.”  But despite the interference, he continued, OSHA 
had still managed to bring about a 10 percent decline in workplace fatalities and a 15 
percent decline in workplace injuries.
472
  The dangerous situation faced by Americans 
at work, this line of thinking ran, was not a testament to OSHA’s failure but was 
instead an indication of how little concern U.S. industry had for its employees.  In 
light of the concerted effort by big business to undercut OSHA’s power, any success 
the agency had in curbing injuries and illness should be considered an achievement.  
OSHA was worth saving because it was doing a good job, but also because it was a 
bulwark against the uncaring forces of the market.  “Fortunately for us,” declared a 
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Sierra Club memo, “our adversaries on this are not among the nation’s favorite 
institutions.”
473
   
 In the end, the OSHA Improvements Act was defeated.  Schweiker could not 
get it out of committee onto the Senate floor.  The Senator mused over some possible 
work arounds, including attaching pieces of the bill to the Labor-HEW appropriations 
package.  The anti-Schweiker coalition geared back up to fight it, but ultimately those 
amendments were never introduced.
474
 
But the defeat of the Schweiker Bill was not the saving grace for OSHA that 
the bill’s opponents hoped it would be.  Indeed, the threat it posed would come to 
seem relatively minor the next year when the newly inaugurated Reagan 
Administration began rolling back regulatory rules and cutting funding for enforcing 
agencies.  In an early, private meeting Vice President George Bush, speaking on 
behalf of the administration, told labor representatives that reforming OSHA would 
be one of the president’s top regulatory priorities, both because the agency had not 
performed well in the past, and because it had developed “an adversarial role and a 
reputation for nitpicking.”
475
  The agency’s budget was cut, and Reagan’s appointee 
to lead it, Thorne Auchter, deemphasized enforcement in favor of education and 
voluntary standards.  Additionally, in implementing the president’s “Regulatory 
Relief Plan,” Auchter subjected the agency’s regulatory standards to a strict cost-
benefit analysis, eliminating as many regulations as possible that were calculated to 
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have a high cost and little financial benefit.
476
  By the AFL-CIO’s accounting, nine 
major OSHA standards were eliminated in Reagan’s first 100 days alone.  The 
president was acting out the wildest dreams of regulatory reformers who, in the words 
of Lane Kirkland, sought “to turn the clock back, to repeal some laws, restrict others, 




Of course it did not take great clairvoyance to predict that Reagan's election would 
lead to a sea change at OSHA.  Within weeks after the November voting, union 
officials within the IUD had decided that “there is greater need to build support in the 
field, in collaboration with non-labor allies, in the light of election returns.”
478
  To 
execute their plan, which called for the creation of an official alliance to protect the 
nation’s occupational safety and health programs, IUD officers drew on the networks 
that had been established fighting the OSHA Improvements Act.  Environmentalists 
such as Sierra Club President Joe Fontaine reacted positively to the IUD’s initiative, 
and encouraged widespread support for the call for an alliance.  “THE TIME FOR 
SUCH A COALITION IS NOW,” he wrote to Club members.  “During the current 
Congress, we can expect the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the Clean Air 
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Act to be the initial targets of the Reagan Administration’s efforts to eliminate 
regulations which, supposedly, are not ‘cost effective’ and which hamper the 
operation and growth of big business.”
479
 
 At a Chicago conference in January, 1981, environmental and labor activists, 
along with representatives from a few public health organizations, formalized their 
relationship as the Network for Safe Workplaces and Clean Communities, later 
renamed the OSHA/Environmental Network.
480
  Publicly announced at a February 6 
press conference, the Network was sold as a “grassroots effort to preserve and 
strengthen the Occupational Safety and Health Act and environmental laws such as 
the Clean Air Act.”  The new organization would be led by a policy-making board 
that included equal numbers of labor and environmentalist leaders, including Doug 
Fraser and representatives from the Sierra Club.  The group was initially co-led by 
Howard Samuel and Joe Fontaine, but Fontaine was ultimately replaced by Mike 
McCloskey.  While the national organization made policy and worked for improved 
federal standards, the heart of the Network was made up of state-level organizations.  
Initially set to operate in twelve states, by the end of its first year the Network had a 
presence in twenty. 
481
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 The earlier anti-Schweiker effort paid dividends for the new coalition almost 
immediately.  The Network's national leaders, drawing on their prior cooperative 
experience, did not require a long period of familiarizing themselves to one another’s 
politics and operating procedures.  The importance of this existent relationship can 
best be seen in comparison to the state Networks, where the necessity of getting to 
know new partners and agree on ground rules often took priority over political 
activity in the Networks' early days.  That necessity was broached in an early 
conference held for potential Network state leaders.  There, more experienced 
officials reiterated to the newcomers the importance of building connections.  "Even 
meeting just to discuss various issues before any serious action is necessary can help 
build your network," they were told, "since you will get a chance to get to know one 
another in a relaxed way.”
482
  The less experienced state leaders were also reminded 
how critical it was to reach an agreement on coalition boundaries early in the process.  
"One of the first orders of business at a meeting should be a friendly discussion 
concerning an ‘agreement to disagree’ about certain issues.  Rather than spending a 
great deal of time arguing about matters where you haven’t seen eye to eye in the 
past, identify those issues where you do all agree and begin working on them."  This 
common sense approach was repeatedly advised as the state networks grew and new 
ones were formed.  “The most often repeated point,” reported an attendee of a later 
OSHA/Environment Network Workshop on State Legislative Activities, “was that 
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The frequent refrain to "agree to disagree" speaks to the continued salience of 
green blackmail – the threat by employers that vigorous enforcement of 
environmental rules would lead to plant closures – especially at the state and local 
level.  Upon hearing the news of the Network's founding, some unionists questioned 
the idea, expressing their job concerns to Howard Samuel.  Those concerns were 
made even more clearly at early planning meetings, where state-level Network 
officials feared "that philosophical differences in the past relating to one or two issues 
would make it difficult to work together in the present….  Concern was expressed 
that the political climate and our opponents’ effective use of economic blackmail 
made it hard to win on controversial issues."
484
  The fear among state Network 
leaders that job blackmail would hamper their effectiveness in attracting members or 
even gaining acceptance from skeptical rank and file union members demonstrated 
that some convincing would be needed before workers would fully embrace the idea 
of an alliance with environmentalists.  
Network leaders addressed those concerns head on, adopting arguments that 
environmentalists had been using since the mid-1970s.  In its Statement of Principles, 
the OSHA/Environmental Network flatly rejected the premise that environmental and 
occupational safety and health regulations were an important factor contributing to 
plant closures, concluding "there is no basic conflict between economic and 
environmental and health and safety interests."  Instead, it insisted, as the Sierra Club 
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had before, that environmental and OSH regulation "stimulates the economy as a 
whole" and leads to additional job opportunities.
485
  Wisconsin OSHA Network 
leaders and Len Germanson, political action director of the Allied Industrial Workers 
International Union, later echoed the point OSHA and the Clean Air Act “will not 
cost jobs.  We actually feel the Clean Air Act has created many more jobs than it has 
lost for the economy….  Those companies that have gone out of business probably 
were marginal anyway.”
486
   
 The Network also continued to draw on the precedents of the Schweiker Bill 
fight in crafting the terms that it used to understand and portray the threats it faced.  
The central focus remained on the contrast between the needs of the community and 
the greed of corporate leaders.  For example, when describing the problems created 
for the EPA and OSHA in the Reagan era, the Network explained to members that, 
for the president “the so-called burden on business has out-ranked the health of 
workers.”
487
  Or, as the Sierra Club's Carl Pope astutely summarized it: “in almost 
every federal agency and department, Reagan and his followers have sought to use 
the power of government to increase the level of risk that society is expected to 
tolerate, to exalt individualism and individual interests at the expense of community 
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and its values, and to limit the degree to which we make sacrifices today in the 
interests of the future.”
488
  
 Finally, the Network continued to emphasize the commonality of the threats 
facing OSHA and other regulatory programs, collapsing the distinctions between 
them and consolidating them under a shared rhetorical roof.  In their testimony 
against the OSHA Improvements Act, for example, Sierra Club representatives had 
said OSHA “represents a strong link in a chain of legislation and administrative 
programs created to control hazardous substances and conditions,” including the 
EPA, Consumer Products Safety Commission, and FDA.
489
  The Schweiker Bill 
specifically targeted OSHA, but the bill's opponents realized that they were not 
defending it in a vacuum.  OSHA's fall would be the first of many if it were allowed 
to happen, and so its defense came to be a defense of regulation in general, as was 
suggested by a memo that circulated among Sierra Club leaders at the time: "While 
the attack by business has been both on individual regulations and on the concept of 
regulation, our response or defense has generally centered on the individual 
regulations which we support.  With evidence of the underlying change in the minds 
of politicians on the concept of regulation in general, however, I think it would be 
prudent for us to make a defense there as well."
490
 
 That policy made even more sense with Ronald Reagan in the White House.  
In the name of reviving the economy and restoring small-government conservatism, 
the Reagan Administration sought to undo a decade's worth of regulatory 
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commitments, either by discontinuing the programs, defunding their enforcement, or 
turning the executive bureaucracies over to the industry interests that they were 
designed to police.  In addition to cutting back on workplace protections, the Reagan 
Administration also sought to limit air and water quality regulations, auto emissions 
standards, and a host of other labor, environmental and consumer protections.  The 
National Labor Relations Board even found its chief legal representation coming 
from the former legal counsel for the National Right to Work Committee.
491
  The 
OSHA Network saw an opportunity in this across the board assault to connect 
previously disparate federal policies, and in so doing to build bridges between 
interests that had not formerly been aligned.   
 While incorporating a variety of regulatory causes on an ad hoc basis, the 
Network committed itself to protecting and extending the Clean Air Act and 
Environmental Protection Agency as well as its namesake OSHA, and it explicitly 
and repeatedly linked the three "regulatory areas most important to workers."
492
  A 
major branding effort was undertaken to clarify the connections between workplace 
and community health for the nation's environmentalists and union members.  The 
Network produced buttons and stickers bearing the slogan “Save Clean Air/ Clean Air 
Saves Lives!  Save OSHA/ OSHA Saves Lives!” The same design made its way onto 
Network created pamphlets that further developed the idea that workplace and 
community health were inextricably united and suffering from politically motivated 
abuse.  "The Occupational Safety and Health Act and the Clean Air Act are under 
attack by the Reagan Administration and big business," it warned.  "Effective 
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regulation of toxic agents in the workplace has ended.  At the same time, the 
Administration wants to undermine the battle against air pollution through weakening 
legislative proposals and lax enforcement."
493
  Throughout the early 1980s the 
OSHA/Environmental Network rarely discussed OSHA, the Clean Air Act, or the 
EPA without reinforcing the theme that each was tied to the others.  
 Although the Network was designed to operate on both the federal and state 
levels, its leaders saw "little hope of effective action at the federal level."
494
  They 
largely dismissed the idea that new major federal regulations could be implemented, 
and adopted mostly defensive national goals.  The Network was able to claim success 
in its limited federal ambitions, preventing the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health from being rolled into the Center for Disease Control and 
minimizing enforcement cuts in OSHA and the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration.
495
  The successes that the Network could claim in the early 1980s 
very much resembled those of one of its core members, the Sierra Club.  In an 
interview with Sierra, McCloskey put as good a face on his group’s efforts as 
possible; the Club did not create new policy, he said, “but we can point to a whole 
string of administration initiatives we’ve succeeded in checkmating this year….  We 
have held the line, at least wherever Congress was involved.”
496
  The bar was set low, 
but at least it was effectively vaulted.  Meanwhile, the Club and the Network (as well 
as the AFL-CIO) worked just as hard, but with a more mixed success record, to score 
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moderate improvements to a series of other federal health programs, including the 
High Risk Occupational Disease Notification and Prevention Act, Occupational 
Disease Compensation Act, Superfund, Clean Air Act, and Clean Water Act.  
The decision to focus on maintaining rather than extending standards at the 
federal level enabled the Network to devote more resources to its state affiliates, 
which functioned to benefit the national OSHA Network in two ways.  First, the state 
Networks served as meeting places and informational clearinghouses that could 
diffuse local tensions between environmentalists and unions before they had a chance 
to become national stories.  The national organization also assembled a suggested 
program of activities for state Networks, that heavily emphasized the need for the 
state affiliates to create effective channels of communication between members, both 
to speed response times against bad policies, and simply to keep local labor and 
environmental leaders in touch with one another.  The Network also encouraged state 
affiliates to participate in a variety of educational programs, which would provide 
labor and environmental activists with a basic understanding of one another's 
issues.
497
  This familiarity would ideally permeate beyond the activists who were 
actually involved in the Networks and into their workshops and communities.      
The second function of the state Networks was to lobby for increased 
environmental and labor regulation on the state level.  The states provided a more 
promising avenue for success in this regard then did the federal government, and 
Network leaders also hoped that an ever more complicated set of state guidelines 
would prove annoying to the nation's biggest businesses and encourage them to 
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support federal regulation as a simpler alternative.
498
  The state alliances were free to 
set their own programs as local conditions dictated, and a diverse but overlapping set 
of goals took shape through the middle of the decade.  The list of reforms that one or 
more state Networks worked for is long and includes victim compensation for people 
exposed to toxic pollution, cleaning up toxic waste sites, OSH protections for public 
employees, removing asbestos from schools, and protecting groundwater from 
contamination with pesticides and other chemicals.
499
  Workplace and community 
health programs clearly dominated the Networks' agendas, but sometimes they were 
able to reach beyond this common ground.  Such was the case when the Wisconsin 
OSHA/Environmental Network supported a recycling bill that eventually made its 
way through the state legislature in 1990.
500
 
 The subject that most dominated Network policy making and that inspired its 
most dogged efforts at reform was toxic waste.  Revelations of toxic waste leaks in 
Hopewell, Virginia (1976), Love Canal, New York (1978), Valley of the Drums, 
Kentucky (1979), and Times Beach, Missouri (1982), along with the major disaster in 
Bhopal, India (1984), in which thousands were killed by the accidental leakage of gas 
from a pesticide plant, helped to cement toxic waste as one of the major 
environmental stories of the 1980s.  With its overlap between workplace and 
community safety, it was also a natural topic for cooperation between unions and 
environmentalists.  The OSHA/Environmental Network's national leadership advised 
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state leaders not to rely on Superfund – the federal program designed to clean up 
hazardous waste sites – even as they worked to strengthen its requirements.  Instead, 
the state Networks were encouraged to pursue the establishment of "mini-Super funds 
(sic)" on the state level "due to failure of [the] federal program to clean up local dump 
sites."
501
  In addition to the state Superfunds, the state Networks also pushed for 
stricter rules for handling, transporting, and disposing of toxic wastes as well as 
increased civic participation in the siting of dump areas.
502
  
Of all the toxics related campaigns, the struggle around Right to Know laws 
was the biggest and most successful.  The principle embodied by Right to Know laws 
was simple:  that workers and communities have a vital interest in being aware of the 
potentially hazardous chemicals to which they are exposed, allowing them to make 
informed decisions about the level of risk they are accepting.  Right to Know laws 
had various permutations, but generally they all required that companies disclose 
which of the tens of thousands of potentially harmful chemicals then in commercial 
production were in use in their facilities.
503
  The OSHA/Environmental Network, at 
both the federal and state levels, called for more specific protections that went beyond 
this simple rule.  It called for chemicals used in the workplace to be clearly labeled 
with their actual name rather than a brand name, and that the chemical composition 
also be made available to workers.  The Networks pushed to get workers the legal 
right to have access to the results of workplace toxicity studies that would inform 
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them of how dangerous the chemicals they worked with were and what to do if they 
were exposed to levels deemed to be unsafe.  Many state Networks also sought to 
make publicly available information regarding what chemicals companies were 
storing and where, as well as what chemical byproducts were being released into the 
air and water. 
Efforts to enshrine the Right to Know into the law predated the OSHA 
Networks.  Basic Right to Know concepts were at the heart of the original OSHA 
legislation in 1970, which called for the Secretary of Labor to “issue regulations 
requiring employers to maintain accurate records of employee exposures to 
potentially toxic materials or harmful agents...  Such regulations shall provide 
employees or their representatives with an opportunity to observe... monitoring or 
measuring, and to have access to the records thereof.”
504
  As it turned out, deciding 
what fell under the rubric of “potentially toxic materials or harmful agents” became a 
difficult and time-consuming task, marred by confusion, delay, and political lobbying.  
For that reason, as early as 1978, a coalition of labor, environmental, and public 
health organizations in New Jersey undertook a state level campaign to have 104 
toxic or carcinogenic chemicals labeled and the community and worker health risks 
associated with them disclosed.
505
  OSHA belatedly proposed a labeling standard for 
workplace chemicals in 1980, but in 1981 it was suspended by the agency's incoming 
leadership.
506
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Right to Know was an issue that the OSHA Network dove into almost 
immediately after its founding.  “Since the federal government has failed [to enforce 
right-to-know provisions of OSHA and Toxic Substances Control Act], we must ask 
every state legislature to act in the coming year," Network planners wrote to state 
Network leaders.
507
  The Networks found it to be a perfect fit for their needs.  
Mutually beneficial to unions and environmentalists, and capable of drawing the 
support of the community at large, Right to Know projects rapidly gained traction.  
The issue “dominated discussion" at an early Network organizational meeting, and 
within months campaigns were established in nine states, including OSHA Network 
strongholds such as Wisconsin as well as unexpected places such as Tennessee.
508
   
Under intense pressure from the Networks, their constituents, and other 
citizens groups, OSHA did finally publish a Hazard Communication Standard in 
1983.  However, that new standard was limited and considered by the Network to be 
too weak to do much good, inspiring redoubled effort on the part of the Networks.  
"The Reagan administration thought a weak OSHA standard would preempt state-
level action by labor, consumer, health and environmental groups,” Howard Samuel 
wrote two years later in the OSHA Network newsletter.  “Just the opposite has 
occurred.  More states have laws or bills pending than ever before."
509
  With states 
and localities across the country adopting their own standards, the Network also kept 
the pressure on the federal government for improved Right to Know legislation.  In 
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the wake of the Bhopal disaster, that pressure increased even more.  Howard Samuel, 
at a 1985 press conference framed the issue starkly, asserting workers "have a basic 
and fundamental right to know the dangers associated with making a living.  They are 
human beings entitled to the best protections our society can provide, not chattel to be 
used ... and disgarded when they join the ranks of the 100,000 who die... each year 
from occupational diseases caused by hazardous exposure."
510
  Community 
protections were increased shortly thereafter by the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right to Know Act (1986), but a concurrent strengthening of workplace 
protections supported by Network members – the High Risk Occupational Disease 
Notification and Prevention Act – struggled to find enough support in Congress. 
Participation in the Network accelerated the growth of health and safety issues 
within the Sierra Club and AFL-CIO and strengthened the bonds between them.  By 
the mid-1980s, toxics campaigns had become more fully integrated into the Sierra 
Club’s program than ever, absorbing an increasing amount of staff time and attention.  
Numerous articles in Sierra were devoted to toxics or workplace health, while others 
often mentioned them merely in passing, as if Club members could be assumed to be 
knowledgeable on the subject.  The Club’s 1985 electoral rundown linked those 
issues to its core wilderness organizing, tempering its disappointment at GOP success 
in the 1984 midterm elections “because Republicans since Teddy Roosevelt have 
been stalwart conservationists, and because a large number of Sierra Club members 
are Republicans, environmentalists hope to redirect the party away from those right-
wing politicians who express a knee-jerk opposition to health and safety regulations 
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  Michael McCloskey’s 1985 testimony in support of the 
High Risk Occupational Disease Notification and Prevention Act also indicated how 
thoroughly his organization was adopting toxics work.  McCloskey recounted a 
pattern of increased action in support of Right to Know legislation, but also noted that 
although the Club’s efforts in that area had only recently expanded they were felt to 
be a natural fit within the organization.  "The tradition of the Club includes support 
for the rights of everyone to information on the names, effects, places of exposure, 
uses, and methods of prudent control of toxic agents to which any of us may be 
exposed.  We have never understood, and have never accepted, the system of values 
that has created a caste of workers deprived of these fundamental rights."
512
   
Whether or not the Sierra Club would have come to this position without its 
association with labor and the OSHA/Environmental Network is impossible to say.  
This activity certainly culminated from the slow progress the Club had been making 
toward incorporating toxics issues since the 1970s. Yet the heavy focus on toxics 
issues as related specifically to the workplace (as opposed to the larger community) in 
the mid-1980s indicates that the Network influenced the thinking of Club staffers.  In 
fact, the Club practice of seeding labor-friendly articles into its journal was a tactic 
for community building that was commonly pursued by Network activists, and had 
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been considered by the Sierra Club as far back as the first meeting of its Labor 
Committee in 1973.
513
   
 Its collaborative work with the OSHA Network also likely influenced the 
Club’s decision to expand its labor programming.  The Labor Liaison committee had 
had its existence cut to a low profile “task force” in the late 1970s.  But by 1982 its 
status as a National Committee was restored, and the revitalized committee was 
pushing in all directions to publicize the Club’s “long and honorable effort… for a 
healthy and safe workplace for all citizens,” among “our natural allies – organized 
labor.”
514
  The mid 1980s also witnessed a bit of renewed interest in the Club in 
working with unions on union specific efforts.   For example, in 1983 the Club put a 
staff member in charge of tracking jobs initiatives after Brock Evans, having by then 
left his post as Sierra Club Washington Office chief and taken a spot on its volunteer 
Board of Directors, "encouraged the Club to become involved in the jobs issue stating 
that the economic situation is affecting the very lives of the earth's inhabitants.”
515
  In 
this instance the Club was again acting in the manner encouraged by OSHA Network 
leaders, who thought a useful way "of developing a good relationship between labor 
and environmentalists is to ‘cross fertilize’ – that is, to… support issues not directly 
related to public health but of deep concern to either labor or environmentalists."
516
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 The inverse was also true; the first half of the 1980s saw a growth in the 
amount of attention that labor paid to environmentalist themes.  Labor publications, 
such as the AFL-CIO News, followed the example set by the Sierra Club and 
discussed environmental issues more frequently and supportively than they had in 
previous years.  The labor press also started to draw links between the problems 
experienced by unionist and environmentalist communities by including the 
environment in otherwise non-environment related stories.  For example, in a 1981 
AFL-CIO News report on the Reagan Administration’s FY ’82 budget, workers were 
told to expect problems to arise from scaled back solar energy research & 
development and natural resource protections as well as cuts to job training and 
income support programs.
517
  Likewise, a 1983 report highlighted the similarities 
between the destruction Reagan appointees were wreaking at the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration and at the EPA, claiming that both agencies had adopted 
the same priorities in "catering to business."
518
 
Similar sentiments even found their way into the talking points of AFL-CIO 
President Lane Kirkland.  Kirkland was not generally known for his environmental 
conscience; he was firmly committed to traditional energy sources such as coal and 
nuclear power, and was more than willing to sacrifice environmental protections that 
ran counter to economic development.  But he was also willing to engage in easy 
coalition building, and in the early 1980s environmentalists were proving easy for 
organized labor to work with.  At Solidarity Day, a 1981 AFL-CIO sponsored event 
focused on expanding labor’s relationship with non-union partners, Kirkland praised 
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environmentalists for the support they had given to a variety of labor programs and 
highlighted labor’s efforts for environmental reform.  “We have been pleased to work 
with the environmental movement to enact and defend clean air and water legislation, 
toxic substances control and strict stripmining legislation.  And we have appreciated 
environmentalist support during our struggle for Labor Law Reform, to defend OSHA 
and for effective full employment legislation.”
519
  His phrasing suggests that Kirkland 
did not see the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts to be labor programs – they were to 
environmentalists what full employment legislation was to organized labor, an 
individually held interest that the other side unselfishly helped to pass.  However, as 
he emphasized the support that the two communities could provide one another with 
their particular interests, his remarks also implied that there was one important area in 
which the two’s goals overlapped: occupational and community health.  “We in labor 
have long recognized that a job which kills and cripples is not much of a job,” 
Kirkland noted.  “That a clean workplace is not worth much if our homes and 
communities lie in the midst of poisoned air and poisoned water.”
520
  The AFL-CIO 
president was equally magnanimous later that year at the Rubber Workers 
convention, lumping labor and environmentalist problems together and telling the 
assembled delegates that originated from the same causes.  The Reagan 
Administration, he intoned, “would have you believe that the President is leading a 
sort of popular liberation movement…  He proposes to liberate the construction 
industry from the prevailing wage law… [and] proposes to liberate industry from 
restrictions against polluting the air and water and against stripping the natural 
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resources that government holds in trust for the people.”  His larger point, restated for 




 Organized labor also undertook some environmentally friendly initiatives 
outside the parameters of the OSHA Network.  The IUD led the way, dividing its 
energy between three big programs – trade, organizing, and occupational health.
 522
  It 
worked for the reauthorization of Superfund, to provide the EPA with the continued 
authority to clean up toxic waste sites and sue hazardous waste polluters for damages. 
In the middle of the decade it concentrated its lobbying initiatives on securing the 
High Risk Occupational Disease Bill and a complementary Compensation Act to ease 
some of the suffering of workers who had been poisoned on the job.  The 
OSHA/Network, the IUD concluded, provided “valuable support for both bills.”
523 
 
The AFL-CIO itself also cooperated with environmental organizations for toxic 
abatement goals.  For example, in 1982 it joined with Friends of the Earth, the Sierra 
Club and four other environmental organizations in a lawsuit against the EPA, which 
refused to release data it had collected on eleven different toxic pesticides.  The 
plaintiffs argued that workers and their communities had the right to know the effect 
that producing or using these chemicals would have on their bodies.
524
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The early 1980s was an optimistic period for blue-green coalition builders.  Although 
the labor and environmental movements faced serious political threats from the rising 
tide of national conservatism, their concerted mutual action proved capable of beating 
back the most reactionary changes to the environmental and labor regulatory systems.  
Having individually concluded that workplace and community health were issues of 
dire significance, the two movements joined forces to beat back major limiting 
revisions to the Occupational Safety and Health Act.  The fight against what seems to 
be, in hindsight, a fairly unimportant piece of legislation proved significant in ways 
beyond its short-term success.  The Schweiker Bill helped take a nebulous feeling and 
a vague set of overlapping principles and crystallized them into a functioning political 
alliance.  Blue-green coalition builders used the experience as a springboard to create 
the OSHA/Environmental Network, which prospered by building on the connections, 
rhetoric, and organizing principles pioneered during the Schweiker Bill controversy.  
The Network – and its state affiliates – in turn helped to create a friendlier 
environment for environmental organizations and unions to operate even outside its 
confines.  After years of insecurity, the relationship between workers and 
environmentalists was finally stable. 
 These interactions demonstrate the need for careful examination of the activity 
of liberal political actors in the early 1980s.   Although the era is known for 
conservative ascendance, neither the labor movement nor the environmental 
movement sat idly while their gains of previous decades were wiped away.  Instead, 
they reemphasized their commitment to those values and committed themselves to a 
 251 
 
thorough defense of the status quo, establishing themselves as important actors in the 
era’s historical processes.  The two continued to push for new reforms at the state 
level, and far from adopting the decade’s supposed pro-business tone, developed a 
strong anti-corporate rhetorical position.  Though my evidence does not speak to the 
experience of all liberal social movement organizations, it suggests that historians 






Epilogue: Beginnings in the End 
 
 
While the interactions between the labor and environmental movements are often 
thought of as intermittent, or even sporadic, this characterization does not stand up to 
sustained historical scrutiny.  The twentieth century saw extensive interaction 
between organized labor and the environmental movement at the national level.  
Between 1970 and 1985, the list of cooperative endeavors undertaken between the 
two grew at a steady pace.  This growth largely took place in two distinct eras: 1970 - 
1973 and 1978 - 1985.  The first was marked by almost overwhelming optimism and 
the sense that environmental improvements could be had fairly cheaply.  It was 
during this period that the blue-green coalition’s biggest legislative triumphs were 
won and the modern regulatory state took shape through them.  The Clean Air Act, 
the Clean Water Act, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act were the key 
achievements of this alliance, which had reached its apogee by 1973.  The second 
period could almost be considered the mirror opposite of the first.  Created in an era 
of pessimism rather than optimism, neither the environmental nor the labor movement 
expected to win great victories through this alliance.  Instead, in that period’s more 
trying circumstances, “victory” was defined as successfully fighting rearguard actions 
to defend earlier gains.  In this respect some victories were won, but it was fear rather 
than hope that cemented the relationship. 
The five-year period in between was itself not bereft of labor-environmental 
interaction.  The period saw rising hostility between the two, as green blackmail 
pushed workers to reconsider how clean an environment they really needed.  But it 
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also saw some notable cooperation.  The Sierra Club defied its stereotypical image as 
an aloof, single-issue constituency and went out of its way to build bridges with 
unions.  These efforts could pay dividends in sometimes unexpected ways, as the 
Club and the United Mine Workers combined to urge new regulations that made coal 
mining both more humane and a bit more environmentally friendly.    
The first and last periods, times in which blue-green collaboration was easier 
and more obvious, tend to attract the most attention from historians.  But it is the 
middle period of the late 1970s – a time that most histories discount – that is crucial 
for properly understanding this relationship.  This period reminds us that 
collaboration is a process, not an event, and as such it has to be actively worked at.  
Even as active coalition involvement waned in the mid-1970s, important work to 
maintain or restore earlier links was being done.  This work often fell 
disproportionately on environmentalists, and included the Sierra Club’s support for 
full employment legislation and its efforts to convince organized labor – and the 
population in general – that environmental reforms could create jobs as easily as 
destroy them.  But they did not act alone.  Several labor groups, including the UAW, 
USW, and the AFL-CIO, continued to speak publicly about the need for the two sides 
to unite, and they strove to undercut job blackmail in their members’ minds.  The 
work that was done in the mid-1970s helped to ease the way back to the alliance at 
the end of the decade by keeping the participants familiar with one another and 
preventing firm ideological barriers from forming.  Having the ability to avoid 
 254 
 
problem areas was, in the words of Len Germanson, the key to the OSHA Network’s 
success.  “Instead, we link up on those issues that we feel we’re mutual on.”
525
 
The issues that labor and environmentalists could “feel mutual on” shifted 
dramatically over the decade and a half covered in this dissertation.  The early bases 
for collaboration were built on the fundamental principles of the emerging 
environmental movement: clean air, clean water, and natural resource preservation.  
These issues were uncontroversial, and enjoyed widespread support throughout the 
population.  However, as the economy turned sour in the mid-1970s many workers – 
and more than a few of their union representatives – were convinced that pollution 
controls and resource protection were injurious to the working class.  Environmental 
protections delayed infrastructure improvements, made goods more expensive by 
increasing production costs, and ultimately threatened their jobs by undermining 
industry’s bottom line.  Environmentalists pushed back against this thinking, and it 
was not embraced in all corners of the labor movement.  But the fear of the 
environmental job killer took hold well enough to make these issues – particularly 
resource protection – extremely complicated for labor leaders.  By the 1980s unions 
could embrace the theoretical idea of resource protection, and they could support the 
protection wild spaces and animals in far-off areas of the world, such as the Amazon.  
But when it came to participating in specific programs for environmental limits to 
development at home, unions always chose the path of least resistance and fewest 
perceived economic sacrifices over undisturbed wilderness.  Indeed, in the late 1980s 
labor would pursue jobs over the preservation of old growth forests in the Pacific 
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Northwest, leading to one of the most divisive episodes ever in the history of blue-
green affairs.    
Occupational safety and health also emerged early on as a potential avenue for 
cooperation.  However, over the course of a few brief experiments the issue failed to 
gain significant environmentalist support and faded from the attention of blue-green 
coalition builders.  The return to the occupational safety and health alliance in the late 
1970s and early 1980s was made possible by internal shifts within organizations such 
as the Sierra Club, which increasingly accepted the importance of environmental 
health issues in U.S. workplaces and communities.  However, the 
OSHA/Environmental Network was built as much on anxiety toward the anti-
regulatory commitments of the new Republican White House as on environmental 
dedication to OSHA, which remained a relatively minor concern for 
environmentalists.  Interestingly, the Sierra Club position continued to evolve, and 
toxic pollution of communities became an issue that it engaged with more 
aggressively and independently throughout the 1980s.  Even after the demise of the 




As an issue for inter-movement politics, energy followed a straighter but no 
less telling path than workplace health.  The energy question emerged in 1973, but it 
was not initially a troubling one.  Labor-environmental cooperation was possible in 
support of coal use as well as conservation.  Nuclear power openly split both 
movements.  But as the decade wore on and scientific knowledge of the danger of 
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carbon fuel burning improved, the environmental position shifted increasingly against 
coal.  At the same time, a labor movement that equated cheap energy with economic 
growth became more pro-coal, more pro-nuclear, and less supportive of conservation.  
Progressive unions such as the Winpisinger led IAM, who were willing to challenge 
the pro-nuclear assumptions of the labor movement, were a small minority.  
Moreover, those union leaders were constrained enough the AFL-CIO’s internal 
political dictates that they did not want to risk an open break over the anti-nuclear 
cause.  By the 1980s, energy issues had become the third rail of labor-environmental 
politics, and in the middle of the decade stepping on it could no longer be avoided. 
Historians have struggled to develop a commonly accepted periodization of 
labor-environmental politics.  When it started, when it peaked, and when it ended 
remain debatable points.  The long-term view taken by this dissertation resolves many 
of these debates not by choosing sides, but by demonstrating that the choices are 
themselves misleading.  I have argued here for a bimodal understanding of blue-green 
coalition building, with interactions rising or falling based on factors both internal 
and external to the participants.  These multiple peaks suggest that historians cannot 
identify the end of blue-green coalition building because there is no end, there is only 
the end of certain phases.  And even in off-peak periods cooperation never ceased 
entirely. 
 
Breakdown of the OSHA Network 
The end of the occupational safety and health phase came in the mid-1980s.  
Although the OSHA/Environmental Network was still officially ongoing, by 1985 its 
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period of effective existence had come to an end.  From there, cooperation between 
the labor and environmental movements decayed rapidly and outright hostility 
became the norm.  By the end of the decade, their relationship reached a nadir worse 
than any point in the 1970s.  It is difficult to account for this dramatic souring of 
relations, but a few potential causes likely combined to bring it on. 
 One of the most popular explanations revolves around the era’s inherently 
conservative atmosphere, which ultimately overwhelmed blue-green coalition 
builders by forcing them to constantly work to maintain the status quo.  There was 
little time for unity in marginal areas, this thinking goes, when fundamental positions 
of the individual movements were continually under assault.  According to Robert 
Gordon, “mainstream labor and environmental groups mobilized their resources to 
defend core values – union jobs and wage increases on the one hand, and the 
preservation of wilderness areas and endangered species on the other.  By the mid-
1980s, defense of these core values had become a top priority, and the labor and 
environmentalist alliances collapsed.”
527
  There is certainly some substance to this 
argument, as both movements were frequently forced to strike reactionary postures 
throughout the decade.  However, this explanation also begs the question why things 
changed in the middle of the decade.  The Reagan Revolution did not force the labor 
and environmental movements apart early in the decade; in fact, it was the catalyst for 
increased cooperation at that time.  What changed between 1981 and 1985 is unclear 
from this perspective.        
 The answer to what changed partially lies in the internal dynamics of the 
individual organizations.  The United Auto Workers, for instance, underwent a major 
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change of leadership in 1983, when the retiring Douglas Fraser was replaced by 
Owen Bieber.  Bieber had neither the gravitas nor the easy likeability of Fraser, and 
he also lacked his predecessor’s political savvy and deep-seated progressive streak.  It 
is possible that this new generation of UAW leaders – the first who had no connection 
to Walter Reuther – did not subscribe to the same social unionist principles that had 
guided the organization for thirty years.  As importantly, the UAW suffered a string 
of economic setbacks that embarrassed the union and hampered its ability to operate.  
Under pressure from a struggling auto industry, concessionary bargaining, which had 
begun under Fraser, became the norm.
528
  As the union hemorrhaged members and 
gave back previously won gains, rank and file rebellion simmered and, at the end of 




 By the mid-1980s, the Sierra Club was also in disarray.  The election of 
Ronald Reagan was initially a boon to Club organizing, as panicked 
environmentalists flocked to the organization and poured money into its coffers.  But 
by the middle of the decade membership was starting to decline and the organization 
was operating at a loss.
530
  The professional staff’s morale deteriorated as Club 
managers deferred wage raises, denied employee input in decision making, and added 
hours to the workweek.
531
  In 1991, after 10 percent of the staff was laid off, the 
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remaining Club employees undertook a unionization campaign of their own that 
resulted in a majority signing cards with UAW District 65.
532
  As importantly, in 
1985 Michael McCloskey was replaced as executive director by moderate Republican 
lawyer Doug Wheeler, who ostracized the staff further and resigned the position in 
little more than a year.
533
  The Board of Directors wrangled internally while they 
searched for a replacement, ultimately deciding by an eight to seen vote to hire 
Michael Fischer.  This internal “fractiousness,” to quote a word Fischer used on five 
separate occasions in describing the board in his oral history of the era, would 
certainly hamper cross-movement alliance making, as would McCloskey’s absence 
from day to day strategy planning.
534
   
 Internal discord and external politico-economic pressure may have been 
enough to spell the end for labor-environmental collaboration on their own, but at the 
same time renewed hostility over energy policy also began to grow, making relations 
between the two movements even more tense.  These new energy problems were 
more difficult to reconcile than they had been previously.  During the oil shocks of 
the 1970s, environmentalists and unions diagnosed the nation’s energy problems 
differently, but both at least recognized that the U.S. had an energy problem.  This 
common bond was no longer present in the 1980s.  Oil prices fell steadily between 
1981 and 1986; energy was now cheap and plentiful, so most people in organized 
labor saw no reason to restrain its use.
535
  Lane Kirkland’s resignation from the board 
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of the Alliance to Save Energy is symbolic of labor’s loss of commitment to any 
energy conservation, although Kirkland’s resignation itself was not particularly 
meaningful since the Federation president had almost no involvement in the 
organization to that point.
536
   
 However, wise use of resources was no longer the main issue regarding 
energy for environmentalists, who had, by the mid-1980s, come to see far more 
apocalyptic problems in the nation’s reliance on carbon energy.  Curbing acid rain 
became a primary goal of the Sierra Club early in the decade, and remained so 
throughout.  Calling it “an environmental crisis,” the Club urged Congress, the White 
House, the EPA, and state governors to take action to remediate “acid pollution [that] 
is silently choking the life in our lakes and streams [and posing] serious public health 
risks.”
537
 On the other hand, even those segments of the labor movement that 
recognized acid rain as a problem took little to no action.  The IUD, for example, was 
hesitant.  Its preferred acid rain control program called for the use of “conventional 
technology” and clean coal, but not the banning of high sulfur coal which it estimated 
would throw 32,000 miners out of work.
538
 
 Just as the acid rain issue was heating up, global warming broke rapidly from 
the world of science into the public consciousness.
539
  Its emergence as an issue of 
concern for the Sierra Club was just as ferocious.  By 1989 Club members identified 
global warming as one of the three most important issues in the country.  “Never 
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before,” wrote Executive Director Fischer, “has an issue come to the top of the Sierra 
Club agenda so quickly.  Given the magnitude of the stakes, the urgency of the hour, 
and the breadth of the problem, this seems appropriate.”
540
  But global warming was 
an issue of life or death for many in the labor movement as well, only in a different 
way.  The United Mine Workers, in particular, saw in global warming the end of coal 
mining and the end of the union.  For years the union devoted itself to fighting the 
idea of global warming’s existence, and hindering any accommodation that the labor 




But from the ashes of the occupational safety and health coalition of the 1980s, new 
labor-environmental collaboration arose in the 1990s.  This time, the alliance grew 
around opposition to the institutions of neoliberal globalization and free trade, such as 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  Ostensibly, this cooperation began in 1993, as the two movements joined 
forces to undermine support for NAFTA in opposition to the Clinton 
Administration’s free trade goals.  This collaboration initially appears to be an 
alliance of convenience, with each side’s opposition to the pact arising from the 
impact they believed it would have on their core organizing areas.  The labor 
movement saw free trade as enabling capital flight from the United States to non-
unionized countries, costing Americans jobs, weakening the labor movement in the 
U.S., and creating an overworked, low-wage class abroad.  Similarly, 
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environmentalists objected to capital’s ability to flee U.S. environmental restrictions 
or to prevent the passage of new ones by threatening to outsource production if they 
were implemented.   
 However, neither the Sierra Club nor the AFL-CIO was new to the free trade 
debate.  Both had studied the issue throughout the late 1980s, and had come to their 
opposition well in advance of NAFTA’s emergence as an issue of public concern.  As 
these positions evolved, the lessons learned by the organizations in their prior 
relationship contributed to their thinking regarding free trade.  In that way, the 
collaboration of the 1970s and early 1980s, particularly the OSHA/Environmental 
Network, continued to influence blue-green decision making even after those 
alliances declined, helping to set the stage for renewed cooperation in the early 1990s. 
As importantly, the two organizations occasionally cooperated on issues related to 
international trade pre-NAFTA period, demonstrating once again that even in an era 
of mostly hostile relations, cross-movement cooperation was still sometimes 
practical. 
 This influence was most clearly evident within the Sierra Club.  There, Club 
activists were brought into contact with international trade issues through concerns 
about pesticides.  Club leaders worried that communities could be poisoned by 
imported crops that were tainted by pesticide residue.  More disturbing, however, was 
the fact that U.S. companies were continuing to produce and sell abroad pesticides 
that were banned from the American market for their dangerous effects on people and 
non-target animals. By the mid-1980s, the Sierra Club had made curbing the use of 
agrochemicals around the world one of its primary international goals, and stopping 
 263 
 
the manufacture and sale of banned pesticides by U.S. companies was one of its chief 
tactics in that campaign.
542
 
 By that point the Club was well-versed in pesticides, having fought against 
their use in national parks and other U.S. areas since the 1960s.  However, what set 
this campaign apart from those that had come before was the important role that 
people – both foreign workers as well as foreign and domestic communities – played 
in the Club’s rhetoric.  Having worked with unions on occupational disease, the 
health concerns of those exposed to the toxic chemicals played a prominent role in the 
Club’s organizing.  International Program leader Gary Taylor’s description of the 
problem to other Club leaders shows how the issue was thought about within the 
organization’s top echelons. “At least 500,000 people,” he wrote “mostly in the Third 
world, are poisoned.  Most developed countries in the world have virtually no 
controls over export of toxic substances.  Most importing Third World countries have 
insufficient infrastructures to monitor imports or to deal medically with sickness and 
death arising from the misuse of agrochemicals.”
543
  
Club activity in the pesticide campaign also presaged the sort of cross-border, 
cross-movement organizing that NAFTA opponents would try to adopt in the early 
1990s.  A good example occurred in June of 1983. That year, the Club, along with 
U.S. farm labor organizers met with representatives from eleven Latin American 
nations in Mexico for the formation of the Latin American Pesticides Action 
Network.  The North American Network members recommitted themselves to 
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stopping the sale of particularly dangerous pesticides in Latin America and also 
pledged to push the World Bank to not fund agriculture projects that used 
agrochemicals on a large scale.
544
   
 The old alliance was also present in the AFL-CIO’s approach to globalization 
in the late 1980s, as the labor organization frequently injected environmental 
concerns into its arguments against free trade.  These issues were especially apparent 
when the Federation discussed the relationship between the U.S. and Mexico.  
Focusing most of its attention on the maquiladoras, manufacturing plants built in 
northern Mexico by foreign (largely U.S.) investors that export most of their 
products, the AFL-CIO warned that trade liberalization between the U.S. and Mexico 
in 1988 had not improved conditions in either country.  Instead, Secretary-Treasurer 
Thomas Donahue claimed, “the job losses and trade deficits are unabated... and the 
toxic waste and pollution along the border are building toward a catastrophe that is 
going to complicate the lives of Texans and Mexicans alike for generations.”
545
  In 
other instances the AFL-CIO made the Southern California furniture industry out to 
be an example of the havoc that trade liberalization could cause.  Speaking before 
Congress, Federation lobbyists argued that furniture makers had moved production to 
Tijuana to avoid California environmental regulations, with expectedly disastrous 
results. “The pollution that California sought to eliminate remains,” they concluded, 
“it merely originates a few miles away, across the border.  Workers in the U.S. have 
lost their jobs, and Mexican workers are endangered by the absence of effective 
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health and safety regulations.”
546
  Although the AFL-CIO’s engagement with the 
environmental issues arising from free trade may have been somewhat more cynical 
than the Club’s anti-pesticide initiatives, it demonstrated the labor group’s 
recognition that environmentalism was politically important and its comfort in 
discussing those issues when it needed to.  
Trade also served as an opportunity for the two organizations to reach out to 
one another on a few occasions.  For example, in 1986 Michael McCloskey (then 
serving as acting Sierra Club Executive Director) signed – along with Owen Bieber, 
Lane Kirkland, William Winpisinger, and Howard Samuel – a letter to the Senate 
demanding the strengthening of workers’ rights under the new Global Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade that was then being negotiated.
547
  Later, the AFL-CIO returned the 
favor to the Sierra Club, urging Congress to exclude “products made in an 
environmentally unsafe manner” from U.S. markets, arguing that  environmentally 
questionable production “constitutes an unfair trade practice” similar to unsafe 
working conditions or lack of unions.
548
 
 In February of 1991, when the chief executives of Canada, Mexico, and the 
United States announced that negotiations were commencing to create a free trade 
pact between the three nations, the Sierra Club, UAW, and AFL-CIO were quick to 
oppose the idea.
549
  However, no sustained inter-movement organizing arose at that 
time.  Instead, each of those organizations focused primarily on its own core interests 
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and what impact NAFTA would have on them.  They also worked to convince 
reluctant partners within their movements to oppose the pact.
550
  Thus, it was not until 
1992, when the agreement’s ratification began to be debated in Congress, that the 
Club and the AFL-CIO put aside the differences that had grown between them and 
joined forces in an effort to forestall the agreement’s ratification.   
 Lobbying together, the Sierra Club and AFL-CIO showed that blue-green 
coalition politics was not only still possible, but it was powerful.  The union 
federation took the lead in grassroots mobilization.  In 1992, it hosted a nationwide 
series of town hall meetings to persuade congressional representatives to oppose 
NAFTA.  “Where possible,” the national office advised regional planners, 
“environmental groups and other coalition organizations should be encouraged to 
participate.”
551
  The AFL-CIO Executive Council Trade Committee also staged 
numerous events throughout the year, including a conference on “Trade, Jobs, and the 
Environment” in May.
552
  Futhermore, the two organizations built a joint lobbying 
apparatus that grew increasingly strong through 1993.  Reflecting on the initiative 
later, McCloskey remembered “I found it rewarding to be working closely with the 
labor movement.... Labor gradually brought a large block of Democrats to its side, 
and we brought some more.”
553
 
 In the end, these efforts proved unsuccessful.  NAFTA was approved by 
Congress in November, 1993 and went into effect in 1994.  This defeat could have 
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led Club and AFL-CIO leaders to rebuke the resurrected coalition, but they did not.  
The NAFTA opposition always knew that it was facing long odds – NAFTA had 
early bipartisan support in Congress and was promoted by the Clinton Administration 
as a central piece of its economic agenda – but it had still nearly managed  to defeat 
the trade agreement.
554
  Moreover, the strength of the opposition created a national 
outcry and forced the Clinton Administration to negotiate a series of side agreements 
meant to ameliorate NAFTA’s worst potential side effects.  Although most of the 
documents related to what happened next remain sealed, it seems clear that support 
for a blue-green trade coalition remained high within the leadership structures of both 
labor and environmental organizations.  The two sides continued to work together on 
this issue throughout the decade, albeit more quietly than in 1992-1993.     
 Labor-environmental cooperation once again became front-page news 
in late November 1999, as massive protests by an international coalition of over 1,400 
labor organizations, human rights groups, anarchists, and environmentalists disrupted 
the Seattle Ministerial conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Because 
blue-green hostility was a political shibboleth by this time, when unionists marched 
arm in arm with environmental protestors dressed like sea turtles (to draw attention to 
the 1998 WTO decision that threatened turtle protection) under banners that read 
“Teamsters and Turtles, Together at Last,” it was an unexpected sight and well worth 
commenting on within the press.
555
  However, while it may have astonished the 
public at large, this heralded blue-green unity did not arise spontaneously in Seattle.  
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Instead, it was the product of years’ worth of concerted effort and cooperation 
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